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POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORWAY'S PROJECT COORDINATOR FOR EUREKA INTERVIEWED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Georg Parmann: "Portrait of the Week: Inge Johansen: Knowledge Is What We Have a Short Supply Of"]

[Text] We will hardly ever get to see Director Inge Johansen running naked around in the streets and shouting, "Eureka! Eureka!" His unassuming style of leadership dictates that he will use other means of marketing the new joint European research organization. When Archimedes of old sat in the bathtub and suddenly discovered the law of buoyancy, he ran out into the street and shouted his legendary "Eureka! I have found it." But Johansen will be glad to shout loudly about Eureka if it is necessary to win sympathy for the new interesting European joint research venture.

When the administrative director of the Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) has been named Norway's project coordinator for Eureka his appointment book will become still thicker. Inge Johansen is the daily leader of the biggest research council in the country, is board chairman of Statoil, and has a board appointment at the ASEV [Business Establishment and Development, Inc.] industrial development company in Trondheim. His close staff members have a tremendous job in delivering papers around the world so that they can be discussed between two meetings or at a stop. But the last two days of the week are kept sacred.

When Inge Johansen left the presidency of the Norwegian Technical College in Trondheim nearly a year ago and became a long-distance commuter to Oslo, he promised himself and his family to keep weekends free from work. Actually, his wife says that she now sees just as much of her husband as she did when he lived and worked in Trondheim. Now he gathers new strength together with his family on weekends. Attendance at church is one fixed point.

The work week begins on the plane to Oslo on Monday morning. Eureka is among the matters which occupy him a lot these days. Here he sees an opportunity to attack tomorrow's problems in a constructive manner. But Eureka will give way to just a few selected research projects. For this reason it is necessary to work on a broad front in technological and scientific research circles here at home. The best ideas and research projects are being supported.

"I am happy about the expressed positive attitude toward research we have seen from political quarters in recent times. There is a growing understanding of the fact that innovation in Norwegian industry and business is dependent on advanced research. But I am not completely sure that it has dawned on most people what extensive changes are actually taking place."

"Look, for example, at the demand for labor. Formerly a skilled worker was a firm's most important resource. Today there are many firms which have over half of their work force consisting of people with a university and college education. For example, in the Norsk Data success firm 70 percent of the employees have been educated at universities or colleges. We find such examples in most strong-growth industries today," Inge Johansen says.

"It is degreed engineers, graduates in science, doctors and engineers who will form the labor force of the future's firms. But too little has been done here at home to increase education capacities. It does not help to send some students abroad for a few years--we have to rearm here at home. I think it is frankly a shame to see young people full of initiative, prepared to go after a higher education without getting a seat in school."

"We cannot let research go in order for industry to get more of the degreed engineers it needs. The high-technology industry does not need just degreed engineers in order to be competitive. People with research competence at a high level are also needed."

"For this reason NTNF is deliberately advocating building up the training of doctoral candidates through basic research assignments. That we have a shortage of competence at all levels in all the fields which the government has designated as venture fields for Norwegian research I do not believe has sufficiently dawned on the politicians. That knowledge is in short supply here at home we can see, among other things, from salaries. While a degreed engineer in Sweden can expect a beginning salary of 9000 kroner a month, the salary in Norway is 4000 to 500 [as published] kroner higher. It should be unnecessary to say that this also affects the country's ability to compete," the NTNF director points out.

However, Inge Johansen admits that the politicians do have a theoretical understanding of this problem. But what we are talking about is tomorrow's problems. Unfortunately, politicians all too often have difficulty enough in handling today's. He would like to caution against weakness here and uses the Netherlands as an example of how it can go when short-term prosperous growth is prioritized over long-term building up of competence. The Netherlands had money from gas production on the continental shelf but did not use it to prepare itself for a time when the gas flow diminished. One result is that the country is among those with the highest unemployment in Europe today.

Inge Johansen admits that research can seem remote to Norwegian industry and management because it is long-term and people do not feel affected by it. But the day the lack of foresight has consequences for our jobs, then it is very difficult to regain what was lost.

[Question] Then it surely must be even more difficult to convince people that we should take part in something as remote as the Eureka European research program, must it not?

[Answer] "Fortunately the politicians have been very quick to comprehend what Eureka is and are supporting it. The main objective is to shorten the path from research and development to the market, so that European industry does not fall behind in relation to its competitors--the USA and Japan. The initiative for research projects in the Eureka joint venture must come from industry and business itself. But in order to bring Norwegian industry into such a joint venture we have to have something to attract with. For this reason, if Eureka is to be successful public money must be put into it also, for loans and support. It is on this point that I am concerned about having to shout loudly in order to arouse the politicians' understanding," Johansen says.

And raising his voice in order to get attention is not one of Inge Johansen's habits. He has a softspoken style of leadership. It is firm, but not authoritarian. He is quick to come to the point and makes decisions when the arguments have been heard, and short-term ulterior motives do not influence him. This is not to say that Inge Johansen does not listen to his staff members. On the contrary, he is very open to technical arguments and knows how to call on the competence which exists around him. These qualities also come in handy in his chairmanship of Statoil's board of directors.

"The job at Statoil requires perspective and special insight more than the knowledge of details. My background in terms of research and education for this reason should not be any worse than other skills for taking an assignment in Norwegian industry."

The 57-year-old chairman of the board has a solid technical background with his electronics education from the Norwegian Technical College. He became a doctor of engineering in 1957 and a professor of electric power engineering in 1959, when he was only 31 years old. He was president of NTH [Norwegian Technical College] from 1976 to 1984. He has had the chairman of the board appointment at Statoil for nearly two years. Here he is taking part in developing the State oil company both on land and in the international market.

"Important features of the further development of Statoil will take place in part on land by the sale of refined products. It is easy enough to sell crude oil when the demand is high and prices are rising. But when it is a seller's market it is important to control all parts of the market. For this reason we are now expanding with marketing preparations for refined products in Sweden. We are also extending our financial commitment on the crude oil side. We are entering promising projects abroad. We are already involved on the Dutch shelf, we are applying for rights in Denmark, and are already partly involved in projects in China," Johansen relates.

It is not just in major industrial and research contexts that Inge Johansen is involved. There is a newly established company in Trondheim, A/S Etablering og Virksomhetsutvikling [Business Establishment and Development,

Inc.] (ASEV), where he has a board appointment. ASEV has the objective of helping new firms to be set up which have their origin in technological research circles. Since its establishment a year and a half ago, 12 to 14 new knowledge-based firms have seen the light of day with their birth aided by ASEV, and he readily talks fervently about this type of purposeful work to get new firms established.

Although Inge Johansen is glad to take part in making decisions in the contexts in which he is involved, he has no problems with being content with a position as an ordinary rank-and-file member. This is the case at the Free Church in Trondheim, for example, which he changed over to a few years ago. Before this time he was active, also in a church context, as the chairman for many years of the parish council in Heimdal.

The changeover to the Evangelical Lutheran Free Church was no big step, among other things, because his wife had grown up with it. "After long consideration I became convinced that the Church and State should separate; therefore, it was easy to take the consequences and change over to the followers of the free church. I wish the Norwegian Church all well, but it is the sheerly in-principle aspects of the national church arrangement which I do not find right. The Church must be free in its testimony towards the State," Johansen says, who himself does not believe in any speedy separation between the Church and State here at home.

In addition to deriving spiritual inspiration from his church, Inge Johansen likes to derive inspiration from nature, and first and foremost from the family's sanctuary in Kvikne. Fortunately, his area was not affected by the Orkla development; otherwise the electronic engineer could perhaps have come into conflict with himself. Although, we have no doubt that in this context too he would have managed splendidly to separate private interests from his professional involvement.

And it is precisely this solid professional involvement which has made Inge Johansen a new and important source of inspiration at his main job at NTNF. He entered the research field when it was in the middle of an extensive process of becoming independent, in which united research institutions were to be converted into independent establishments. This process is on the point of being completed, and he has his share of the credit for the fact that the slight uneasiness which characterized some institutes has now been turned into new optimism and push. It is with the same optimism that he tirelessly, day after day, is working for Norwegian business and management to get constantly better research programs in the field of science and technology.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

MARTENS, GEENS, MONFILS, WATHELET ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Jan 86 p 6

[Interview with Wilfried Martens, prime minister; Gaston Geens, president of the Flemish Executive; Philippe Monfils, president of the French Community Executive; and Melchior Wathelet, president of the Walloon Community, at the editorial offices of LE SOIR by Guy Duplat, Catherine Ferrant and Yvon Toussaint: "Martens, Geens, Monfils, Wathelet: the Quartet Who Will Dominate Belgium Practice Their Scales at LE SOIR"; date not given]

[Text] Meeting in the editorial offices of LE SOIR, these four "prime ministers" who belong to three different political formations, discussed the policies they intend to conduct within their respective spheres of power. It was an opportunity to discover through their statements, their intentions and their innuendos, the manner -- whether harmonious or not -- in which the complex structures of our national, community and regional institutions function.

1. Allegro or "the Land of Smiles"

Question: The fact that the same liberal-Christian majority exists in all the executives and in the national government evidently arouses hope... Does it promise what Mr Martens calls a "second chance" for our institutions?

Wilfried Martens: The results of the last elections and the seating of the same majority everywhere provides a new chance to reform our institutions. I have always been convinced that the beginning of regionalization in Belgium would be difficult. But I was very unhappy to see how the committee for dialogue among the executives had become a confrontation ground instead of being the place where agreements are developed. I hope and I am convinced that the fact that there is the same majority everywhere will not prevent the executives from demanding what they have a right to. But I hope that henceforth the shock of different majorities will not cloud the issues.

Question: The committee for dialogue regularly brings together the presidents of the executives and representatives of the central government. It is charged with settling conflicts of interest -- simply by consensus. Every time someone thinks that the other has trespassed on his preserve and has wronged him, he can have recourse to the committee for dialogue. But those meetings rapidly became lengthy monologues, unconnected and sterile.

Gaston Geens: I have known the committee for dialogue since its origin. It worked badly. For various reasons. Even when it developed an agreement in matters of tourism, I had to note that the national government -- Minister De Croo in this case -- did not respect it. The national ministers involved should also come to the committee meetings. As for Mr Dehousse, he sometimes came to the committee with subjects which it had nothing to do with, such as the problem of milk cows in Wallonia, which concerns Europe and not the committee for dialogue. We are willing to play the game of "federal loyalty," -- our agreement for the Flemish Executive explicitly states so -- but for that everyone must be loyal!

Philippe Monfils: For 4 years, the Walloon Region and the French Community were often at war with the national government, while an agreement could easily have been reached. And that because of the different majorities. I am thinking of the quarrel about arts education, which was widely talked about, while today we have no problem in admitting that it really is a matter of Community authority. But when different majorities oppose one another, everyone thinks he would demean himself if he were to give in one inch of his prerogatives. I will not accept having the authority of the Community gnawed at, but I think that the committee for dialogue should occupy itself solely with important things. Or else, for having endlessly cried wolf, they won't see the wolf when he appears...

Melchior Wathelet: The same majorities may be an opportunity, but I say it straight away: that does not mean that we will give up any part of our authority...

Geens and Monfils: Agreed! Agreed!

Wathelet: We must stop making conflict the objective and, on the contrary, take the resolution of conflict as the objective. And for that, I don't think that it is useful to go to the committee for dialogue all the time. The work being done there would be bad. Let us first try to solve the problems directly. I would like it if, in addition to the committee for dialogue, there were also another meeting place where the executives and the central government could tackle their relationships in a constructive manner this time.

Martens: The objective within the committee for dialogue actually was confrontation. But to function well, the federal system must include common actions. We should also use this committee to construct. That is also federal loyalty.

Monfils: While each one of us remains in his own sphere of authority, it is in all our interests to work together. I am thinking about home care, which it is beneficial to couple to action by the central government in matters of health care. I am thinking about the audiovisual field and local radio stations, for which we need decisions by the national government in matters of allocations of frequency and of advertising.

Martens (laughing): I have also become minister for the PTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telephone].

Wathelet: Federalism is not built by developing one's image at the expense of others! That is particularly important in this transition period. We sometimes have to say white to the regional council, in order to say black next to the national parliament. Let us avoid that. Besides, I wonder whether to solve certain conflicts the authority of the arbitration court should not be expanded.

2. Ma Non Troppo or "the Exportation of Conflicts"

Question: A large number of past and future difficulties among the Regions, the Communities and the central government are the result of the laws of August 1980 themselves, which have sometimes broken up intimately complementary authorities (Mr Monfils made reference to it in talking about home care and the audiovisual field), and which served to put precisely on the same footing, without any degree of subordination, decisions made by the national government and those made by the executives. Foreign relations provided a good example of the imbroglio this could produce.

The two Communities can negotiate cultural treaties with other countries, treaties which must however be signed by the king. The Regions can canvass for specific business (we have seen Walloon and Flemish missions succeed one another and oppose one another in Japan, in Quebec, and in the United States). Our national diplomats -- too often -- don't understand anything about it and sometimes refuse to play the game of regionalized Belgium.

Geens: The executives and the national government actually form independent columns working side by side without subordination. However, the national column remains the largest.

Martens: But you are slimmer!

Geens: It is true that you have more fat! As far as foreign relations are concerned, the state reform is not complete. It isn't normal that in community matters the executives are completely autonomous, except for the signing of treaties. And it is curious that we, in the Regions, have the authority to attract foreign investors, but that we are only associated with the national government's actions in this area. It is true that some ministers didn't play the game, but we are determined to work with Belgian diplomacy. There is no problem there.

Monfisl: The law is the law, we repeat it. We have the right to negotiate the treaties and to be represented at UNESCO and the United Nations.

Geens: With their Regions and their Communities, the Belgian delegations are becoming impressive.

Monfils: It is true that some people laugh about them. But we consult one another and speak with one voice. The French speakers in any case want to be present at those different forums. As for our embassies, they sometimes welcome us badly. They treat us as "sub-ministers," as "false ministers." We are not at your disposal, they say. Some older diplomats seem not to have read the laws of 1980. It must be said that the postal system is sometimes slow.

Question: What are you going to do about Mr Outers in Paris?

Monfils: We will not take his salary away from him! But I was not directly involved in his nomination as ambassador.

Wathelet: We want to cooperate in the international area with the French community in order to be more effective. In everything I have done over the last 4 years in the Walloon Region, I have always found the cooperation I wanted among our diplomats. I did not appoint any ambassadors, but a few technological attaches such as in Japan. I think that it is necessary for young diplomats not to be content with a visit to the National Bank, but also pay a visit to our new institutions. But it is not in our interest to be competing abroad. We should not build our positive image on the negative of the other.

Question: Mr Martens, do you share Mr Tindemans' irritation with those parallel diplomacies?

Martens: One should not be surprised about difficult starts. The FRG experienced the same thing. And our texts are very progressive, in matters of cultural treaties for example. However, one should not create a diplomatic corps for the Regions and the Communities. The Regions and the Communities must be able to entrust tasks to our diplomatic corps. Our diplomats, our civil servants must play fair with the Regions and the Communities and respect their authority. The irritated reactions of some countries are sometimes due to their own situation. Japan and China, for example, have a hard time understanding that a country might present itself as not completely united.

3. Vivace or "To Each His Own Truth"

Question: As soon as you touch the direct interests of a region or a community you see the resurgence of antagonisms. For certain issues, Christian, liberal or socialist are only first names. The last name remains that of the community or the region.

How will you finance the Limburg mines once the national envelope has been exhausted?

Geens: That is the easiest problem... well, that is a jest. It is a serious problem. However, it is necessary that the French speakers know this: our coal mines are still financed by the national envelope, whereas they have already exhausted their rights of succession to repay the Cockerill-Sambre loans 15 years ago. We, however, will be able to borrow 37 billion francs.

Martens: The National Company of the national sectors could proceed with such a loan, but by using the succession rights in Flanders, until the year 2005!

When the enormous battle raged about Walloon steel and the five national sectors, I was conscious of the fact that there were also the coal mines. The problem was on both sides. I repeat, as I said then, that if people want to regionalize those national sectors, this can be done by ordinary royal decree approved by the regional Executives.

Question: Another apple of discord: Brussels. You, Mr Geens, have stated that it was a ripe apple ready to fall into the hands of Flanders?

Geens: Yes, that is right. A great many things have changed in the field, and in Brussels people are increasingly aware of the fact that they should have more than preferential ties with the Flemish. Flanders is in better health than the other regions, that is a fact, even though I regret it, because to maintain an economic and monetary unity implies that all regions have coherent economic policies. As for the Walloons, they have left Brussels. That has done them a great deal of harm. I was approached from everywhere to purchase the land and the deserted buildings.

Monfils: Our capital is Brussels. It is a battle for all French speakers and we are present there. I am surprised at Mr Geens' arrogance. It is that of an idol with feet of clay. Flanders Technology was a beautiful display window, but I have been told that it was in part an empty envelope. The Festival of Flanders is monolithic: in the face of that, the French speakers have nothing to blush about. We are determined to keep Brussels and to continue to subsidize the bodies established in the municipalities with language facilities and in Fourons.

Wathelet: We have decided to keep the Walloon Executive in Brussels. I am increasingly convinced that a transfer to Namur would not have been good for Wallonia. It was not at the moment when Brussels was becoming a multi-functional capital (national, European... and Flemish) that we should abandon it. And I stress that the Flemish have chosen Brussels as their capital even though it is not located on the territory of their region any more than it is located on the territory of Wallonia. Furthermore, within the framework of federal loyalty, Brussels must be a center of equilibrium. I don't agree when Mr Geens talks about a ripe fruit. I want Brussels to be the capital of everyone.

Martens: During the government negotiations I noticed for the first time that both French speaking and Flemish inhabitants of Brussels were asking for the same thing when the subject was town planning or regional development. Without input from both camps, there will never be a solution for Brussels. Because basically, in terms of political status, the solution found in the Egmont pact has failed. We have to try again. Things are beginning to ripen for finding a status for Brussels. The government will support the search for a solution, but parliament is where it will have to happen.

Question: Let us turn to the issue of government contracts. Does it bother you, Mr Geens, that the minister of national defence is a French speaker?

Geens: The national ministers must be national.

Question: Do you want regional distribution keys for government contracts?

Geens: Keys have been provided for the Ministry of National Defence. They must be implemented. But for contracts with the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration], there is no key. The law must be respected on the public market places. And may the best win.

Wathelet: I don't agree with Mr Geens' principle which says that everything that is his is his, but that everything that is someone else's is negotiable. Whether it is a matter of government contracts or of other things, we have to end up with harmonious development for all the regions. All federalized countries do the same. As for the RTT issue, we believe that we can find a solution by enlarging the pie, by advocating technological advances for our country which would benefit all the regions.

Martens: I repeat that I have taken the PTT under my authority. Hence, I will concern myself with what has been called the "contract of the century." I believe that everybody is happy that I have become the arbitrator. But I won't make any earth shattering statements today. Telecommunications are too important... they are the highways of the future.

Question: Mr Monfils, you don't have the problems of the coal mines or government contracts to deal with, but rather those of the audiovisual field. What do you expect from the central government?

Monfils: We want to go very fast in matters of local television broadcasting, of pay television, of cable television, and for the RTBF [Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television System (French Service)]. We want everything to be introduced before the council of the Community and voted on before Easter, to take advantage of the usual honeymoon period during the first months of a new administration. In terms of local radio stations, we have already made several important decisions. We are asking the government to put the bill on commercial advertising to a vote very quickly and to expand the range of frequencies available to local radio stations. We cannot go below 100 MHz today. We would also like to use the 88-100 MHz range in order to set up large regional radio stations with a power range of 30 kilometers. Our goal is to achieve peace on the waves and, in order to avoid war, the government will have to act very quickly.

Martens: I have become responsible not only for the "contract of the century," but also for the audiovisual field, as supervisory minister for the Secretariat of State for PTT! There are areas which interest me enormously. The audiovisual issue is our main priority, even when taking into account the special powers. As a matter of fact, I foresee a terrible battle in parliament, because our bill will drastically change the audiovisual scenery, as is going on in France.

4. Finale or "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall"

Question: In the understanding which exists between a couple, a great deal ultimately depends on the image each has of the other. If it is a negative one, the risks of divorce remain real.

Geens: Wallonia is dying of socialism. Those gentlemen, Wathelet and Monfils, have an historic opportunity to put an end to that process. In Wallonia, initiative has been killed. It was a question of "being red or no bread." The result of that: there are three times as many people in their city halls than in ours. And in Brussels it is even worse.

Wathelet: I don't have the same statistics.

Geens: If the differences between the economies become such that the financial transfers from one region to the other become unbearable, that will be the end of Belgium. We have already contributed to national solidarity via social security, for example, and via subsidies. Don't ask for anything more; that is all.

Monfils: Mr Geens' attitude is arrogant, I repeat. I myself, have neither fear of nor admiration for Flanders. Only great caution.

Wathelet: I will put all my efforts into further improving the image of Wallonia. And I won't do it through comparative advertising which consists of increasing one's standing by denigrating the other. I don't go along with Mr Geens talking about a two-speed Belgium or about an economic and monetary unity that is threatened, because that isn't true. I would also say that Mr Geens has put an end to solidarity rather quickly. The debate should be broadened, to look at what has been done over the last 10 to 15 years, at what will happen tomorrow.

I will have to talk about it to Flanders, because its inhabitants don't know us very well at all. I personally have a calm image of Flanders. It is neither hell nor Peru. They have other assets than we do and they use them differently, that is all. That is what regionalization is all about.

Martens: I have always been in favor of a sizable autonomy for the regions and the communities. I even said it at a time when it was hard to state such things. The autonomy of Flanders I advocated also meant the autonomy of Wallonia. The emancipation of the Flemish people also carries with it the emancipation of the Walloon people. However, I remain convinced that we can not only solve our problems but go beyond them without for all that returning to unitarism or thinking about provincial federalism. The happiness of some can never be allowed to mean the unhappiness of others. I was worried about today's exchange of views. I was aware of the risks it entailed. But at the end of this debate, the idea that a second chance is possible for our institutions seems even more well-founded to me!

8463

CSO: 3619/19

POLITICAL

DENMARK

POLL INDICATES ELECTION WOULD BRING LEFTIST MAJORITY

Big Gains for Greens

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Jan 86 pp 1, 8

[Article by Ole Dall: "Gallup Poll Shows Red Majority and Green Representation in Folketing"]

[Text] The year's first Gallup poll is a grave warning to the four-party government and the party supporting it on economic policy, the Radical Liberal Party. Even without the aid of the seats for the Greenland and Faeroe Islands representatives, the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party [SF] and the Left-Socialist Party [VS] received a combined total of 90 seats--an absolute majority. In terms of percentages the socialist parties had the support of 50.2 percent of the respondents.

The Green Party appeared on the Gallup "score board" for the first time with a rating of 2.3 percent. That would mean four Green Folketing members and it is not known what type of government they would support. An election now would be a catastrophe for the Progressive Party which would be eliminated from Folketing. Last month's Gallup poll also put the party under the 2 percent cutoff limit.

The Conservative Party was the only one of the four government parties that registered a modest gain of a single seat. The Liberals declined almost a percentage point compared to the last survey, but the party's support is almost at the level it had in the 1984 election. The Christian People's Party is heading for the edge of the cliff with a rating of only 2.1 percent. And finally the Center-Democrats [CD] would lose three of their eight seats in an election at this time. But the CD people can console themselves with the thought that they have once more risen above the cutoff limit.

The Radical Liberals are still below their last election result. This time the Gallup poll indicates a loss of two seats for the party.

SF is the big winner on the left. SF would win six seats while the Social Democrats would get only two extra seats in Folketing.

The Gallup poll was conducted from 1 to 19 December. The government presented its "Christmas package" on 5 December and 3 days later the government parties and the Radical Liberals had negotiated an agreement.

Table 1. Distribution of Folketing Seats

<u>Party</u>	<u>Poll</u>	<u>1984 Election</u>
Social Democrats	58	56
Radical Liberals	8	10
Conservatives	43	42
Socialist People's Party	27	21
Green Party	5	0
Center-Democrats	5	8
Christian People's Party	4	5
Liberals	21	22
Left-Socialists	5	5
Progressives	0	6

Table 2. Political Index

Question: "Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow?" Polling period: 1 to 19 December 1985. Answers in percentages.

<u>Party</u>	<u>10 Jan 1984</u>	<u>Aug 1985</u>	<u>Sep 1985</u>	<u>Oct 1985</u>	<u>Nov 1985</u>	<u>Dec 1985</u>
Social Democrats	31.6	31.4	33.0	30.9	33.4	32.5
Radical Liberals	5.5	4.6	4.1	4.8	4.6	4.2
Conservatives	23.4	23.7	26.2	25.2	24.8	24.0
Single-Tax Party	1.5	--	--	--	--	--
Socialist People's Party	11.5	13.4	11.9	13.2	13.8	15.1
Green Party	--	--	--	--	--	2.3
Humanist Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
International Socialist						
Workers' Party	0.1	--	--	--	--	--
Communist Party	0.7	--	--	--	--	--
Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	--	--	--	--	--
Center-Democrats	4.6	4.3	4.3	3.4	--	2.7
Christian People's Party	2.7	3.2	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.1
Liberals	12.1	11.6	10.8	11.1	12.8	11.9
Left-Socialist Party	2.7	--	2.3	2.9	2.6	2.6
Progressives	3.6	2.7	2.3	2.6	--	--
Other parties*	--	5.1	2.7	3.2	5.6	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes.

Source: Gallup Institute and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Liberals Add Folketing Seats

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 86 p 7

[Text] Greenland representative Otto Steenholdt, who used to be a member of the Social Democratic Folketing group, has now joined the Liberal group. This brings the Liberal group, which already included Faeroese representative Pauli Ellefsen, up to 24 members.

6578
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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS RESIST PROPOSED JOB CLASSIFICATIONS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by Peter Phillips: "Professors Fear that 'Excessive Economy' and 'Arbitrariness' Will Drive Younger Generation Out of Universities"]

[Text] The quarrel between university professors and Federal Government is already outlined at the beginning of the new year: the bone of contention stems from the revision of the basic law on universities (HRG), more precisely from the resultant new regulation of "Federal Pay Plan C", which is to be debated and passed by the Bundestag in the coming weeks. Gerth Dorff, executive secretary of the Association of Universities, told DIE WELT: "All in all, this bill makes a mockery of the constant protestations by the federal and land governments that they wish to promote the younger scientific generation, meaning research and teaching."

From the beginning, one of the major concerns of the HRG revision had been the intention--also supported by the highest court decision--to change the personnel structure at universities: the "title of professor now applied as appropriate to the office," initiated by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of June 1983 (Dorff) is part of it, but above all it is the elimination of university assistants and professors of pay scale C-2, who are again to be replaced by scientific assistants, senior assistants and senior engineers (each as temporary civil servants), and university lecturers (both as temporary and permanent civil servants) to be working at universities.

After some back and forth, all this was accepted in principle by the Association of Universities, representing the professors' interests, at the advisory level. The fight broke out only after the "working group of federal and land education advisors", after establishing the new job titles, had also worked out the corresponding pay scales. Dorff: "They (the civil servants) had only one goal, namely, to save."

Too Schematic?

In the opinion of the association, this "led to a solution which even falls short of the pay scale which the Laender had granted in their land pay scale H to their scientific assistants, senior assistants, senior engineers and college and university lecturers prior to the introduction

of federal pay scale C, i.e., before 1975." Furthermore, the so-called "position key," according to which the highest number of positions in the various pay groups are distributed among the Laender, is "schematic," "arbitrary", and leaves "no room for a policy of scientific considerations."

For one thing, the entire group of assistants is to be taken out of the C-pay scale created for universities and transferred to the A-pay scale established for career civil servants. Lecturers--as limited-time civil servants--are also to be shifted to the A-pay scale, while their lecturer colleagues with permanent status, although with the same qualifications and employed in the same capacity, are to be classified under the better paying C-pay scale. The president of the Association of Universities, Cologne international law expert Hartmut Schiedermair, speaks in this context of "arbitrariness" and "contrary to the system" and states: "Acquiring tenure at an average age of 38 years, these civil servants (senior assistants, senior engineers) have qualifications which surpass by far the demands placed on mid-level career civil servants." Furthermore, they also have to prepare and give lectures on their own, so that it is "imperative" that they, like the university lecturers hired permanently, "are put in the C-2 pay scale."

At present, the university association still hopes for the understanding of those politically responsible. For this reason, Dorff stated to DIE WELT: "There is a big difference between a minister giving a public speech on promoting the younger scientific generation and the discussions and decisions made by high officials of the finance ministries on their pay scale." And Schiedermair added: "Any university is only as good as its professors."

To Promote Competition

The inflexible position key should, therefore, be eliminated "without substitution" from the federal pay scale law, and "development of plans for positions at the universities should be given back to the Laender." "Only in this manner can competition among the Laender and the universities be promoted meaningfully." Furthermore, a "professorship at the C-3 pay scale level is not tempting for an outstanding scientist." In order to prevent his switching to industry or going abroad and keep him in university research, one must be able to react flexibly in the position plan, perhaps by creating a C-4 professorship. Schiedermair: "Any position key in the university field carries the seal of arbitrariness."

9917
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POLITICAL

FINLAND

SORSA IN INTERVIEW RETRACTS PLEDGE TO STEP DOWN AS SDP CHIEF

Still Undecided About Parliament

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Dec 85 p 13

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa by Anneli Sundberg: "One Decision Has Taken Shape, Another Is Now Being Considered; Sorsa Is Now Considering Leaving Parliament"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa will be available to serve as Social Democratic Party (SDP) chairman in the future as well.

On the other hand, he has not decided whether he will still run as a candidate in the next parliamentary elections. "The chairman of the SDP doesn't necessarily have to be in Parliament."

On Friday Sorsa thought that he might well stay on as a politician for the rest of his life. It is getting to be too late for a change of career.

In the gray of winter Helsinkians dash about Senaatintori during the Christmas rush unaware that a man who will evidently spend the rest of his life on the back seat of a black car is watching them a bit enviously from a corner window of the yellow Council of State building.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa has made a personal choice. A bunch of red roses on the prime minister's desk reminds us of this.

Sorsa will be available when the SDP elects a chairman in 1987.

The decision was announced in this morning's paper.

Sorsa described his mood as somewhat sad but thought that his sadness would disappear after taking a rest in his Christmas vacation cabin.

The Christmas of candidates to succeed him may be less calm since Sorsa is no longer specifying the duration of his leadership of the party.

"One has to learn something from one's mistakes."

He said that he has laid to rest the times for a change of career and that he is preparing himself to remain a lifelong politician, although not necessarily chairman of the SDP.

[Question] What other job could there be?

[Answer] Even in such a small country there are a few of them.

[Question] The presidency?

[Answer] We have a man who will continue to be president for yet a long time to come. I believe that it isn't wise for anyone to overly trouble himself about it. What will happen to them is what happens to those who overly trouble themselves about it.

[Question] Have you thought about getting ready to run against Paavo Vayrynen, for example, in the 1994 presidential elections?

[Answer] I say to you in all truth that I haven't troubled myself over it, nor will I trouble myself before -- when and if -- the situation begins to appear to be such that I have to seriously take a stand on it.

Nothing indicates that I should decide on my position quickly. Mauno Koivisto may be in office for a third term since nowhere is it ordained that he will be a two-term president.

"Nowhere," Sorsa was emphatic.

A Chat with Koivisto

[Question] Did you discuss the matter with the president before making your decision on the chairmanship?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Did his opinion have any influence on you?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Much?

[Answer] It naturally carried most weight in connection with opinions on individual matters.

Sorsa did not want to talk about the details of the discussion.

[Question] Do you keep in regular contact with the president through discussions?

[Answer] We regularly discuss matters once a week on Fridays and, in addition, occasionally, at least 6 to 10 times a month.

The news of Minister Kaarina Suonio's transfer to Tampere as assistant city manager reached him a couple of days before Sorsa officially announced that he would be available as chairman in the future too.

Suonio's departure means that a considerable number of Social Democratic votes will be released in the Helsinki election district. It has been claimed that these influenced Sorsa's decision. The number of his own votes has been declining.

Aside from being low-brow, these claims about Sorsa are also erroneous.

First, Sorsa feels that the people who make these claims' logic is elementary; there is absolutely no causal connection, even if things were to happen in succession.

Second, Sorsa pointed out that he should be in no rush [to decide] during the next elections either.

"The number of votes I command no longer moves through the clouds as it did when people were attracted by my newness, but it is not a low figure either."

Third, Sorsa pointed out that he had not yet made up his mind whether he would run as a candidate at all in the next parliamentary elections.

"The chairman does not necessarily have to be in Parliament. That matter too has to be considered separately."

[Question] Are you averse to a personal fight for votes?

[Answer] There are undesirable features in that. The long-ticket system would not impose as big a burden on relations between candidates as the present system does, nor would it persuade people to behave in a way in which they would not otherwise act, tripping others up and muzzling them.

Lasting Administration Must Be Supported

[Question] Would the post of prime minister appeal to you in the future too?

[Answer] Sure, this is a good job. You meet people in it.

It looks as though Sorsa's current administration will remain in office until the end of the election term. There has been little change of personnel. So far only one minister has left for another position.

In Sorsa's opinion, the advantages of low turnover are greater than the disadvantages.

"When an administration has a long term in which to function, it has the time to get its economic policy into such shape that results begin to show. Ministers have enough time to familiarize themselves with their duties and are able to master them and also control their officials. One's political will

is exercised better than in a short-term administration. The disadvantages are, of course, that a career minister can start looking at the job as a meal ticket, and the press has no variety."

Ministers Suonio and Ahti Pekkala will be leaving for other positions in the spring.

[Question] Will there be a bigger reshuffle in the administration?

[Answer] No.

Sorsa was of the opinion that no partner in the government has a desire for any major alterations, although the ministerial posts that are to become vacant are indeed tempting.

In his opinion, in neither of the two big government parties have they seriously tried to topple the government.

"I have full confidence in even the party secretaries."

There May Be Ministerial Material Among the Greens

Sorsa believes that the Center-Left government will continue to exist even after the next elections. He noted that it is not the only alternative, but the most likely, perhaps appropriately supplemented.

He mentioned the Rural Party and the Greens as possible additions. According to Sorsa, the Greens' chances really depend to a great extent on how it goes for them in the elections and on whether they become a party or not.

Allied with the Center Party, the Christian Leaguers too may, at least as individuals, be proposed as additional ministers, but Sorsa doubts whether they would be able to carry out a joint government platform with them.

"As I see it, the Christian Leaguers are Finland's most conservative party."

Even Kekkonen Met Them Halfway

Sorsa was hard on the Conservative Party.

"I regard an alternative whereby the Social Democrats and the Right would be part of a government coalition as neither lasting nor desirable."

Sorsa complained that the Conservative Party does not want to acknowledge that its majority is composed of city-dwelling Centrists. He supposes that the reason for this is that the party fears it will lose conservative votes.

"For as long as the Conservative Party wants to be a right-wing party, I wish them bon voyage!"

The way things look now, according to Sorsa, there will be no government deals after the elections. Nothing points to such a development.

"If the Conservatives want to form a government coalition with us, they will have to move loudly and clearly to the Center. Even Kekkonen met us halfway."

In Sorsa's opinion, a party the size of the SDP cannot resign itself to being in the opposition, even if the elections were to go badly.

"It's hard for the biggest party in any country and, since it furthermore happens to be the case that we are the president's party, that too produces its own pressures."

It has been predicted that the coming winter labor negotiations will be so difficult that the government too will be rocked. Sorsa nevertheless feels that the atmosphere has improved and that the willingness to conclude an extensive wage settlement has grown.

[Question] Do you intend to take a hand in the wage negotiations?

[Answer] I hope that it won't be necessary, but, if the need arises, I'll be ready, like a shoemaker is for war.

According to what Sorsa said, the government has nothing to give for 1986, but the distribution of funds for 1987 to stimulate recovery could already be discussed. It is futile to hope for an agreement shorter than 2 years, according to the government.

In Sorsa's opinion, there can be no question of marginal tax reform alone. He feels that it could be accomplished only as apart of a bigger tax reform.

Sorsa predicted that the fight would be intensified in the labor union movement because of the Communists' civil war.

"An unfortunate vicious cycle is developing in the Left, one which probably no one intentionally wants. Relations are worsening and clashes are becoming more frequent."

In Sorsa's opinion, once the Communists get their relations among themselves straightened out, there would be reason for them to sit down together and consider a bit what damages have been done.

Koivisto Seen Benefiting

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Sorsa's Promise Eases Koivisto's Position"]

[Text] Having almost reached the point of being ridiculous, the "will not stay on -- stay on" game Kalevi Sorsa has been playing with regard to his future as chairman of the SDP is fortunately finally over. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Sorsa's original intention to resign, doing

so has long since shown itself to be politically most unlikely. This is why his public indecision and postponement from month to month of an announcement that he would stay on were rapidly developing into a shoddy political spectacle.

In moving from the overly long Kekkonen era to the Koivisto era, Prime Minister Sorsa is in part deservedly viewed as a mainstay of the consensus on domestic policy and even as a guarantor of it. Domestic policy has not produced any problems for the president either. For the first time it appears that the same government will remain in office for the entire election term.

Nevertheless, threatening clouds are building up on the horizon, clouds that may prove to be a serious challenge, especially to the government caretaker party, the SDP, and to the president who has risen from its ranks. Probably of most concern to them is the Communist Party's (SKP) definitive split and its effects on the balance of power in Parliament, collaboration with the Left, the labor union movement, the atmosphere of consensus and perhaps even the premises underlying foreign policy.

Support for the Left has been declining for a long time. The SKP split and the fact that the SKP will have to enter the 1987 parliamentary elections on two different tickets may halve the number of seats the Communists have in Parliament. Nor can a possible SDP victory compensate for such a loss either, one which will only strengthen the nonsocialist majority in Parliament.

The SKP will not get into Parliament nor will it become a coalition partner of the SDP during the next few years. The fight against the Stalinist minority is forcing the moderate leadership of the SKP to accentuate the line drawn between it and the Social Democrats. It also throws a cloud over its chances of cooperation in labor movement circles. It is precisely there that the Communists may try to rally forces and build the basis for a new ascent. The first sacrifice produced by this fight would appear to be the consensus that has existed up to now.

In the nonsocialist wing of Parliament Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has succeeded in creating a four-party centrist alliance, bearing in mind the next elections, one which the Christian Leaguers have been pulled off the sidelines to join as an addition to the KEPU [Center Party], the Liberals and the RKP [Swedish People's Party]. If the election coalition is realized to the extent planned, the government caretaker party may clearly lose out in negotiating with the KEPU on a continuation of the Center-Left coalition.

Having a party leader's duties remain in the same hands for 15 years is hardly a purely good thing for any party whatsoever. Since Sorsa has from year to year simultaneously served as prime minister in a multiparty government, the SDP's ideological profile has of necessity been lowered. This is why more and more voices are beginning to be heard in the party in favor of moving into the opposition. This would mean a considerable overturning of Koivisto era political arrangements.

Now that Sorsa has confirmed the fact that he will continue in politics and stay on as head of the SDP after 1987 as well, above all the president has

heaved a sigh of relief. It does not pay to underestimate Sorsa's political influence, but talk of the SDP's making an effort to voluntarily enter the opposition can be forgotten.

Sorsa is known to be a firm supporter of a Center-Left coalition. Taking the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] into the government after the last elections, on the other hand, demonstrated that he may be prepared to look for a government coalition in surprising directions if need be. KEPU party secretary Seppo Kaariainen has already had occasion to express his concern over the SDP's gambling on a Conservative card.

Other Newspapers Comment

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Dec 85 p 5

[Editorial roundup]

[Text] Sorsa Should Be Supported

In his column in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI columnist Aimo Kairamo (Social Democrat) gives instructions to the Social Democrats as to what they ought to do now that Kalevi Sorsa has consented to stay on as chairman of the SDP: "Since we upheld him, we should also support him."

"I don't mean anything like raising him onto a pedestal or bowing to his image. A great deal of that is generated by old organization habits and government practices without even trying," Kairamo writes.

"I don't mean that the chairman should refrain from criticism either. Both relevant and irrelevant criticism is the role of a political leader. Thanks are mostly carved on tombstones.

"What I mean most is that we ought to stop spreading the notion that this country's wage policy decisions and moderate economic policies are made for Sorsa personally and not for the nation at all. Too often explaining after the fact that it would have turned out better, but since Sorsa didn't..., is to no purpose for many other factors.

"If we don't need altars for religious services in a democratic worker party, we don't need either for one man to really be raised above the others, but on a cross, and for the rest to be hanging onto his toes to weigh him down."

Communists Are Surprised

The organ of the moderate Communist wing, KANSAN UUTISTEN VIIKKOLEHTI, cannot accept SDP chairman Kalevi Sorsa's appraisal of future relations between the Social Democrats and the Communists.

"Sorsa explains that the moderate Communists will now be increasingly attacking the SDP in the labor union movement for tactical reasons. This surprising

appraisal does not hold true. If the SDP's difficulties in the labor union movement have increased, the reason lies somewhere else than in the Communist or SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] policy lines.

"The source of the problems is probably primarily to be sought in the the SDP's own decisions relating to labor union policy, perhaps also in changes in labor union movement members' way of thinking."

Vayrynen Is Suspicious of the SDP

In Paavo's column in the party organ, SUOMENMAA, KEPU chairman Paavo Vayrynen reexamines his favorite subject, the affairs of the capital. Vayrynen reveals that he is suspicious of the coalition planned by the SDP and the Conservative Party.

"The discussion of capital district problems (in Parliament) has of necessity given rise to the suspicion that some Social Democrats are deliberately trying to put together a conservative-Left coalition instead of the present Center-Left coalition. Or how else can we explain the fact that many Social Democrats are fraternizing with Conservatives in opposition to the policy set by the capital district program approved by the government and in opposition to their own local policy lines?

"The Center Party has its own clearcut, principled position with regard to both capital district development and a government coalition. We are seeking permanent solutions to the special problems of the Helsinki district that are made on the basis of principled decisions and in cooperation with the SDP. In this way we are trying to see to it that the Center-Left coalition, which is important to Finland in terms of both foreign and domestic policy, may be preserved."

Vayrynen to the Municipal Council

Conservative Member of Parliament Eva-Riitta Siitonen writes in the nonsocialist UUSI SUOMI about discussions engaged in in the capital by KEPU chairman Paavo Vayrynen in the news media and in Parliament:

"Paavo Vayrynen's factual information shows that he is not familiar with Helsinki's problems. That is why his advisor's role appeared to be chiefly comical. There is reason to ask whether the KEPU should not look for a channel for itself to influence Helsinki affairs in the same ways as others do. It will have to gain the confidence of the residents of the district. Certainly participation in elections, up to and including the foreign minister, a faction on the municipal council and through it participation in the decision-making process. That is true local democracy -- counseling 'from outside' is merely a manifestation of interference in affairs even though there is no local political power and responsibility.

"The KEPU has indeed its potential role as a Finnish party in the cities too. But first it must be redeemed from the people as municipal council seats."

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER VIEWS IMPLICATIONS OF SORSA DECISION TO REMAIN

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Thus Spake Sorsa"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] There may have been partly personal reasons for Kalevi Sorsa's hesitation about continuing as party chairman, but his decision is nonetheless a political decision that will have very important political results, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson. The editorial below analyzes the political consequences in various areas.

Kalevi Sorsa has finally said "yes" to continuing as party chairman, which is what most political soothsayers saw in the works right after the party council meeting in Polijarvi in November. His delayed answer and the endless suspense in which the party and the country waited for it could not fail to lend a somewhat prima donna atmosphere to the whole procedure. Despite that, there is no reason to doubt that personal hesitation on Sorsa's part as to how he should shape his existence was in fact the basic reason why he had difficulty in reaching a decision. Sorsa will be 60 years old in the same year that his coming 3-year term as party chairman expires. Many politicians have felt themselves to be worn out from politics at a considerably younger age.

It is impossible to determine the extent to which factors other than purely personal considerations played a part in Sorsa's decision. The lack of suitable retirement posts has been mentioned as a possible factor. It is also hard to believe that a politician as experienced as Sorsa would leave political factors out of account.

Whatever the facts may be, Sorsa's decision to stay on is in any case a political event with very important political effects. It is worthwhile to reflect on what the political effects of his decision are.

First of all, it postpones and partly conceals the struggle for leadership that is facing the party in any case. This has both its advantages and its disadvantages. One advantage is that the party can go into the 1987 election under tested and authoritative leadership. A disadvantage is that even though the struggle for leadership is going on in secret, it will be a long one.

Sorsa says in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI that the party stands united today. And that is true in comparison with certain periods in the past--not only the party split in the 1950's but also, for example, the years of fighting over the EC. But even so, obvious cracks are visible in the party today. This applies particularly to the leftwing, centered in Helsinki, which has clearly grown tired of the ideological watering down of consensus politics and, moreover, represents a certain regional opposition to red-green cooperation.

Sorsa created his present image as a statesman by leading a successful fight against inflation and presiding over several years of rising prosperity. In his statement to the party newspaper, he says that the word "consensus" has already served its time. And perhaps that is true, especially on the political level, where the government is working with a very narrow majority against a double opposition that is gradually growing more and more aggressive.

Despite that, there are probably still two reasons for talking at least about a lingering "miniconsensus." One is the fact that the government was formed across the dividing line between nonsocialists and the Left and that we in Finland have therefore not adopted what is known in Scandinavia as bloc politics. The other reason for talking about lingering consensus is to be found in the conciliatory agreements on the labor market.

As far as the makeup of the government is concerned, the announcement of Sorsa's willingness to stay on is no doubt significant. The knowledge that he was intending to resign has probably had a negative effect on the current government's stability. It is also possible that a new party chairman would have found it tempting to go into opposition, since that would make it easier to appeal to the voters. It is obvious that Sorsa might also change course, but it more likely that he will continue in the future to try to hold together a government coalition of the same basic hue that he has led successfully for such a long time.

It is hardly likely that any other Social Democrat will become prime minister as long as Sorsa is party chairman. On the other hand, it is not so certain that after the next election, he will be able to count automatically on being prime minister. The Center Party's impatience and Vayrynen's ambitions may lead to a competing candidate for prime minister. On the other side, it is uncertain whether a person of Sorsa's standing would be willing to accept another post in the government.

This leads to the question of the government's makeup. While the Center Party's party secretary, Seppo Kaariainen, has warmed to the idea of continued red-green cooperation, the talk of direct cooperation between the urban parties, the Social Democrats, and the Conservative Party has continued.

Sorsa says in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI that a form of cooperation between the Conservative Party and the Social Democrats is going to exist, if only because the two are "doomed to cooperate" in local politics. But, he says, cooperation between them in the government cannot exist. At least for the time being, there is no reason to doubt that Sorsa's words on that point will

hold true. Not only because he is fairly orthodox ideologically, but also because the Conservative Party may be too large a party to be a suitable companion for the Social Democrats in government. But Sorsa's lightning fast maneuver to bring the Finnish Rural Party into his government is a warning that he can produce surprises.

There is fairly wide agreement that the labor market is the place where the remains of consensus are now going to be tested. That is also where Sorsa personally has the most to gain or lose. The decision concerning the rules of the game is praised by Sorsa, who does not forget to add a flattering opinion of SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] boss Viinanen. But considering the demands that have been made, particularly by the smaller union confederations, successful agreement in accordance with the government's anti-inflation goals seems fairly doubtful.

In his statement in the party organ, Sorsa attaches great importance to the party program of principles that is to be adopted at the next party congress. Sorsa's own interest in ideological questions is well known, and from the historical standpoint, the new program is an event: it will be the third program of principles since 1903 in Forssa. The rough drafts seen so far, with their somewhat vague attempts to combine traditional social democracy with green values, have not been very convincing.

In Sorsa's statement there are--very naturally, one can say--no references to the presidential issue. It is very probable that the division of labor between the two top figures in the party--Koivisto and Sorsa--will remain as before. Neither the presidential election in 1988 nor, especially, the election after that in 1994 can be completely ignored in Sorsa's planning for the future.

Sorsa also accompanied his agreement to continue as party chairman with the reservation that the matter must be reconsidered if "something previously totally unsuspected" should happen. Such a precautionary clause is completely natural, and among other things, it may conceivably have in view the presidential election and the results of the parliamentary election. But in the republic that has been headed by Kalevi Sorsa, the unsuspected has generally been conspicuous by its absence.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

INEVITABILITY OF SDP-CENTER BASED COALITIONS QUESTIONED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSLADET in Swedish 29 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "On a Foundation of Red Earth"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSLADET introduction]

[Text] "Red earth" cooperation between the Center and Social Democratic Parties has effectively taken root in Finnish political consciousness, notes Bjorn Mansson in view of the debate in recent weeks concerning the basis of government. Red earth is a problem only if it means the complete exclusion of alternatives, he writes.

The debate over the basis of government--an eternal question in our politics--has been activated just in time for the "20th anniversary" of the Conservative Party's time in opposition. One of the strongest indications of this came from Seppo Kaariainen, party secretary of the Center Party, who published a defense of and tribute to the so-called red earth basis--that is, cooperation in the government between the Social Democrats and the Center Party--in his party's favorite newspaper, SUOMENMAA, on 10 December (quoted the next day in HUFVUDSTADSLADET).

At least part of the reason was the concern felt by the Center Party over a possible projection onto the national scene of the very widespread cooperation between the SDP and the Conservative Party on the local political level. Ilkko Suominen, boss of the National Coalition [Conservative] Party, had revealed that he had "held certain discussions" with Prime Minister Sorsa concerning agricultural and energy policies--both being typical of issues on which the Conservatives and the SDP are assumed to be very close to each other. There is naturally concern in the political middle at the prospect of being flattened by a Conservative-SDP coalition.

Kaariainen mentioned the nearly 50-year-old traditions of the red earth basis for government (it was founded in 1937 at the instigation of President Kallio) and drew attention to its impressive results: national unification, the welfare society, and foreign policy. President Kekkonen's lifework was not mentioned explicitly, but his spirit hovered over the line of reasoning presented. Kaariainen also warned against "playing the National Coalition Party card" and attempting to "get the upper hand" in cooperation.

He also propounded five theses in favor of continued cooperation--theses which undoubtedly well justify cooperation across the ideological boundary separating the Center Party and the SDP:

"Renovation" of the welfare society (through expanded democracy, among other things), joint responsibility in particular for full employment, regional policy, environment, and the defense of national culture against pressure from abroad.

Kaariainen's conclusion that the red earth basis for government should be retained includes, interestingly enough, the reservation that "there is even room for others in this framework." He concluded his discourse with a direct appeal on behalf of the "stable course" followed by the country so far and mentioned in particular the foreign policy and "social peace."

Kaariainen's appeal met with sympathy not only in his party's own ranks and the coalition itself but also in other quarters. Considering that the country's largest newspaper headlined its editorial comment "It Is Worthwhile To Defend Red Earth," one can say that on this particular point, an initiative by the Center Party has seldom been so well received. Particularly in the less developed regions, other voices in the press emphasized the importance of red earth in continuing that portion of Urho Kekkonen's lifework which might be called mutual understanding in the area of regional policy concerning what is best for sparsely populated regions.

Some shrill overtones have also appeared in the press debate. Among them one must include the comments by Kari Hokkanen, editor in chief of the Center Party newspaper ILKKA (quoted in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET on 24 December). In his plea on behalf of red earth, he used unnecessarily exaggerated arguments against the alternatives: a government made up of the National Coalition Party, the Center Party, and the SDP was rejected on the grounds of the civil war in 1918! Red earth can no doubt defend itself without recourse to such arguments from history.

It is obvious that opinion within the Center Party is unequivocally in favor of continued red earth cooperation. For his part, party leader Paavo Vayrynen has repeatedly expressed his strong support for red earth--most recently on the grounds that the controversial problems in the region of the capital should be solved on that political basis.

Prime Minister Sorsa, speaking for the Social Democrats, has also strongly stressed the value of the red earth basis for government--most recently in interviews concerned with his decision to stay on as boss of the SDP. Sorsa's imminent reelection as party leader in 1987 has also been seen as an indication of the SDP's continued policy of cooperation with the Center Party.

Also part of the debate is the fact that National Coalition Party leader Ilkka Suominen has started expressing more skepticism concerning the ability of a purely nonsocialist government to hold its own. The Right therefore now seems inclined to give priority to broad-based cooperation at least with the Social Democrats rather than cooperation in a nonsocialist government. To the extent

that the Center Party is also included in the Right's plans, one could speak of an "expanded red earth basis" with a blue (or, as the slanderers say, a black) component.

Just before Christmas, the rightwing newspaper UUSI SUOMI made a contribution to the debate in the form of a public opinion poll. As is known, Gallup results should always be interpreted with caution, but the trend was now so unambiguous that it could not be brushed aside:

Of those interviewed, 56 percent expressed definite support for the current red earth basis for government. Concerning the 36 percent who did not consider that the best basis for government, it should be remembered that their opinion is not entirely uniform, but split among several alternatives. The fact that the red earth basis has "the people's support" is not surprising in itself, since a clear majority of voters support the parties making up that basis. It is noteworthy, on the other hand, that red earth also meets with sympathy from 40 percent of those who vote for the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and from one out of four supporters of the National Coalition Party!

A full 69 percent answered yes when asked specifically if they would support the current basis for government even after the next election, provided that "the balance of power among the parties did not change substantially" (which, if we may say so, seems very likely). It is noteworthy that here again, a majority of both the National Coalition Party's voters (52 percent) and the SKDL's supporters (57 percent) hold that view. Only one out of three members of the Conservative Party prefers a purely nonsocialist government, just as only one out of three SKDL supporters prefers a purely leftist government. So the current basis is strongly supported even within the opposition!

Equally interesting is the fact that only 11 percent of the Center Party's supporters want a purely nonsocialist government, and 6 percent of the SDP's want a purely leftist government.

The picture is rounded out, however, by the answers to the question as to "how the current basis for government could be improved." No fewer than 49 percent of those polled want the Conservative Party included. It is not surprising that that view is held by 80 percent of the Conservative Party's own supporters and 56 percent of the Center Party's supporters, but it is noteworthy that it is shared by a full 42 percent of the SDP's sympathizers. Compare that with the fact that only half as many SDP supporters want the People's Democrats included! In the Center Party, incidentally, interest in having the SKDL as a partner in government is negligible at 6 percent.

The results of that poll are therefore extremely favorable to the red earth basis for government, but with the proviso that that basis should be rounded out by adding the Conservative Party. The idea of cooperation across what would be called the bloc boundary in the other Nordic countries has therefore taken firm hold in the political thinking of the Finns. From a Nordic standpoint, that alone is unique. President Kekkonen's central idea concerning broad mutual understanding has left clear traces.

The red earth basis is a problem for Finland only if it signifies a complete lack of alternatives. In a sense, and contrary to what Sorsa and others have claimed, a functioning alternative for government would be an advantage in itself--with a view to the workability of Parliament.

So even though, from a longer perspective, our governments should preferably be based on cooperation across the boundary between nonsocialists and the Left, there ought to be a readiness to try out other alternatives if necessary. If an "excessively broad" government based on the Right, the middle, and the SDP must be regarded then as quite unrealistic, the only remaining alternative for a majority will be a purely nonsocialist government.

The reason is that a "blue-red" coalition between the National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats would be a disaster for the country. It would mean cooperation between "the great and the beautiful"--in the economic, social, and regional sense--and social peace would not be served thereby.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

RIVAL COMMUNIST WINGS' NEWSPAPERS EXCHANGE CHARGES

'Moderates' Defend Card Exchange

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Exchange of Membership Cards"]

[Text] With the exchange of membership cards, decided by the Central Committee of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], an attempt will be made to ensure an opportunity for all party members to function within the framework of the party's normal structures and in the basic organizations belonging to the party.

This decision is a logical continuation to the preceding decisions. They dealt a blow to organized factional activity within the framework of the party. However, this was not directed against members of organizations belonging to the TIEDONANTAJA faction except for those who consider the building of a parallel organization as the only task.

Members will be faced with a choice in connection with the exchange: One cannot be a member of the SKP and at the same time build an organization for another party. This is what is now being done by the members of the so-called shadow central committee under the beautiful guise of unity.

It is hoped that the members will decide in favor of the Finnish Communist Party while appreciating its great historical tradition, its past and present struggle on behalf of the interests, rights, and democracy of the working people and on behalf of a policy of friendship between Finland and the USSR.

At the same time the Central Committee directed the attention of party organizations to the recruiting of new members and by this means the securing of a better tomorrow.

Stalinist Organ Attacks 'Liquidations'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Liquidators"]

[Text] A decision was made in the SKP Central Committee last Sunday to exchange membership cards next spring. The reasons for making this decision

were not kept a secret: the Aalto faction, which has taken over the party leadership, wants to change the party's membership before the next parliamentary elections. The purpose is to suspend more than half of all the members from the SKP by an exchange of membership cards. Thus in the parliamentary elections the lists of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] would include only those candidates who without protest support the forceful right-wing trend in the policies of the SKP and the whole People's Democratic movement and who permit the collapse of the influence and authority of the Communist and People's Democratic movement in this country.

The exchange of membership cards in the form outlined by the party leadership is in all its significance only a part of the many actions in a series which has only one goal: to liquidate the SKP as a communist party in Finland.

The fierceness of the measure is certainly startling even far beyond the limits of the SKP. It is not necessary to be a communist to comprehend that in the liquidation of the Communist Party it is a question of something which has long since ceased to be a so-called internal matter of the SKP.

Recently, this has been reflected in the stands taken by the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party, among others. These parties have expressed ever increasing concern about the SKP's situation. In these parties they have adopted an increasingly amazed attitude toward what exactly is the ultimate purpose of Aalto and his closest colleagues in the destruction of the SKP and where are the actual background forces for such action since no other support for it can be found from within the country except from the extreme right wing?

In fact, the fierceness of the actions of Aalto's faction speaks to this very fear of becoming isolated and its dire urgency. But this faction in a manner of speaking is caught in the impasse of its own actions: each disruptive act opens up new eyes to see the national and international consequences of the liquidation of the Communist Party, it cultivates counter-forces against division, and forces Aalto, for his part, to take new and even more dramatic and thus eye-opening actions.

Aalto's faction has no right or justification in accordance with the regulations to expel anyone. The allegation that the committee of SKP organizations is a kind of parallel organ opposed to the party is a lie. The committee's only purpose is to assemble the party's organizations and member for a struggle on behalf of the SKP's principles, chief party line, internationalism, and unity. And now it is these very circumstances which are being threatened, whether one looks at the actions of Aalto's faction or its statements on a new program draft debate.

Arvo Aalto's term has taken hundreds of thousands of voters, connections, authority, and internal unity away from the SKP. Now more than half of its membership, its main policy line, international relations, and national allies are being taken away. Finnish Communists and many other people are convinced that Finland needs the SKP. But who in the end will need this faction taken over by the deception of the SKP's leadership?

'Aalto Group' Attacked

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 3

[Column by Erkki Susi, Editor]

[Text] A delegation of district secretaries from the SKP's regular district organizations is finally visiting the Soviet Union. In spite of arguments to the contrary from Arvo Aalto's faction and KANSAN UUTISET, the delegation also includes district secretaries from the eight illegally suspended districts.

Some of these district secretaries have already been subjected to threefold penalties. Aalto's faction has suspended their district secretarial powers, expelled their districts, and now is threatening to suspend them for belonging to the committee of SKP organizations.

This serves as an example of the kind of inflation the disruptive actions of Aalto's faction have experienced, how negligible the faction's authority as a party leader is, and how completely the legality and validity of the faction's divisive actions are being disputed at the international level.

The situation is the same with respect to the national level and within the SKP itself. No discriminating political quarter can accept Aalto's faction as the normal party leadership. A real movement of disobedience against Aalto's faction has become stronger in the SKP.

Aalto's faction is an anti-party faction, which has illegally usurped power and is aiming at the liquidation of the SKP as a Marxist-Leninist party basing its actions on proletarian internationalism. Since the faction does not have the support of the majority of the party's membership, it has chosen the division of the party as the means of achieving its goal. This kind of action is detrimental to the working class and the national interests of our country.

The party's rank and file understands this ever more clearly. Therefore, it does not recognize the position of party leadership assumed by Aalto's faction -- does not even call it the party leadership -- nor does it recognize its suspensions and other divisive actions as legal or binding in accordance with the regulations.

Threatening demands and suspensions have come in a steady stream. But instead of recognizing the validity of the actions taken by Aalto's faction, the party organizations and members have disregarded them and have joined forces to support the SKP.

In order to facilitate disruption, Aalto's faction has labelled the unification actions of the rank and file and the establishment of a committee of SKP organizations as actions opposed to the SKP and separate from the SKP. This has been answered by an ever stronger adherence to the SKP's ideological, political, and organizational principles, regulations, and collective decisions.

"We are an inseparable part of the SKP regardless of the illegal actions which are being directed against us from whatever direction and which Aalto's faction is foisting upon the party organs it controls," declare the SKP's supporters. It is a declaration by which the representation and leadership power of Aalto's faction is disputed.

Here and there the party rank and file, it was imagined would turn the other cheek or submit to being thrown out, is instead raising the demand to expel the bankrupt leadership.

Naturally, disputing the validity of suspensions does not mean that the suspensions do not have any significance. Indeed, Aalto's faction can by use of force put formal suspensions into effect and exclude organizations and members from their own apparatus and benefits.

The effect of suspensions threatens to be felt more tangibly and become worse in the near future as preparations are made for the parliamentary elections.

For this reason, actions opposing dissolution must still be significantly strengthened. We must make certain that if Aalto's faction brings about a dissolution in spite of everything, it will suffer the heaviest defeats, will be disclosed and be isolated, and will remain the faction of one general and a few lieutenants without any troops.

Sinisalo Hits Card Exchange

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 20 Dec 85 p 6

[Commentary by Taisto Sinisalo]

[Text] "Aalto has deviated from the party's main line."

"The historical struggle for the SKP's line continues."

"The struggle must be waged on two fronts."

The exchange of membership cards now has the undisguised nature and purpose of breaking up the SKP, states Taisto Sinisalo, a member of the chairmanship of the committee of SKP organizations.

For example, the leadership of the SKP's Lapland District has already issued instructions according to which "a card will not be issued to members of the TIEDONANTAJA faction". General Secretary Vainionpaa, for his part, has also made reference to accomplishing the dissolution of the SKDL's election alliances by denying the right of membership for some members through the exchange of membership cards.

The exchange of membership cards is traditional in the Communist Party. However, the action now being taken in the name of the Central Committee is completely contrary to the regulations -- as are many of the actions of Aalto's faction, notes Taisto Sinisalo.

"According to the regulations, a party section accepts and suspends members. The law of association is also based on this. Now an attempt is being made to transfer this right to Aalto's faction, which is using the name of the Central Committee. Since the membership does not approve of Aalto's leadership, this leadership is now attempting to deprive it of its right of membership.

"In spite of the actions taken in the name of the Central Committee, each member accepted by a party section will retain his membership, whether or not he is issued a new membership card. General Secretary Vainionpaa's threat of the loss of party membership if a member stays in a primary organization for which Aalto's faction will not issue membership cards is unjustified and invalid as an act contrary to the regulations.

"Also the right to participate, for example, in the nomination of candidates to the parliamentary elections and in a membership vote in accordance with the election law does not give any party leadership any grounds for limiting this right by refusing to issue membership cards to some of the party's primary organizations. Such an attempt will divide the party's primary organizations into two unequal castes, will leave approximately half of the primary organizations devoid of rights, and will be an unprecedented gross attempt to destroy all party democracy in the political life of our country."

Majority Out of The Sections

Those forces which Aalto has already declared to be "crushed" when the eight district organizations were suspended have grown larger and stronger. Aalto's faction is hastening to exchange membership cards for the very reason that it does not represent the real will of the membership.

"Party division has been answered by an intensified joint struggle of the membership," says Sinisalo. A good indication of this is the intensification of activities in the SKP district organizations which publish our newspaper and the work of the unification committees that has been enthusiastically initiated in nine districts. The committee of SKP organizations elected together with them now includes more than half of the party's primary organizations within its districts. This is indicative of the fact that the demands raised by the changed situation to prevent the dissolution of the party and to assemble forces on behalf of Marxism-Leninism are becoming ever more visible.

2,700 New Subscribers

According to Sinisalo, another encouraging indication of the strengthening of party oriented forces is the success of TIEDONANTAJA and its monthly supplement.

"Our newspaper has never before achieved the kind of results it has now achieved this fall. The number of subscribers to TIEDONANTAJA has increased this year already by 2,700 new subscribers. It has been said with justification that interest in TIEDONANTAJA is now greater than what can be accomplished by the former method of conducting circulation work. Of exceptional significance is the expanding circulation of the paper at job sites, which in the spring

also included the regular distribution of timely TIEDONANTAJA fliers. Also the sales of the newspaper in kiosks is increasing," says Sinisalo.

The fighting spirit of the October meeting in Lahti has continued and is becoming stronger. At the same time the chairman of the committee of SKP organizations emphasizes the politicization of the actions of the unification forces, especially the trend of the party sections toward mass actions.

"The preparations for next spring's struggle to increase real wages, to shorten the work week to 35 hours, to repeal the statute on fines for striking, and to prevent unemployment require from us more extensive and closer ties with old as well as new occupations. The recent meeting of the council of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] demonstrated that Aalto's faction is once again accommodating the right-wing trend.

"The boycott against race discrimination in South Africa also demonstrates that the advancement of the peace movement is decisively dependent on the intensified role of the working class," states Sinisalo, a member of the executive committee of the Peace Defenders, in making reference to the importance of the annual meeting of the Vocational Peace Committee. "Preparations for the parliamentary elections are not just actions against discrimination and the dissolution of the SKDL's election alliances. What is needed is a broad coalition of progressive forces that are free of consensus and extend beyond the traditional framework of the SKDL."

The third Lenin Seminar held on Independence Day in Tampere continued the development work of the SKP's policy line, which was interrupted by the arbitrary decisions of the 20th Congress.

"The premises and guidelines for the preparation of a new party program set forth by the 20th Congress have, on the other hand, been pushed aside in the program proposals made by Aalto's faction."

Chairman Aalto's speech on the party program neglects the party's Marxist-Leninist nature and ideological foundation, the main line against big capital and the right wing, the struggle against right-wing trends and reformism, criticism of a consensus and government policy, and an analysis of the experiences of mass movements as well as characterizations of the ideological and political foundations of proletarian internationalism.

Division Is A Means of Liquidating Party

Division is a means which is ever more clearly aimed at liquidating the SKP as a communist party. It is for this very reason that persecution and indoctrination have been directed against those who adhere to the SKP's policy of class struggle, the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and solidarity with the socialist world as well as cooperation with the CPSU and other fraternal parties. The transfer of the party's membership rolls to the supervision of the state and the banks along with a new method of collecting membership dues represents the modern method of liquidation.

The dissolution of the SKP is detrimental from a national as well as international point of view. It has already encouraged capitalist and right-wing circles. Aalto's faction has not actually received support from anywhere else except right-wing circles.

The interest and support expressed on the part of several fraternal parties toward the work of the committee of SKP organizations is an indication of the known concern in the international communist movement as the result of the situation in the SKP.

"The meeting of representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the committee of SKP organizations was an important event, which greatly advances the intensification of work against the dissolution of the SKP," states Sinisalo in summarizing the trip made together with Jouko Kajanoja and Erkki Suti.

A Letter to Every Member

In supporting the members of the committee of SKP organizations the SKP's members and organizations support their statutory right to cooperate in actions against the dissolution and destruction of the party.

"In this lies the basis of a broad and warm solidarity," notes Sinisalo. By taking the "Letter to Comrades", written by the committee of SKP organizations, to each and every member, even to those who have not been of the same opinion with us, this solidarity movement in the SKP can still be expanded.

In addition to belittling members, the labelling of this coalition of SKP members, Communists, as a "hollow unity" or as a corruption of communist organization and an "alliance policy" also results in an isolation from other party comrades and from party oriented tasks. This is not a forward acceleration, but in practice only hinders real progress and weakens the struggle against the dissolution of the SKP.

"The SKP's members have behind them a difficult and demanding year. In summarizing the experiences of the past year, the point that becomes emphasized is that the struggle for the SKP's traditions, main party line, and unity will not end regardless of whatever the phases of events are at the beginning of the new year. This is an inseparable part of the conviction and actions of Finnish Communists.

The historical struggle on behalf of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the SKP's line, name, and banner continues. We are waging this struggle aware of the fact that the great majority of the party's members and friends is opposed to the dissolution and liquidation of the SKP.

"A tightening of the ranks of party oriented forces is needed in this endeavor. Now is not the time for furtive glances to the right or the left. On the contrary, the situation has placed before Communists the inevitability of a struggle on two fronts, as we have confirmed in assessments by representatives of the SKP's organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. Only then can we overcome attempts to divide our ranks now when all developments should be directed at efforts to assemble forces.

"The initiative and experience of the party's members and primary organizations represent a firm guarantee of the fact that in the important and demanding trials of the coming year we will find common and correct solutions which will open up prospects for revitalizing our country's communist and whole progressive movement.

'Only Communist Newspaper'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 Dec 85 p 6

[Column by Erkki Susi, Editor]

[Text] The argument according to which TIEDONANTAJA is the only progressive workers' newspaper in our country is not just empty boasting.

The expansion of the weekend issue, the reform of the editorial technique, the establishment of a monthly supplement, the increase in the number of subscribers by 2,700 during the fall, and the imminent move to better facilities attest to the advancement of TIEDONANTAJA.

The fact that there were more New Year's greetings than there have been for a long time also attests to its advancement.

There are many factors in the background of the paper's progress. TIEDONANTAJA has become more well known. Interest in it has increased. Its writings on peace, real socialism, Finnish foreign policy, the timely struggles of workers, and questions relating to the SKP have been observed to be correct or at least interesting.

However, one factor must not be forgotten. The knowledgeable contribution of the newspaper's friends and the party organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. For communists a newspaper does not represent an activity that is separate from other activities, but an important tool for all activities. If you want to improve your actions and promote your goals more effectively, strengthen the communist newspaper. This is the link.

Of course, it is no secret that the recent growth in support for TIEDONANTAJA is, to a great degree, the result of the situation in the SKP. As the only communist daily paper, TIEDONANTAJA's task has been to defend a united Marxist-Leninist SKP, reveal the disrupters, and assemble communists to work against dissolution.

Many of the party's members and friends who have previously kept their distance from the paper have come to observe TIEDONANTAJA's significance in this work. The logic of the struggle has broken down many doubts and prejudices. And it has educated not only these comrades, but TIEDONANTAJA also.

TIEDONANTAJA has, indeed, become a newspaper representing the majority of communists.

The nerve wracking nature and complexity of the struggle over the SKP has, on the other hand, caused difficulties for TIEDONANTAJA. TIEDONANTAJA has

observed the joint and unanimous policy line of its publishing organizations and has adapted its writings to this policy line. This has been criticized to some degree. As a public forum TIEDONANTAJA also has not related all the aspects and arguments of the line, tactics, and plans of the forces on the side of the SKP.

The demand for "more light to the membership" is, of course, correct, and it must be met in the party organizations as well as in the press. But the demand that it must be able to combine the "illegal" and the "legal" and not disclose to its opponents what need not be disclosed is also correct.

What is the future of TIEDONANTAJA? An iron rule holds true in the making of a newspaper: one must not stop! One must not be satisfied with what has already been achieved, but one must continue to move forward in the development of the paper's content as well as in strengthening its position.

The results to date indicate that opportunities do exist. I believe that as far as opportunities are concerned, TIEDONANTAJA is only just beginning to surpass its previous limits.

There are still thousands of Communists and People's Democrats who have never in their life seen TIEDONANTAJA, and if it were to up to Aalto's staff, they will never see it. The more wretched, more right-wing, and more nationalistic the newspapers under the supervision of Aalto's faction become, the more these people will need a communist paper.

Among the broad masses of workers TIEDONANTAJA also does not have any fateful limits which it cannot overcome. The trump cards of a communist paper are its scientific nature, truthfulness, and tenacity. TIEDONANTAJA can and should be made known as the only internationalist and real workers' paper which is free of consensus, involved in the life and struggle of the people, and is developed together with them.

Whether it is a case of daydreaming or not, the goal is to improve TIEDONANTAJA both qualitatively as well as quantitatively so that it will become the number one workers' paper in this country.

On behalf of myself and the whole TIEDONANTAJA staff I thank all our readers and friends for the past year and wish you a Happy New Year.

10576
CSO: 3617/54

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FABIUS CONTINUE LOSS IN SOFRES POLL

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 4 Jan 86 pp 68-70

[Article by Charles Rebois]

[Text] French people do not like baloney, especially when it is electoral. The government is dishing it out copiously. To listen to the authorities, all economic indicators project upswings. The government is spreading its bounty on credit. All the official and unofficial media are lauding its favors. Yet, in fact, nothing is happening and the French people are not grateful to their government.

Francois Mitterrand, the ultimate authority, is marking time. The number of individuals who distrust him has even risen by 2 points. The head of state is paying for the error that he committed by receiving Gen Jaruzelski.

He cannot simultaneously pose as the defender of human rights and assume the spotlight at the side of the Polish people's oppressor. The televised programs where Francois Mitterrand has tried to exculpate himself have not been convincing.

The revival in public confidence in the president begun in October 1985 has stopped dead in its tracks. This augurs badly for the socialists who, 2 and 1/2 months before the legislative elections, are placing all their hopes in the promises of the French president.

But it is even more costly for Laurent Fabius to have publicized his problems. The prime minister has taken a nosedive, dropping 8 points in December and 3 points in January. Only 38 percent of the respondents polled still expressed confidence in his ability to solve the problems facing France whereas his support quotient had stood at 59 percent 8 months ago (indicating a drop of 21 percent). By all evidence, the young prime minister that Francois Mitterrand has given France and for whom he still vouches appears to be very fragile today.

By playing Pontius Pilate in the Greenpeace affair, Fabius alienated a large section of French public opinion. He aggravated his case even farther by breaking ranks with President Mitterrand in the Jaruzelski affair.

And it should not be forgotten that in the meantime he had cut a pitiful figure in his face-to-face debate with Jacques Chirac. These are as many signs of discredit of a shameful Socialist who bedecks himself with the virtues of liberalism in order to survive.

Another leader in trouble who made a similarly equivocal move is Michel Rocard (down 2 points). He has tried to wash away the sins of socialism by engaging in confessions to the foreign press. The Left (down 10 points among the communists and down 7 points among the Socialists) has indicated to him that there are limits beyond which he should not go.

There are also blemished reputations: Charles Hernu (down 7 points) has learned this the hard way. The role of scapegoat does not sit well on one dreaming of the French presidency.

While they do not serve the cause of the government, the Socialist antics have enabled Georges Marchais (up 2 points) to patiently regain his health. This is so true that without winning anything on its right the French Socialist Party is beginning to yield ground on its left. The most recent cantonal elections already indicated such an evolution.

As for the opposition, several of its representatives have benefited from their recent appearance on television, the small screen being the prime instrument of political promotion. Raymond Barre, the star of a recent "Hour of Truth" program, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a skillful performer on the "Questions of Home" program, have improved their popularity quotient by 4 points. But these gains are often ephemeral.

The fact remains that Raymond Barre is securing for himself an increasingly dominant position in the UDF while Jacques Chaban-Delmas has seen his following increase gradually among the Socialists as the latter have sought to exercise damage control.

But in the opposite direction, the public opinion poll also indicates the return of pessimism among the French people. There are two reasons for this: The recent social strife, especially that which underlay the paralysis of the capital, and the increasingly numerous acts of violence.

Compared to December, the social climate has deteriorated and the struggle against criminality has become a priority concern.

Another subject of concern to the government is that the official indicators reflecting a drop in the number of unemployed workers have not been credible at all. The government's fight against joblessness continues to be viewed as ineffective.

Mitterrand: 53 percent no longer have confidence in him

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence, or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand's ability to solve the problems facing France right now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Complete confidence.....	9	+ 2
● Some confidence.....	34	- 2
● Little confidence.....	28	+ 1
● No confidence at all.....	25	+ 1
● No opinion.....	4	- 2
	100 %	100 %

Fabius: 55 percent no longer have confidence in him

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence, or no confidence at all in Laurent Fabius' ability to solve the problems facing France right now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Complete confidence.....	7	-
● Some confidence.....	31	- 3
● Little confidence.....	26	+ 2
● No confidence at all.....	29	+ 3
● No opinion.....	7	- 2
	100 %	100 %

Technical Information about the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] Poll

1. Public opinion poll taken for FIGARO-MAGAZINE.
2. Date of poll-taking: Between 19 and 23 December 1985.
3. National sample of 1,000 individuals representative of the overall population 18 years of age and above.
4. Method of selecting the respondent group (by sex, age, occupation of the head of household) and stratification by regions and categories of population centers.

Political personalities of the majority party

Question: For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him play an important role during the months and years to come?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
Michel Rocard	57	- 2
Jacques Delors	41	- 1
Laurent Fabius	36	- 2
Jean-Pierre Chevènement	34	+ 1
Charles Hernu	28	- 7
Lionel Jospin	28	- 2
Pierre Mauroy	24	-
Pierre Bérégovoy	23	+ 1
Georges Marchais	12	+ 2

Political personalities of the opposition

Question: For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him play an important role during the months and years to come?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
Raymond Barre	48	+ 4
Simone Veil	45	- 2
Jacques Chirac	37	- 3
François Léotard	35	- 3
J. Chaban- Delmas	33	+ 4
V. Giscard d'Estaing	28	- 2
Jacques Toubon	23	- 3
René Monory	16	+ 2
Jean-Marie Le Pen	12	- 3

Rating of political parties

	P.C.	P.S.	M.R.G.	U.D.F.	R.P.R.	Fr. Nat.
High opinion	15	45	23	40	43	11
Low opinion	71	43	44	42	42	75

Unemployment and Price Increases

Priority issue: Still unemployment

Question: Among the following issues, which is the one which in your opinion should receive the government's priority attention now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Fight against price hikes.....	8	- 1
● Fight against unemployment.....	65	- 3
● Fight against violence and criminality	20	+ 5
● Maintenance of social peace.....	6	- 1
● No opinion.....	1	-
	100 %	100 %

58 percent deem the fight against inflation to be ineffective

Question: As regards the fight against price hikes, do you believe that the government's action can be described as:

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Very effective.....	4	-
... Fairly effective.....	33	+ 1
... Not very effective.....	43	-
... Completely ineffective.....	15	- 1
● No opinion.....	5	-
	100 %	100 %

80 percent deem the fight against unemployment to be ineffective

Question: As regards the fight against unemployment, do you believe that the government's action can be described as:

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Very effective.....	1	-
... Fairly effective.....	14	- 1
... Not very effective.....	47	- 1
... Completely ineffective.....	33	+ 1
● No opinion.....	5	+ 1
	100 %	100 %

Optimism and Pessimism

49 percent believe that things will be worse

Question: When you see the way in which France and the French are evolving, do you have the impression that things are improving or, contrariwise, that they have a tendency to worsen?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Things are improving.....	17	- 2
● They tend to worsen.....	49	-
● There is no change.....	31	+ 2
● No opinion.....	3	-
	100 %	100 %

43 percent believe that there will be much social conflict...

Question: Do you believe that in the coming 2 or 3 months there will be much or little social conflict?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Much social conflict.....	43	+ 4
● Little social conflict.....	39	- 5
● No opinion.....	18	+ 1
	100 %	100 %

... and 32 percent fear the return of the violence

Question: In your opinion, in the coming 2 or 3 months the principal problems facing France...

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Can be resolved through negotiation and compromise.....	53	- 5
... Threaten to lead to confrontation and violence.....	32	+ 3
● No opinion.....	15	+ 2
	100 %	100 %

France's Role in the World

41 percent believe that France's role in the world is weakening

Question: Do you believe that at present France's role in the world is becoming stronger or is weakening?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● It is becoming stronger.....	23	+ 1
● It is weakening.....	41	+ 1
● There is no change.....	29	- 1
● No opinion.....	7	- 1
	100 %	100 %

2662/7051
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POLITICAL

FRANCE

DEBRAY ON PACIFISTS, NUCLEAR DETERRENT, EUROPEAN INTERESTS

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 25 Nov 85 pp 98-99

[Interview with Regis Debray, by Carlos Zeller; date and place not given]

[Text] An adviser to President Mitterrand and counselor of state, Regis Debray claims to have written his book "Los Imperios Contra Europa" [Empires Against Europe] in response to a certain kind of journalism that ideologizes international relations and makes them mythical. For Che's old comrade, the atomic bomb is in essence a pacifistic and anti-imperialist weapon.

[Question] One of the central ideas of your book is that new technologies will be the driving force ensuring economic development, security and the independence of Europe.

[Answer] I do not believe that class antagonisms can now be in the forefront of European life, first of all, because if there is deindustrialization, in the long run one produces a displacement of European labor and its subordination to American multinational companies. We are sometimes asked why the big industries in France were nationalized. The answer is in order to prevent the Americans from buying them. I prefer that the workers be working for French interests rather than for Japanese or American multinationals. On this point, I confess I am a nationalist. The class struggle does not seem to me to be a key to an understanding of international life. International relations are relations between nations; they have an autonomous order.

[Question] Then in your opinion, what is the dominant trend in the international realm?

[Answer] If there is one outstanding phenomenon at the close of this 20th century, it is the resurgence of the national problem. The main discussion today is not the proletariat against the bourgeoisie or even democracy against totalitarianism. For me, the major dilemma of the times is technology and nationalisms: on the one hand, the technical unification of the world by virtue of the internationalization of the productive processes; and on the other hand, the fragmentation, the national explosion everywhere, the proliferation of sovereignties. There are now 160 countries, compared with only about 80 some 40 years ago. Everywhere, there is a resurgence of cultural identities,

whether they be called Islam, Buddhism or Christianity, tribalism, regionalism or nationalism. This seems to me to be the decisive phenomenon: how human groups can maintain their historical identity in a world that is increasingly more homogeneous, technically and industrially speaking.

[Question] Since De Gaulle, the French nuclear strategy has enjoyed a broad consensus in the country. Everyone recognizes that it plays a key role in France's autonomy. Do you believe that Europe's independence depends on the development of nuclear weapons in other countries?

[Answer] Nuclear weapons are nationalist, very anti-alliance weapons. When China obtained the atomic bomb, it no longer needed its alliance with the Soviet Union and when France obtained it, it could also emancipate itself from NATO. Nuclear weapons -- Mitterrand said this years ago -- are somewhat in contradiction with the principle of any weapon due to the fact that their destructive effects are such that they can only be used for the defense of their territory and vital interests. In that sense, there is no credible nuclear umbrella. It is not logical to think that the United States would risk its life over the defense of any European city.

[Question] Following the installation of the Euromissiles, Mitterrand said that the pacifists were in West Europe and the rockets in the USSR!

[Answer] We have to recognize that we owe peace to the atomic era. It has been the balance of terror that has protected peace in West Europe. It is not by accident that a nuclearized continent such as Europe has enjoyed peace for 40 years. Nor is it an accident that continents without nuclear weapons are the regions of the world where all conflicts have been concentrated. In other words, one can only praise the atomic bomb as an anti-imperialist and pacifist bomb.

[Question] That seems to be a provocation.

[Answer] I would go even further. If the pacifists were consistent, they would have to support atomic weapons, which cannot be used against one's own people.

[Question] What role is played by military strategies in the unification of Europe?

[Answer] In my book, I say that we cannot leave Yalta without breaking the false America-or-Russia alternative. This leads us to the problem of European unity because there can be no overall military defense if there is not a political unit, above all, with nuclear weapons, which implies unified decision-making. In other words, there cannot be 12 fingers on an atomic trigger because crises are so rapid and what is at stake is something so far-reaching that only one can decide.

[Question] Do you believe that France, with its nuclear potential, is more independent in the international sphere than Sweden?

[Answer] No, France has mortgaged a goodly share of its autonomy because of its membership in the Washington Treaty. Now then, most of the bit of independence that France enjoys is due to the fact that it has a credible military and nuclear power. Its international influence responds more to its strategic autonomy than to its economic and industrial potential and, naturally, to the fact that it thinks for itself concerning major international problems.

[Question] How do you evaluate the understanding shown by Gorbachev in Paris concerning the Eureka project?

[Answer] On that there is a misunderstanding. Gorbachev wants Europe not to become involved in the "star wars" project. The Soviets are happy that France and other countries such as Germany do not want to be mere lackeys or subcontractors in the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project and there is fact a divergency of European and Soviet interests. The Soviets do not want the SDI because they know it represents an incredible technological efforts, an immense cost, and they are behind on all technologies necessary for a space defense project.

[Question] And can Europe expect to compete?

[Answer] Europe's interest, naturally, lies in clearly maintaining the nuclear deterrent, fighting to maintain its competitiveness with the United States in decisive technologies, which are those that are used in space, mainly microelectronics and artificial intelligence. We must act in concert in order not to become underdeveloped and Gorbachev supports the Eureka project to the extent that he views it as a civil program. It is tactical support. The challenges put forth cannot be faced individually by each European country within the narrow framework of their borders.

[Question] What is your opinion of a referendum to decide whether Spain remains in or leaves NATO?

[Answer] I find the idea of a referendum formidable. It seems to me to be proof of democracy, civic maturity and citizen participation unique in the European world. There has never been such a vote. When France signed the Washington Treaty in 1949, it was not even ratified by Parliament. This referendum is out of the ordinary, but excellent. I am confident that it will result in quantities of information and a discussion on very specific aspects. Under such conditions, it can be a unique opportunity to educate the people.

11,464
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POLITICAL

GREECE

U.S. INTENTIONS BEHIND BASES' ISSUE QUESTIONED

Athens ENA in Greek 19 Dec 85 p 13

Article by Panos Loukakos: "The Bases and the Questions"

Text Once again within the last few years Greek-American relations occupy the headlines. The bases are the main issue.

As opposition party in the Chamber of Deputies, PASOK used to say that "the bases will be removed." As the government a few years later, it signed an agreement which provided that the bases would remain at least until 1988. At the very moment this agreement was being signed, the big posters PASOK had put up proclaimed triumphantly that "the bases are thrown out, the struggle is now being justified." Of course, no struggle had been justified and no bases had been thrown out. Now the next round begins.

The American government has officially asked the Greek government "here and now" to clarify the future of the bases; that is, to say whether the agreement will be extended beyond 1988. Unofficially and behind the scenes, the Greek government has apparently given Washington the impression that the bases will stay. But already the American secretary of state has asked for a public and official commitment, and that's where the trouble starts--big trouble!

The Greek government has already abandoned the slogan of withdrawing from EEC. It shows no intention of leaving NATO. Two of the most important slogans used by PASOK to feed its followers have collapsed. Only one remains: "Throw out the bases of death." They will not be expelled immediately, but will be removed in 1988. This was the way out used until now.

But now time is running out. Washington is pressing for a clear answer which must be given in the first few months of this year. The pressure is not accidental--it comes at a time when the Greek government is searching abroad for economic support to deal with the economic crisis. This support will not be easily found unless our foreign policy is aligned with that of the West.

All these points are too obvious to need elaboration. What is not yet clear is the way PASOK will try to convince its followers to give up the slogan for

removal of the bases. Neither is it clear what will be left from the PASOK political program presented between 1974 and 1981 when it came to power.

The problem now facing A. Papandreu is not trivial. Anti-Americanism was one of the sacred cows of the Greek Left, communist or not. It was relatively easy to shift gears in the case of the EEC. Even remaining in NATO could be somehow justified. But retention of the bases after 1988, which must be formalized now, exceeds the limits of endurance by the PASOK rank and file.

For these reasons it is hard to foretell the government's reaction. The pressure Washington applies at this moment on Papandreu is very strong. The price sought by Washington is too heavy: it is asking PASOK to give up the last vestiges of its political program. This is tough; very difficult even for a government that has repeatedly changed its views.

Should PASOK now accept Washington's request, should it now give assurances that the bases will stay--the entire political edifice it erected since 1974 will crumble. Washington of course knows it well; and the question is why did Washington select this moment to raise the issue for retention of the bases after 1988? Why does it try to force the Greek government to face many different blind alleys, although it knows that in the end the bases will not be removed? What is behind this new scenario which once again may undermine the current climate of good Greek-American relations?

7520
CSO: 3521/77

POLITICAL

GREECE

GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLING EXPECTED IN MAY

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 19 Dec 85 p 6

/From the Paraskinios column/

/Text/ The government will appear in May with a new face. It seems that Premier A. Papandreu is likely to go in that direction. Suggestions by close associates to speed up the reshuffling (in January or February) were rejected. May appears to be more suitable for a cabinet reshuffling for two reasons:

First, by then the economic measures taken by the government will have some result.

Second, the cabinet will be approximately 10 months old and therefore it will be possible for the premier to evaluate the performance of the ministers.

Although it is too early to forecast the composition of the new cabinet, there are already some indications that:

First, there will be no significant changes in the key ministries.

Second, new cadres will be tried out.

Third, ministers will be moved from one ministry to another.

The idea to use persons outside the Parliamentary Group and Movement is being abandoned, in spite of suggestions made to the premier by close associates.

Nevertheless, I am told that certain cabinet members have asked to be assigned to other ministries either because they believe that in another post they will be more effective or that they exhausted their contribution to the post they now occupy.

A problem currently considered by the premier is utilization of persons with special talents who have been appointed to cabinet posts in previous PASOK cabinets. It seems that some of them may be used again. Already a former minister was told that he is going to be included in the next cabinet.

7520

CSO: 3521/78

POLITICAL

GREECE

LOOKING TO 1986: MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, OTHER PROBLEMS

Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 22 Dec 85 p 48

[Text] A difficult year has ended and a more difficult one is beginning. The coming year is going to be more difficult because, during its course, the economic and social crises are going to peak. At the same time, it is a pre-election year because municipal elections are going to be held in October 1986 and, under the present conditions, their political impact is going to be tremendous.

It is precisely here where the big problems are going to emerge. Faced with municipal elections, how is the government going to be able to implement the announced policy? And, if, under pressure by its voters, it goes back on it, what are going to be the consequences on the course of the economy? On the other hand, the opposition parties will be able to avoid the facile criticism and the thoughtless promises when they know that the municipal elections will be the determining factors for the political proceedings.

Matters are relatively simple and it is not necessary for one to have divining powers to foretell their course. If Mr. Mitsotakis is able to sidestep the obstacle of his party's congress and has not been ousted by fall, it will be precisely in the municipal elections that he will fight his last battle. It is evident that if he does not win this battle too, he will be ousted the next day. The municipal elections constitute a determining factor for New Democracy and its leader.

Thus, the struggle fought by the official opposition will be tougher.

The KKE will also have no other alternative except to fight a hard and protracted preelectoral struggle. First, because it must regain, at all costs, the ground it lost in the June elections. Second, because it is already facing certain internal problems that will become more intense if the election results do not provide a clear indication that the Communists are once more rallying their forces. Already Mr. Florakis and the leadership group of the KKE are the target of criticism from their rank and file for the strategy they followed during the 1985 pre-electoral campaign. Evidently, what the critics are mainly seeking is for the Communist Party to harden its position towards PASOK.

Finally, PASOK begins the preelectoral year under extremely difficult conditions. The economic crisis will grow during the months to come. The social pressures

will be intensified at the same time. 1986 will not be just an election year, it will be a year of strikes. The government knows this. It knows it, but it is unable to confront it. There are no margins for concessions.

An abandonment of the present hard financial policy will lead straight to the IMF. And words are not enough as a substitute for action. The government has officially admitted that during 1986 the buying power of the workers will decrease by about 10 percent. Actually, this decrease is going to be much greater.

This coming fall PASOK will have to face both the Right and Left opposition under these extremely difficult conditions. The result of this electoral battle is just as determining for New Democracy as it is for PASOK. Because a clear defeat of PASOK in the municipal elections will automatically pose a political question in view of the fact that the opposition will contend every day that the government plainly no longer has the confidence of the people. A PASOK defeat in this year's municipal elections will inevitably open the door for the holding of early parliamentary elections.

Of course, 1986 hides other problems beyond the municipal elections. With regard to the government, the first few months of the year will determine the course of Greek-American relations. During these first few months, the government must notify Washington unequivocally what it intends to do about the matter of the bases, whether they will remain or not. The pressure exerted by the United States on this subject is already great. The greater the pressure, the more difficult it will be for Mr. Andreas Papandreou to publicly commit himself at this time as to what he intends to do in 1988 when the existing agreement expires. A breakdown in Greek-American relations at this moment will give preelectoral arguments to New Democracy. Conversely, a solution of the question at this moment, when the Americans demand it, will supply the KKE's attack with new ammunition.

On the other hand, New Democracy has to confront its own endemic intra-party crisis. It goes to its convention without being sure of who is going to be its leader at this convention. Mr. Mitsotakis' opponents within the party always move effectively, while he tries, by jerky moves, to hold on to the party leadership. The first few weeks of 1986 will determine Mr. Mitsotakis' fate because during these weeks either his opponents will form an alliance and oust him or he will manage to reach the convention, which he, of course, will have succeeded in controlling in order to hang on to the leadership.

PASOK does not have similar problems because no one is opposing its leadership. However, this does not mean that there are no internal problems within the government party.

The expelled labor union leaders have already proceeded to form new movements, while a variety of creaks are being heard at the organized party base. There will be tensions even at the top level, as soon as the premier proceeds to effect the expected reshuffling because naturally some will leave, some will be brought in and, as always happens, the majority will once more remain outside the "bridal chamber," and during a preelection year, those who "remain outside the bridal chamber" can create problems.

The coming year will be difficult. Economic crisis, social tensions, political problems. All these pile up and demand urgent solutions. Who is to give them though, and how?

POLITICAL

GREECE

NAMES, FACTS, BEHIND PASOK YOUTH ORGANIZATION'S DIVISIONS

Athens ENA in Greek 26 Dec 85 p 11

/Text/ The intra-party crisis besetting PASOK lately has not left the Movement's Youth Organization unaffected. The opposite is true.

On the internal "front" of the Youth Organization we today find two opposing groups. On the one hand the old leadership of the PASOK student organization which is considered to belong to the Left wing of the Movement, and which continues to "uphold" the September 3 founding declaration; and on the other, a newly formed alliance of various leading cadres who reflect the official new party line and who personify in the youth area of PASOK what the traditional Left calls "a rightward shift."

Today the latter group controls the PASOK Youth Committee--mainly through Committee Secretary Thanasis Papageorgiou--which plays the role of a "conveyor belt" for transmitting directives of the party leadership from the /PASOK/ Executive Bureau to the youth area.

The "high-level overseers" on behalf of the party leadership are Christos Papoutsis (a Eurodeputy and erstwhile chairman of the National Student Union of Greece /EFEET/); Kostas Skandalidis (a member of the Executive Bureau); and Stefanos Tzoumacas (alternate member of the Executive Bureau).

Kh. Papoutsis, who served in the past as an advisor to M. Koutsogiorgas, is regarded as a "Koutsogiorgas man" and is seen as trying to form--in the context of the new PASOK orientation--a strong "bridgehead" for the Koutsogiorgas group (E. Kouloumbis, E. Giannopoulos, G. A. Mangakis and others) within the party youth area.

For different reasons Papoutsis receives the cooperation of K. Skandalidis, a past "protege" and advisor to K. Laliotis (now those who dislike him accuse him of declaring publicly that "I never identified with Laliotis"), and St. Tzoumacas who, it is said, is lately "under the wing" of A. Tsokhatzopoulos.

The triad has won over the Youth Organization Secretary Th. Papageorgiou, who in the past had ties with G. Gennimatas, and tries to expand its strongholds throughout the organizational mechanism of the PASOK youth.

For the time being, its main goal is to dampen the objections of those who disagree with recent governmental measures, and push to the side the cadres of the Left wing who continue to defend the principles of the PASOK founding declaration.

The machinations of this triad are considered to be responsible for the removal of two of the three alternate secretaries of the PASOK Youth Organization and their replacement by persons having the absolute confidence of Th. Papageorgiou.

Specifically, Giannis Nikolaou (close to G. Gennimatas) and Khr. Smyrlis (a close friend of K. Laliotis who had clashed in the past with Th. Katsanevas when he was deputy governor of the Labor Force Employment Organization-- both elected members of the Movement's Central Committee--) were removed from the post of alternate secretaries and replaced by Giannis Papadonikolakis and Dimitris Karydas. The third alternate secretary, G. Magriotis, is still in his post but without any real power.

In the face of this situation, the Left wing has set up its ramparts in the ranks of the Student Youth. This wing is represented at the leadership level by Dimitris Katsandonis, chairman of the University of Salonica Student Union and a member of the Youth Committee; Vasilis Togias, a member of the leadership of the Student Youth in Athens; Alekos Petrakis, secretary of the Student Youth; Dionysis Kambourakis, and Giannis Tsamourgelis (a member of the EFEE Central Council who was deposed from the posts to which he was elected by decision of the General Council of the Athens Financial Section on charges of having agreed to allow the special Riot Control Units to enter the chemistry school, while he was a member of the Off-bounds Committee).

The Youth Leading Group, which is said to systematically promote cadres favored by A. Tsokhatzopoulos and M. Koutsogiorgas, lately resorted to two maneuvers to avert a further deterioration of the situation.

Specifically, according to those who disagree /the group/, trying to present a "Left alibi" launched "out of the blue" a harsh attack against Sotiris Kostopoulos, the former secretary general of Press and Information, and sought to have him expelled from PASOK for saying that the cabinet should broaden its base by bringing in I. Boutos and Dion. Livanos, etc.

The second maneuver was in the direction of giving greater autonomy to the Panhellenic Militant Student Faction /PASP/, the PASOK student youth organization.

This move is also a temporary solution of necessity, which will allow PASP leftist cadres to get rid of its organizational introversion which intensified after the resignation of Laliotis (the former deputy minister exercised great influence on these cadres who now seek new representation to the Executive Bureau and the high leadership groups around G. Rokkos and And. Tritsis) and to prepare the organization for the student elections.

One can understand how necessary this was by looking at the first results of the elections in the various schools where PASP lost a great deal of ground. On its part, the Left wing is preparing, according to certain reports, a document with signatures which--we are told--will cause a tremendous commotion in the leadership group of the Youth Organization.

The cadres' reply to the youth of the two communist parties, who ask 'why aren't you leaving?' is the cryptic phrase, "let Andreas leave first and then we will reshuffle the deck of cards."

7520
CSO: 3521/77

POLITICAL

GREECE

REASONS FOR TSOKHATZOPoulos' INCREASED POWERS

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 26 Dec 85 p 6

/Text/ Akis Tsokhatzopoulos has assumed additional responsibilities--not in the government but in the Movement /Party/. His main task is to coordinate all organizations and keep in touch with PASOK cadres to assure better organization and efficiency of the party mechanism. This was deemed necessary following certain events:

First, the premier's involvement with governmental operations which he wishes to control, while at the same time he wants to check implementation of economic measures. Under these conditions the premier cannot spend as much time now with the Movement as he did in the past.

Second, the recent complete change in membership of the Executive Bureau /EG/ where Tsokhatzopoulos is the only member from the previous bureau. So, he has the expertise and knowledge of the party mechanism to play a leadership role and give guidance on issues emerging in the party organizations. Despite their abilities the other EG members do not have the Tsokhatzopoulos range to intervene in certain operational problems of the party machinery.

Third, the expulsion of PASOK trade unionists and group moves of other cadres (in the trade unions) require existence of additional control to assure unity of the Movement.

Fourth, the forthcoming municipal election requires the existence of coordination among the party organizations to facilitate the nomination of PASOK candidates in municipalities and communities and the preparation and mobilization of the entire party mechanism for the October contest.

Because of these facts, it was deemed necessary to have a super-coordinator in the Movement, to guide the organizations on key issues.

Of course, the main choices and charting of the party line and strategy will be made by the EG which convenes (in plenary session, or with participation of certain members) at regular intervals.

In the context of the PASOK party mechanism restructuring, there are changes in the persons leading certain party organizations.

7520

CSO: 3521/78

ITALY

CRAXI-DE MITA 'TRUCE' DECLARED DESPITE PCI-DC TENSIONS

Polemics Attenuated

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Georgio Battestini: "The Secretariat and Directorate Tone Down Controversies with Palazzo Chigi"]

[Text] At Piazza del Gesu they calmly and coolly pull the plug before the majority gets a short circuit. The prevailing attitude could be summed up as follows: that's enough for now, let's avoid a brawl. We'll talk about it later. For the present let's deal with concrete problems. No direct response to Craxi's comments on TV. In order not to rekindle a controversy that appeared closed with the Senate vote on Friday, but which flared up immediately afterwards and was immensely magnified in the papers and on TV, Di Mita's staff say "Let's go ahead since the country's problems require it."

The DC secretary said something more than that to the directorate which met yesterday afternoon, after a morning devoted to a closed meeting of the secretariat. Di Mita seems to have completely gotten over the most recent flareups of controversy. He says "the settlement of the government crisis was a positive event." Christian Democracy contributed in a noteworthy if not conclusive way, even in straightening out the difficulties arising during the parliamentary debate on the confidence vote for the government. We did so with moderation and a sense of responsibility, carrying out that five-party line set forth by the congress, and which was our own firm choice. That remains the DC position. In a diligent and attentive way, we shall pursue it, explaining and justifying our positions in support of the alliance.

In the tense (and ostentatiously calm) climate prevailing yesterday at Piazza del Gesu, at an extraordinarily crowded directorate meeting (the pre-congress electoral arrangements were also under discussion), the measured words of De Mita should be weighed one by one. The DC leader would have the PSI note that the government was twice saved by Piazza del Gesu; that socialist criticisms are bound to compete with and collide with the "moderation and sense of responsibility" of the largest government party. The DC answers Craxi, who yesterday was speculating about a new socialist congress if the current five-party collaboration were called into question, with similar arguments, that is, by confirming its adherence to the political line "set forth at the

congress" stating "this remains the DC position." But the socialists are sent a warning: the biggest party in the alliance will pursue this line "in a careful and alert way." Which is to say there is the suspicion that others do not intend to stand by the agreements. This, as well as the possibility of early elections, came up several times at the directorate yesterday. Some people close to the secretary took it upon themselves to air this suspicion. "We do not want early elections, but we must be careful not to let ourselves be caught unprepared, because we do have the impression that somebody wants them," said Nicola Mancino, president of the DC senators. The day after Craxi's awaited reply on TV, the prevailing atmosphere in the DC establishment was the desire to let the government and majority have a quiet convalescence, and avoid undesirable relapses into the high fever of an explosive brawl. In the directorate Forlani, above all, is the chief advocate of this line. The vice chairman of the council said, "I fail to understand on what logical basis a group of leaders who are not in the service of the King of Prussia could cast aside a line of collaboration, other than which there is in fact nothing, except the King of Prussia." Early elections would be a dereliction of responsibility. It could only be justified if in fact the PSI were to use the government formula merely to exploit it against the DC to bring about a reversal of alliances. "But," Forlani states, "we know on the basis of facts that this has never been Craxi's line." However, while De Mita's conclusions after 5 and 1/2 hours of discussion admitted that Forlani was right, they do remind him that "something has changed during these days."

One of the three vice secretaries, Vincenzo Scotti, affirms that the squabble "is neither eliminated nor ended. Immediate responses? Calm. Politics have longer time periods than newspapers." Rognoni, who was directly attacked by Craxi ("it does not appear to me that his objections have a place in the constitution") adds that in any event "for us the controversy is ended if the socialists do not start up again. Now we are thinking of things that should be done." Certainly, discontent is still rife; but it is being curbed. "It is impossible that Craxi should say one thing and Martelli and Formica should say something else," Nicola Mancino goes on to say. "Obviously these are not unimportant party secretaries."

The fear expressed in muted tones is that a part of the controversy fed by the socialists has the real (but unavowable) objective: the coming DC congress. In a word, to spread discord in the adversary's camp. Perhaps even for that reason yesterday evening De Mita, while confirming "careful and alert" support for the alliance, made an explicit reference to the May congress. He said until that time we should "dedicate ourselves to adjusting our structures to link up with the people, associating them with the political proposal the party is putting forward. Furthermore, he added, these most recent developments themselves show how, for the whole Italian political framework, and the DC internally, there is the problem of new and more efficient forms of communication with society. The DC ought to be able to respond to the great receptiveness which public opinion is showing toward the party. To do that, now, more than ever, our internal unity, an indispensable element for the democratic equilibrium of the country, is necessary. All are called on to create that internal unity, with ones own contribution, ones own loyalty, ones own readiness." The first test is reform of the electoral rules for the next congress; a proposal for reform was distributed recently. (As Paolo Cabras,

responsible for organization, explains) the most important innovation is eliminating the rigidity of the voting by list in order to introduce a "limited multiple" vote into the sections, making possible the "expression of minorities and freeing one from being cooped up in advance by party trends."

[Photo Caption] Arnaldo Forlani, vice-president of the council of ministers. The DC secretary confirms the faithfulness to the political line "set forth in the congress." For Forlani early elections would be a "dereliction of responsibility"

PCI Role in Parliament

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Nov 85

[Article by Alberto Stabile: "Back Into the Game, but Suspicious; Natta Does Not Wish to 'Serve as a Buffer'"]

[Text] How is the communist party handling the sudden accelerations in the political situation? What responses is the largest opposition party giving to the prime minister's overtures, even though watered down by the conclusion that an alternative to the five party accord cannot for the moment be envisaged?

From the communist side recently there has been no lack of concrete indications of the attention given to these new signals from Craxian politics. The five party alliance is in the process of dissolution and yet, as Natta wrote in the Sunday UNITA, "There have been considerable changes and these are fully taken in." But, and here is the question, within which framework of alliance are these opportunities to be taken in? With what intentions? For which strategy?

The reply they give at the Botteghe Oscure does not ignore the importance of the collaboration Craxi requested on the parliamentary front (laws; budget), but goes well beyond that. It is said that the sole remedy for the death-throes of the five party accord (and the only antidote for early elections) is a government with a plan, without set formulas or line-ups. With the specification (as Massimo D'Alena will emphasize in the forthcoming number of RINASCITA) that the principal task of that government as an alternative prospect would be to "reform and renovate the democratic system."

Will this politico-institutional proposal, which appears to contain Ingrao's recent proposals for a "constituent government", be the key permitting the PCI to leave the perennial antechamber of power and enter into full participation?

Moments of satisfaction for having "re-entered the game," thus breaking out of an isolation lasting for years, alternate with evaluations characterized by a judicious suspicion. As a communist leader pointed out, the PCI fears serving as a buffer for Craxi's oscillations without being able to reap the advantages, and for that reason it responds with a proposal which is not based on any exclusions vis a vis the DC. And then there is the awareness (Bufalini apparently recalled it) that even the death-throes of the center-left were very long and years passed before the framework of alliances would change.

In reality the communist party today is passing through a particularly difficult time. The shocks inflicted on the political framework obliged it to offer an immediate proposal which was dropped (it was the program government). The internal crisis, confirmed by the double electoral defeat, obliges it to take into account the new elements of the precongress debate which is on the verge of reaching its highest point.

From today until Friday the commission of 77 will examine the text of the theses document which will constitute the basis for discussion. That weighty document, with its nearly 100 pages, is divided into chapters which probably embrace too many subjects to serve at the same time as a flexible instrument for discussion. The new PCI line is there, in those 97 pages which extend from foreign policy to organizational problems. The strategic prospect still remains an alternative, but the real problem is the "intermediate steps" to reach it. And it is known that on this front the leading communist group is divided between the "miglioristi" or reformists (favorable to a privileged relationship with the socialists), the Berlinguer center, and the Ingraoist left-wing.

There is no advance information. However it does appear that the proposal for the "program government" has been confirmed, since it is considered not to conflict with the tasks of institutional reforms characterizing the "constituent government" launched by Ingrao.

There remains the problem of relations with the socialists. According to Occhetto (who referred to it in RINASCITA) the PSI ought to have a "central" role, "a hinge," even in the "program government". If this proposal prevails the "liberal" Right, which identifies with Napolitano's positions, will be satisfied with it. It remains to be seen what Ingrao thinks of it. That will be known at the central committee which will be called for the end of the month. Meanwhile it can be said that Craxi's overtures were not ignored. There are contacts, between Chiaromonte and Formica, between Occhetto and Martelli: party diplomacy at work. The budget will be the proving ground.

9772
CSO: 3528/20

PCI'S NAPOLITANO LEADS SURVEY AS SUCCESSOR TO NATTA

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 27 Nov 85 p 18

[Text] Geirgio Napolitano is the leading communist who Italian politicians are focusing their attention on. This is the result of a poll conducted by Demoskopea for Adnkronos of a sample of 511 parliamentarians, and regional and local councillors chosen on the basis of a statistical criterion.

To the question "who in the next 10 years will be the most efficient and productive leader of the PCI", Napolitano has in all obtained 110 votes, followed closely by 93 votes for Lama (who, however, within his own party collected the smallest number of votes).

The 110 votes obtained by Napolitano represent the total "preferences" expressed by parliamentarians (25), regional councillors (37), and town councillors (37). The poll brings to light different, relevant opinions among politicians of different groups. Parliamentarians and town councillors concur in their preference for Napolitano over other leading communists indicated on the questionnaire. Regional councillors prefer Lama.

Regarding the overall voting, the "results" are as follows: Napolitano 110, Lama 93, Occhetto 85, Zangheri 65, Natta 31 and D'Alema 30; 69 preferred not to respond while 38 polled have indicated other names.

Christian Democrats [DC] who were polled showed more preference for Lama, who received 49 votes out of a total of 175. In the DC ranking Napolitano is in second place with 45 votes, followed by Zangheri (29) and Occhetto (22). Natta received only 2 votes, one less than D'Alema.

Among the Communists polled, there is greater harmony, even though Occhetto takes the advantage (25 votes) over Napolitano and D'Alema (both in second place, receiving 24 votes). Natta received 22 votes and Zangheri 17, while Lama received only 10 votes.

The results of choices indicated by other parties again show Napolitano in the lead, Lama in second place, followed by Occhetto.

Finally, the "percentage" breakdown: Those polled with incomes up to 20 million lire prefer Occhetto, those between 20-40 million lire prefer Lama, those earning over 40 million prefer Napolitano.

6182

CSO: 3528/34

MSI VICE-SECRETARY TREMAGLIA RESIGNS OVER ANTI-U.S. DISSENT

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 29 Oct 85 p 18

[Article: "Tremaglia: I Disagree With the MSI Anti-U.S. Controversy"]

[Text] Giuseppe Nicolai's resolution, which provoked vice secretary Tremaglia's resignation at the MSI [Italian Social Movement] is considered by the latter as a "mishap along the way." Tremaglia explained the reasons for his decision although he sought to emphasize that "There was an explanation and there are no further misunderstandings" with Almirante, the party secretary. In any event the internal debate on the question was referred to the political office. "For the time being," stated Tremaglia, "the resignation stands."

The MSI-DN vice-secretary explained he had resigned because of a resolution adopted on foreign policy. It was a resolution that "did not follow the party line as fixed in the congress documents and all our policy statements. I am vice-secretary and responsible for foreign policy. Obviously I resigned from everything. Someone like me certainly doesn't stand on ceremony," Tremaglia added.

Concerning relations with the MSI-DN secretary, Tremaglia claimed "there is no further misunderstanding" between Almirante and himself. "If misunderstandings remain with someone else...we shall see. After my speech at the central committee Almirante stood up and said he agreed with everything [I had said] adding that the party line in foreign policy was as I had stated it. At this point I am confident there will be a meeting of the political office to clarify matters."

Tremaglia explained the nature of the resolution. "Recently at the NATO North Atlantic assembly, of which I am a member, I noted considerable progress toward Euro-Atlanticism. Hence, a joint attitude already exists and is confirmed in every quarter. At San Francisco the policy of the two pillars, USA and Europe, was clearly set forth." According to Tremaglia there are yet to clarify "Five points which represent the Right's image in the world, and there are no others: loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and to Euro-Atlanticism; no subjection to anyone whatsoever; a policy for European and Western security without any place for the Third World dissuasion against Soviet aggression and imperialism; struggle against international terrorism against the 'Arafat and Qadhafi gangs; recognition of Israel's right to security and of the Palestine people's right to a homeland."

9772
CSO:3528/20

POLITICAL

NORWAY

POLL SHOWS LOSSES FOR LABOR PARTY, COALITION PARTNER

Center, Liberals Decline

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 9

[Article by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] The January political barometer from the Norwegian Opinion Institute [NOI] indicates unusually big shifts in party support levels. The Labor Party had a sharp decline, historic lows were recorded for the Center Party and the Liberals, and the Christian People's Party moved up substantially.

The Labor Party rating for this month was 41.0 percent. This is the lowest level noted since the Storting election last year and a decline of 2 whole percentage points since its peak in December. But it is too early to tell whether this is the beginning of a negative trend for the Labor Party. There is still a very high percentage of stability in the Labor Party and if the decline is a real one it is due more to eroding support among quite new voters than to the defection of old voters.

The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, increased its support from 5.7 to 6.4 percent, its best rating since the election.

The Conservative Party's situation is very stable (+0.2 percent since December). The 30.4 percent support level is exactly the same as the party received in the Storting election. The Progressive Party gained slightly (+0.4) and seems to have ended up somewhat below the election result of 3.7 percent. The January poll gave the Progressives a 3.5 percent rating.

Little Stability

The picture for the other nonsocialist parties is far from stable. The Center Party is all the way down to 4.8 percent (-1.0), lower than the party has ever been in an NOI poll. The Center Party [SP] has lost about a quarter of its voters since the election in September, when its support level was 6.6 percent. The survey material suggests that the party has lost about the same number of voters to the Conservatives as to the Labor Party.

	Stor- lings- (1) valget 1981	Feb. %	Mars %	April %	May %	Juni %	Aug. %	Sept. %	Okt. %	Nov. %	Des. %	Jan. %
	Stor- lings- (1) valget 1986											
Ap.(2)	37.1	39.4	38.7	38.2	38.9	37.6	37.3	40.8	41.6	42.6	43.0	41.0
DLF(3)	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.4
Fr.p.(4)	4.5	4.9	4.4	6.1	4.0	3.3	4.1	3.7	4.5	4.1	3.1	3.5
H(5)	31.8	30.8	32.6	30.6	31.9	33.5	32.8	30.4	29.0	29.8	31.1	30.4
Kr.F.(6)	9.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.7	8.7	8.9	8.3	7.4	7.6	7.5	9.5
NKP(7)	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.4
RV(8)	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.5	1.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.3
Sp.(9)	6.6	5.5	6.6	7.3	6.5	5.8	5.8	6.6	6.2	6.8	6.5	4.8
SV(10)	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.3	5.2	5.9	6.7	5.5	6.3	5.8	5.7	6.4
V(11)	3.9	4.4	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.7	2.9	3.1	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.2
Andre(12)	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.4	1.1
Sum: (13)	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0
Ap. + SV(14)	42.1	44.4	43.2	43.5	44.1	43.5	43.0	46.3	47.9	47.7	48.3	47.4
H + Kr.F. + Sp.(15)	47.7	44.5	47.4	46.2	47.1	48.0	47.5	45.3	42.6	44.2	45.1	44.7
Ap. + SV + V(16)	46.0	48.8	45.9	45.8	47.4	47.2	45.9	49.4	51.2	50.4	50.8	51.4
H + Kr.F. + Sp. + Fr.p.(17)	52.2	49.4	51.8	52.3	51.1	51.3	51.6	49.0	47.1	48.3	48.2	48.2

The figures show how many votes would go to each party if we had a Storting election tomorrow, as indicated by people who would definitely cast a vote. They were also asked which party they voted for in the 1985 Storting election. The difference between these answers and the actual election results in 1985 was used as a weighting factor.

There were 903 interviews with people 18 and older and 1010 with people 15 and older.

Interviews conducted in the period 10-25 January 1986 by Gallup/NOI.

Key:

1. Storting elections
2. Labor Party
3. Liberal People's Party
4. Progressives
5. Conservatives
6. Christian People's Party
7. Norwegian CP
8. Red Election Alliance
9. Center Party
10. Socialist Left
11. Liberals
12. Other
13. Total
14. Labor + Socialist Left
15. Conservatives + Christian People's Party + Center
16. Labor Party + Socialist Left + Liberals
17. Conservatives + Christian People's Party + Center + Progressives

The Liberal decline was only 0.5 percent compared to September but the trend was even more ominous for SP. Its level of 2.2 percent is a historic low and does not indicate the prospect of a Storting comeback.

The Christian People's Party was this month's winner with 9.5 percent (+1.7) of the votes. That is well above the party's election results of 8.3 percent and the best level the party has had since NOI started taking polls for AFTENPOSTEN in 1982.

The Labor Party and the Socialist Left [SV] are still ahead of the government coalition parties by 47.4 percent to 44.7, but if the Progressives are added in, the nonsocialist bloc has a support level of 48.2 percent.

Party Leaders Comment

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 9

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Jakobsen Calls Poll Figures an Aberration"]

[Text] "A support level of 41 percent does not create pessimism in the Labor Party," said Labor Party secretary Ivar Leveraas in his comment on the party's decline from 43 to 41 percent in the January poll from Gallup/NOI. "The picture is confusing," said Center Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen, while Christian People's Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik said this concerning the gains made by his party: "This was very encouraging!"

Bondevik, Jakobsen and Leveraas agreed that one cannot put too much emphasis on a single opinion poll and all three said that the balance of strength between the two "blocs" in Norwegian politics is very even.

Aberration?

Traffic Minister Johan J. Jakobsen, leader of the Center Party, wanted to wait and see the results of other polls before making definite conclusions. His party declined from 5.8 to 4.8 percent. He reminded us that the Center Party's support levels in the Gallup/NOI polls have fluctuated a great deal and recalled that the Center Party got a rating of 7.3 percent in April while its election result was 6.6 percent.

"When Market Data's January poll gave the Center Party a 6.2 percent rating, I think this latest poll is an aberration," said Jakobsen. And he did not see any political explanation for the fact that the Center Party and the Labor Party are declining while the Christian People's Party is gaining ground and the Conservatives are holding their own.

No Pessimism

What are people saying at Labor Party headquarters in Youngstorvet about the fact that the party dropped from 43 percent in December to 41 percent in January? Labor Party secretary Ivar Leveraas replied:

"If we take the margin of error into account, the poll indicates a stable situation. I do not find the poll remarkable and the blocs have equal levels of strength. A support level of 41 percent does not create pessimism in the Labor Party. The December rating of 43 percent was the highest we have had in a long long time and this can be regarded as a kind of natural readjustment."

While Jakobsen and Leveraas have experienced declines, the opposite is true for Christian People's Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik. His party went up from 7.8 to 9.5 percent. Bondevik's comment went like this:

"This was a tremendous encouragement at the beginning of a new year. The poll confirms and reinforces the gains the Christian People's Party scored in the Market Data poll. I have no good explanation for this gain, but I am not ruling out the possibility that people have noted that at the beginning of a new year we have strongly emphasized our 'special issues,' namely the protection of life and human values and social responsibility. It is hard to give a more comprehensive explanation before more polls have been released."

Paper on Center's Setback

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Voters on the Move"]

[Text] With its 4.8 percent in the Gallup/NOI political opinion poll the Center Party has hit bottom. That is a record low for the Center Party in the history of this institute's political barometer. At times it has had an even lower support level in polls released by other institutes. The poll published in AFTENPOSTEN today is a dash of cold water confirming the fact that the party has lost ground on all sides.

As a predominantly business party the Center Party cannot become a really big party. In urban areas it lacks appeal and credibility and in rural areas its social and political structure are different than they were in the party's heyday. As banner bearer for broad nonsocialist cooperation, the Conservative Party has taken over the role of the largest government party, even in areas of the country where it once had trouble making any inroads. Only a small number of nonsocialist voters consider the Center Party an alternative today. The question for them in a nutshell is which of the three parties best safeguards their interests.

It is hard to read any clear pattern on the basis of a single opinion poll. This is especially true because the record low for the coalition's smallest party was noted at the same time as the Labor Party lost 2 whole percentage points. But the trend on the nonsocialist side is clear enough.

The Christian People's Party swings between ratings of just under 8 percent and--as now--just over 9 percent. As the largest and thus most exposed government party the Conservative Party has had remarkable stability around the

30 percent mark. The rating of 30.4 percent for January is precisely the same support level that the party had in the election last fall.

The stability among Conservative voters illustrates the growth potential of the government's biggest party. We assume that the new party leaders, headed by Rolf Presthus, will see the possibilities this opens up for an offensive liberal-conservative policy. The Center Party for its part faces a choice of possibly historic importance.

If the party misjudges this situation it may fall over the edge of the precipice. As we know opposition forces in the party have drawn the conclusion that the miserable Gallup figures are the price the party is paying for the government cooperation they have always been against. This analysis could not be more wrong and of course the party leaders are aware of that.

It is now more important than ever before to unite party forces in an active defense of the government cooperation that made it possible for the Center Party to refute all the predictions of the early demise of the party in the election. The necessity of gathering party forces should be obvious to all three government parties which still have less total support than the two socialist opposition parties.

6578

CSO: 3639/68

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS REPORTED, ANALYZED

Details Provided

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 pp 4-6

[Text] Clean Sweep in Albufeira

For people watching local government, Albufeira posed one of the knottiest problems in the Algarve, and this was true for all parties. The renewal movement was confident of beating Xavier Xufre of the PS [Socialist Party], the social democrats argued at length with a view to covering the council, the alliance headed by the communists openly snubbed the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] for its own exclusive advantage, and the socialists did not conceal the 6 October syndrome. But what happened was almost a clean sweep.

The PSD [Social Democratic Party] vote dropped from 3,245 (in 1982) to 2,937. The APU [United People's Alliance] vote dropped from 1,032 to 775, and the PRD won only 681 votes. A half a thousand of the 1982 CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] votes, many of those of the APU and still more of those of the PSD went over to the enormous field of those who abstained. The PS held steady with Xavier Xufre, winning yet another term of office (four), and the party must now engage in dialogue with the three PSD members of the council on its executive board.

The rise in the tone of Xufre's campaign was reflected in the pages of DIARIO DE NOTICIAS. He proved capable of making use of headwinds in his navigation. The socialist candidate reached port safely and has a clear field for keeping his electoral promises, above all for the rural sectors, which showed no great fondness for the winner.

Albufeira provided one of the most curious cases in the autarchic struggle in the Algarve, serving as an example for Silves, on whose ramparts the APU has now taken its stand, such that the PS can conclude that it cannot make use of Xufres everywhere. (C. A.)

Albufeira

Parishes Verified -- 3
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 14,026
Votes Cast - 7,786 55.51
Blank Ballots - 79 1.01
Invalid Ballots - 107 1.37

Registered Voters - 13,167
Votes Cast - 8,605 65.35
Blank Ballots - 142 1.65
Invalid Ballots - 174 2.02

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	3,207	41.19	4	PS	3,546
PSD	2,937	37.72	3	PSD	3,245
APU	775	9.95		APU	1,032
PRD	681	8.75		CDS	466

Absolute Majority in Amadora

Everyone in Amadora relied on the PRD votes, but it was the APU which got them in the end. After a 6-year effort to win an absolute majority, the communists finally achieved it, electing six councilmen.

The PS and the PSD, which ran as a coalition, were seemingly well-placed to win the presidency of the council. However, the results at the post destroyed all illusions. The APU apparently won almost all of the votes which went to the PRD in the council election on 6 October.

Where the legislative elections are concerned, the PS-PSD coalition would have 40.4 percent (day before yesterday, it had 37.15), and the APU, with the aid of the democratic renewal electorate, would reach 48.9 percent (it won 47.65). The difference seen between the one block and the other will have shifted to the CDS, which has now seen an increase to 10.62 to the 5.7 won in October.

In very general terms, based on the somewhat superficial analysis, the transfers of votes appear to have occurred as described. However, it is not clear that all of the PRD votes went to the APU, just as it is not certain that all of those who voted for the PS and the PSD in October have now voted for the coalition.

What is really certain in Amadora is that Orlando de Almeida has an absolute majority with which to administer one of the most complicated municipalities in the enveloping Lisbon zone. (J.F.M.)

Amadora

Parishes Verified -- 8
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	127,922
Votes Cast -	78,549
Blank Ballots -	1,409
Invalid Ballots -	1,739
	61.40
	1.79
	2.21

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	117,701
Votes Cast -	85,209
Blank Ballots -	983
Invalid Ballots -	948
	72.39
	1.15
	1.11

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
APU	37,432	47.65	6	APU	34,966
PS	29,178	37.15	4	PS	23,765
CDS	8,341	10.62	1	AD*	22,949
PCTP	450	0.57		UDP**	962
				PCTP	381
				POUS	255
					0.45
					0.30

* Democratic Alliance

** Popular Democratic Union

Consolidated Leadership in Amarante

A social democratic victory in the executive board of the Amarante Town Council was expected. There were doubts only as to the some thousands of votes which were cast on 6 October for the PRD, a political force which did not compete in the elections for the self-governing body. Even so, the PSD consolidated its leadership in the municipality, despite the strong challenge too it posed by all of the parties situated to its left and right.

For example, the PS nurtured some hopes of winning the presidency of the council, which was the reason for a rather enthusiastic campaign culminating in the presentation of an ambitious program. Then there was the expectation revealed in an PRD communique which was published in the JORNAL DE AMARANTE, but in the end, it gave no indication of the vote. Only the socialists came up against believers in the deterioration of the image of the president who has now been reelected, and throughout his term had difficulty in dealing even with the social democratic council members.

As to the CDS, for which the vote was weak, and the APU, with even less support, both fell far below what they had hoped. And just as the main force defeated, they can only find an explanation for this result now in the dynamics of the triumph of the party headed by Cavaco Silva. In any case, a question becomes increasingly pertinent: how will interparty relations develop in the Amarante Town Council? (A.M.)

Amarante

Parishes Verified -- 40
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 37,483
Votes Cast - 24,894 66.41
Blank Ballots - 326 1.31
Invalid Ballots - 482 1.94

Registered Voters - 34,306
Votes Cast - 24,832 72.38
Blank Ballots - 433 1.74
Invalid Ballots - 638 2.57

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PSD	11,279	45.31	4	PSD	10,281	41.40	4
PS	7,877	31.64	2	PS	8,928	35.95	3
CDS	3,093	12.42	1	CDS	2,416	9.73	
APU	1,579	6.34		APU	1,781	7.17	
UDP	258	1.04		UDP	355	1.43	

Socialists Lose Councilman in Braga

Despite the fact that it has won in the Braga municipal elections for the fourth time, the Socialist Party suffered a harsh blow this time. It lost the majority it had in the council and the municipal assembly. In fact, the executive board, headed as always by Mesquita Machado (who has been accused of murky administrative practices, illegalities and favoritism), found itself reduced by one council member in the election the day before yesterday. That seat was won by the PSD, with the support of the CDS and the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party], which formed a new kind of "AD," nominating an independent candidate, Armando Osorio. The socialists, who had an absolute majority in the municipal assembly, also lost that. They lost four municipal deputies' seats, all of which went to the PRD, which, since it did not elect a single councilman, now finds itself represented in that supervisory body alone.

Thus the electorate did heed the appeals of the opposition forces, which sought not only to strengthen their position with regard to the PS (they lost more than 3,000 votes for the council), but also to win the majority away from it. The United People's Alliance, although it won a slight increase in votes, did not succeed in electing another councilman, which it had hoped to do. It continues to have just one, while it maintained its representation in the municipal assembly. Similarly, the CDS, supported by the PSD in the election for that body, also maintained the same number of representatives won by the AD in 1982. (A. S.)

Braga

Parishes Verified -- 61
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters	- 93,100
Votes Cast	- 69,452 74.60
Blank Ballots	- 1,095 1.58
Invalid Ballots	- 898 1.29

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters	- 83,535
Votes Cast	- 66,231 79.29
Blank Ballots	- 1,360 2.05
Invalid Ballots	- 1,087 1.64

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	31,258	45.01	4	PS	34,656 52.33
PSD	25,726	37.04	4	AD	21,225 32.05
APU	6,935	9.99	1	APU	6,775 10.23
PRD	2,642	3.80		PCTP	653 0.99
UDP	508	0.73		UDP	475 0.72
PCTP	390	0.56			

PSD Gains in Cascais

Only the PSD won additional votes in Cascais, with an increase in its aldermen from four to five. The APU, which counted heavily on winning in the council, lost more than 4,000 votes as compared to 1982, although it retained its three seats.

As to the PS and the CDS, their "declines" were considerably greater. The socialists lost about 6,000 votes and the centrists nearly 9,000, and each lost one council member.

The PRD, for its part, saw a decline in relation to the legislative elections of about 10,000 votes. However, it succeeded in winning representation on the executive board of the council with one member. In this connection, it should be noted that in terms of a comparison with the 6 October results, only the PSD and the APU gained (10 and 8 percent, respectively). The rest suffered a decline, and in the case of the socialists and the renewal faction, a significant one. The PS lost 5 points, the CDS 1, and the PRD 12.

To summarize, it can be said that the harsh criticisms made of Helena Roseta's administration by all of the political forces serve no purpose in the Cascais Town Council. The new president of the municipal body, George Dargent, who has always been optimistic about his party's ability to retain the presidency, will therefore be somewhat surprised by the final result, which substantially strengthened the position of the PSD. (J.F.M.)

Concilia

Parishes Verified -- 6
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 115,625
 Votes Cast - 66,524 57.53
 Blank Ballots - 657 0.99
 Invalid Ballots - 646 0.97

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 107,079
 Votes Cast - 76,883 71.80
 Blank Ballots - 1,100 1.43
 Invalid Ballots - 1,251 1.63

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>	
PSD	27,711	41.66	5	PSD	22,909 29.80	4
APU	15,639	23.51	3	APU	19,772 25.72	3
PS	8,572	12.89	1	CDS	15,645 20.35	2
CDS	6,954	10.45	1	PS	14,738 19.17	2
PRD	4,768	7.17		PCTP	582 0.76	
PPM	777	1.17		PPM	466 0.61	
UDP	501	0.75		UDP	420 0.55	

PS Beats AD in Coimbra

In Coimbra, the PS was the victim of the same weapons as it used against the APU. In order to oust the communists from the presidency of some municipal councils, the socialists allied themselves with the PSD and/or the CDS, and these parties joined in a coalition with the PPM in the university city to defeat the PS. And they succeeded, although they did have the "aid" of the APU (which increased its representation from one to two seats) and the PRD (which elected one candidate). In other words, while the PSD-CDS-PPM succeeded in retaining the four members they already had, the PS lost to, precisely to the APU and the PRD.

But while the PS and the outgoing town council president (Mendes da Silva were unable to resist the combined force of these three parties, the same cannot be said with regard to the town council, where the socialists continue to have a majority. This appears to be interpreted as meaning less social democratic loyalty to the coalition, since in the council they voted for their party member, but in the assembly, did not give unanimous support to the centrists who headed the slate of the alliance.

The relative majority obtained by the PSD-CDS-PPM was no great surprise in Coimbra, where there are some who even think that this was only a weak triumph. Without a doubt a better (or greater) result was achieved by the APU, which will again have two councilmen, having been able to resist the PRD and the prospect of a "useful vote" in the PS. The renewal faction members were, on the other hand, the great losers in Coimbra (between the legislative elections and the elections day before yesterday they lost about three-quarters of their voting support). (J.F.)

Coimbra

Parishes Verified -- 31
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 110,815
Votes Cast - 63,516 57.32
Blank Ballots - 1,452 2.29
Invalid Ballots - 986 1.55

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 105,249
Votes Cast - 73,098 69.45
Blank Ballots - 1,513 2.07
Invalid Ballots - 1,371 1.88

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PSD	23,758	37.40	4	PS	34,015	46.53	6
PS	20,766	32.69	4	AD	24,334	33.29	4
APU	11,058	17.41	2	APU	11,188	15.31	1
PRD	5,142	8.10		PCTP	677	0.93	
PCTP	354	0.56					

Political Instinct Wins in Faro

The voters in Faro did not forgive the lukewarm nature of the opposition to Negro Belo's exercise of local authority. This official was not "dropped" by the PSD but ran as a candidate, and was imposed bag and baggage on the local party factions (he made use of them). He won something over 9,000 votes, which had gone to the AD in 1982.

In this case, the other stronger parties were penalized by the abstentions.

The main victim of this painful electoral lesson was the PRD, which won an insignificant number of votes in the town council election. For the renewal faction members, who ran in the more important municipalities in the Algarve, at least one substantial group of councilmen in the regional capital was essential. They did not get it.

The political struggle was in fact waged between Negro Belo and Joaquim Belchior of the PS. But the socialists too learned once again that a team of officials for a self-governing body who can win (or recover) the voters' confidence, after a long interval, is not developed overnight. Belchior emerged after such an interval, and appealing to the social memory of the people was not enough for him. Negro Belo acted precisely during that interval, with "political instinct." The capital of the Algarve now has all of the conditions needed for stability, but the people of Fero are eager for proof. (C.A.)

Faro

Parishes Verified -- 5
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	37,289	
Votes Cast -	21,578	57.87
Blank Ballots -	361	1.67
Invalid Ballots -	265	1.23

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	35,439	
Votes Cast -	24,728	69.78
Blank Ballots -	429	1.73
Invalid Ballots -	421	1.70

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PSD	9,531	44.17	4	AD	9,227	37.31	3
APU	4,846	22.46	2	PS	8,226	33.27	2
PS	4,620	21.41	1	APU	6,155	24.89	2
PRD	1,793	8.31		UDP	270	1.09	
UDP	162	0.75					

Fifteen Thousand Votes "Gone" in Lisbon

Even a hasty analysis of the results of the 1985 elections for the self-governing bodies in Lisbon immediately suggests one statement and two questions.

The first has to do with the expected reelection of Nuno Abecasis. The camouflaged coalition of the PSD and the CDS left no room for much doubt, in view of the traditional weakness of the PS in the capital, while Goncalo Ribeiro Teles lacked a very solid support base for his aspirations.

The second question has to do with where the 15,000-vote difference between the PSD slate for the executive board of the council and the CDS slate for the municipal assembly went. Did they go to the Socialist Party, which showed a decline of almost 70,000 votes from the 1982 figure? Were they blank votes, due to the refusal of the social democrats to vote for the CDS slate, even though it was negotiated by the party?

The answers will inevitably be inconclusive, due to their axiomatic nature, and they will naturally suit the whim of those who seek to provide an answer, claiming sociological, political or any other kind of factor.

The second question posed will be more readily answered. The president who has been reelected is already accustomed to governing with a minority, but this time, the scale seems to be tipping more drastically. The eight seats won by the PSD need the support of Ribeiro to tip the balance in its favor if the PS reaches an agreement with the APU.

And, as has already been said, the former is a part of the opposition. (E.V.)

Lisbon

Parishes Verified -- 53
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 675,033
Votes Cast - 396,341 58.71
Blank Ballots - 5,211 1.31
Invalid Ballots - 4,639 1.17

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 664,610
Votes Cast - 479,650 72.17
Blank Ballots - 7,044 1.47
Invalid Ballots - 6,884 1.44

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PSD	177,439	44.77	8	AD	198,274	41.34	7
APU	109,013	27.50	5	PS	129,499	27.00	5
PS	71,275	17.98	3	APU	127,384	26.56	5
PFM	20,113	5.07	1	POUS	4,183	0.87	
UDP	5,839	1.47		UDP	4,039	0.84	
PCTP	1,675	0.42		PCTP	2,343	0.49	
POUS	1,137	0.29					

Sweetest APU Victory in Loures

Severiano Falcao and the APU are firm and strong in Loures. If there had still been any doubt, the results on Sunday served as a plebiscite for an extremely productive and popular presidency.

The PS-PSD coalition notwithstanding (which also had the "cooperation" of the CDS, through its absence), the APU substantially strengthened its position, winning an absolute majority on the executive board of the council.

The communists did not gain much in numbers of votes, but as Severiano Falcao predicted before the election, abstentions "worked to its benefit." In other words, the APU saw a substantial increase of 2,000 votes, but the PS-PSD-CDS bloc lost more than 25,000 in comparison to 1982. In percentage terms, and with regard to the legislative elections, the APU saw an increase from 25.8 to 47.4 percent, and the coalition a decline from 46.7 to 39.2 percent. This serves to confirm the fact that mathematical gains do not suffice when one is faced, as here, with a "personalized vote."

The decline suffered by the PRD, on the other hand, should be emphasized. Its voting strength dropped significantly. It won 22.4 percent in the legislative elections (second, immediately after the APU), while it now commands no more than a modest 7.6 percent.

Loures will have been the sweetest victory in these elections for self-governing bodies in Loures. But what is beyond doubt is that this happened thanks to Falcao, who is in reality "difficult to beat." (J.F.M.)

Loures

Parishes Verified -- 19
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	213,266	
Votes Cast -	140,156	65.72
Blank Ballots -	2,926	2.09
Invalid Ballots -	1,612	1.15

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	196,694	
Votes Cast -	146,017	74.24
Blank Ballots -	1,031	1.19
Invalid Ballots -	1,717	1.18

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
APU	66,473	47.43	6	APU	64,728	44.33	5
PS	55,030	39.26	5	PS	41,529	28.44	3
PRD	10,654	7.60		AD	34,023	23.30	3
PCTP	1,385	0.99		PCTP	893	0.61	
POUS	1,045	0.75		UDP	857	0.59	
UDP	1,031	0.74		POUS	539	0.37	

Cabral Wins in Oporto

Fernando Cabral was expected to win the presidency of the Oporto Town Council, an eminently political position in the second city in the country in socioeconomic importance. Just as happened, moreover in Lisbon.

In truth, the social democratic candidate was one of the group of five favorites going in, as we have emphasized in articles on the preelectoral situation in that municipality. However the fact that this victory for Fernando Cabral was not essentially based on his personality or political image, despite the fact that he is not exactly unknown in this northern capital, but rather on the strength of the PSD electorate, in quantitative terms, should not be overlooked.

However, if there was no great personal component in the triumph of this social democratic candidate, the same cannot however be said of the main loser in this popular consultation, the socialist Rosado Correia. He even relied heavily on his own charisma and on the exposure he gained while he headed the Ministry of Social Equipment in trying to win the post which had twice escaped him.

The stability of the APU electorate, which enabled it to retain both councilmen from the preceding term, was another relevant factor in this election. But the centrist voters had already decided to punish their candidates, with the loss of one of its two seats on the executive board, which was won by the candidate heading the renewal faction slate.

Oporto

Parishes Verified -- 15
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	268,351	
Votes Cast -	163,100	60.78
Blank Ballots -	1,704	1.04
Invalid Ballots -	1,763	1.08

Registered Voters -	259,187	
Votes Cast -	191,210	73.77
Blank Ballots -	2,104	1.10
Invalid Ballots -	2,112	1.10

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PSD	58,824	36.07	5	AD	81,475	42.61	6
PS	43,682	26.78	4	PS	65,881	34.45	5
APU	29,524	18.10	2	APU	37,275	19.49	2
CDS	13,665	8.38	1	UDP	1,568	0.82	
PRD	12,089	7.41	1	PCTP	480	0.25	
UDP	1,494	0.92		OCMLP*	315	0.16	
PCTP	355	0.22					

* Portuguese Communist Organization, Marxist-Leninist

Continuity Guaranteed in Santarem

The possibility of the "diversion" to the new PRD of the votes lost by the PS between 1982 and this year cannot be excluded. But they did not suffice to oust Ladislau Botas from the presidency of the Santarem City Council, after three consecutive terms.

Even taking the boycott of the 1985 elections for the self-governing bodies in two of the parishes of the municipality into account, the numbers already verified tell us that the PSD and the CDS together achieved the same results as were obtained 3 years ago by the extinct Democratic Alliance, which also happened, moreover, with the APU. From this it can be concluded that the members of the renewal faction were the sole factor "disturbing" the traditional electorate of the PS.

Recalling what was previously said about Santarem, another inference which can be drawn, to the effect that the "pragmatism" of this municipal leader is quite resistant to projects which are without a doubt ambitious, but based on inefficient knowledge of the municipal realities, in terms of the material resources for carrying them out. The people of Santarem do not hesitate long between a "bird in the hand" and "two in the bush," and they reelected the man who, if results are to be believed, have governed the municipality satisfactorily for 9 years, even if his administration merits some criticism. The people of Santarem are, seemingly, not unaware of the fact that the good is the adversary of the optimal. (E.V.)

Santarem

Parishes Verified -- 26
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 2
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	48,997	Registered Voters -	47,984
Votes Cast -	31,823	Votes Cast -	33,752
Blank Ballots -	537	Blank Ballots -	628
Invalid Ballots -	344	Invalid Ballots -	639

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	12,403	38.97	PS	16,564	49.08
PSD	8,586	26.98	AD	10,172	30.14
APU	4,799	15.08	APU	5,208	15.43
PRD	3,463	10.88	POUS	381	1.13
CDS	1,691	5.31	PCTP	160	0.47

APU Dethroned in Setubal

Setubal was one of the two municipalities in the district (the other was Montijo) where the presidency of the municipal council went from the APU to the PS. This result was not however the cause of great surprise. In fact, although there was no PS-PSD coalition formally, such did exist in fact and in substance (and, in the self-governing bodies of Setubal, for the first time). It further benefitted from the votes of the CDS, which did not sponsor a slate on Sunday. Now the PS and the PSD had always, taken together, won a majority of the votes in the council. If we compare the results in the 1982 local elections with those in 1985, we see that the APU saw a decline from 43.21 percent of the votes cast (23,755) to 39 percent (19,822), with a reduction from five to four seats. This decline was affected, apart from the greater number of abstentions, by the fact that the PRD competed for votes in the self-governing council for the first time, winning 14.74 percent (7,491 votes--one seat). The PS and the PSD, which competed for votes separately in 1982, obtained 31.01 percent (17,048 votes) and 14.33 percent (7,877), respectively, this year, which taken together total 45.34 percent (24,925 votes). They thus won four seats (three for the PS and one for the PSD), just as many as they have now in coalition. But the table below will show that the results obtained by the two parties in the "central bloc" taken together showed a decline between 1982 and 1985, apart from the fact that the goal of winning five seats and thus an absolute majority (as the candidate heading the slate, Mata Caceres, emphasized to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS) was not achieved, such that this majority remained in the hands of the opposition.

Setubal

Parishes Verified -- 8
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 79,180
Votes Cast - 50,823 64.19
Blank Ballots - 720 1.42
Invalid Ballots - 462 0.91

Registered Voters - 73,661
Votes Cast - 54,970 74.63
Blank Ballots - 667 1.21
Invalid Ballots - 809 1.47

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PS	21,414	42.13	4	APU	23,755	43.21	5
APU	19,821	39.00	4	PS	17,048	31.01	3
PRD	7,491	14.74	1	PSD	7,877	14.33	1
UDP	704	1.39		CDS	3,597	6.54	
PCTP	211	0.42		UDP	880	1.60	
				PCTP	337	0.67	

Socialist Effort in Sintra Fails

In Sintra, everything has remained (practically) the same. While 3 years ago, the PSD-CDS won the presidency of the town council by a close margin (1,413) over the APU, that difference was decreased by about half on Sunday (712 votes). And it can be said that if there was a loser, it was the PS.

In fact, the great change seen in the membership structure of the council from one administration to the other lay in the "transfer" of one seat from the PS to the PRD. The socialists, although they recovered some of what they lost to the renewal faction on 6 October, failed categorically in their bid to win the presidency of the council.

In relation to the legislative elections, the PRD suffered a decline of "only" 14 points. These were votes which "slid over" to the APU (about 12 percent) or "returned" to the PS (1.5 percent). The sharp decline for the democratic renewal faction, such as to provide the "perhaps" greatest surprise in the voting for the council, also served to reverse a trend which has been seen in Sintra since 1979, the domination of the "political vote" over the "personalized vote." Thus the results in practice went contrary to the predictions, which pointed to some potential for the PRD in the race for the council presidency. It would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the renewal faction there was that which won the most votes in the legislative elections. (J.F.M.)

Setubal

Parishes Verified -- 13
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 171,767
Votes Cast - 99,746 58.07
Blank Ballots - 1,336 1.34
Invalid Ballots - 1,390 1.39

Registered Voters - 158,768
Votes Cast - 113,449 71.46
Blank Ballots - 1,684 1.48
Invalid Ballots - 1,820 1.60

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		
PSD	32,181	32.26	4	AD	37,362	32.93	4
APU	31,469	31.55	4	APU	35,949	31.69	4
PS	21,387	21.44	2	PS	34,792	30.67	3
PRD	10,433	10.46	1	UDP	1,186	1.05	
PCTP	451	0.45		PCTP	656	0.58	

Situation Unchanged in Vila do Conde

Engineer Mario Almeida, who was reelected as president of the Vila do Conde Town Council, was right when he told us he had confidence in the voters and in the work done by the executive board he has headed for some years now. The fact is that there have been no major changes in that pretty town. The PS has had absolute majorities in the council, and perhaps more important, in the municipal assembly.

It is not of interest at this point to count the votes each party won or lost, since what is important are the final results. Out of seven councilmen, the PS elected five, as happened before. The PSD garnered the other two seats, while the CDS, which had previously competed in a coalition with that party, found itself excluded. The APU, which came close to placing a representative in the council, will have to await another opportunity, and the PRD did not sponsor a candidate for this body.

The main concern of the PS was the possibility of losing its absolute majority in the town council, and now that this can be discussed without fear of charges of trying to manipulate, as occurred when a report on that council was published, there was the impression that all of the parties counted more on that possibility, because we have been told that the socialists, "proposed and disposed" because they were always certain that the municipal assembly would sagely say "amen" to all their undertakings or lack thereof.

It remains to comment on the PRD. Its hopes were dashed and in the end it elected only one deputy to the assembly, in which body the socialists are represented by 18, the PPD-PSD by eight, the CDS by two, and the APU also by two. (P. de C.)

Vila do Conde

Parishes Verified -- 30
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	45,777	
Votes Cast -	33,062	72.22
Blank Ballots -	362	1.09
Invalid Ballots -	453	1.37

Registered Voters -	42,439	
Votes Cast -	32,154	75.77
Blank Ballots -	536	1.67
Invalid Ballots -	702	2.18

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	19,420	58.74
PSD	8,813	26.66
CDS	2,130	6.44
APU	1,884	5.70

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	17,402	54.12
AD	10,382	32.29
APU	3,132	9.74

CDS Regains Council Control in Viseu

The CDS has recovered the presidency of the Viseu City Council after 3 years. This period was not in fact the most auspicious for the local PSD. The candidate heading the slate with which it won the 1982 elections was in the end to be removed following an inquiry into his administration, and he was succeeded in the post, by the fourth of his council members, because the rest were legally barred. And the drafting of the slate with a view to the election held day before yesterday also turned out in the end not to be a peaceful process.

The Christian Democrats, led by the charismatic engineer Engracio Carrilho, thus succeeded, as moreover was expected in various circles, in winning back a post which that party has always keenly desired.

This was achieved, however, mainly at the expense of the PS, which, having elected two individuals in 1982, now has but one representative. The PRD obtained which is really a very insignificant electoral percentage (3.9 percent), like the APU itself, whose "score" dropped from 3.7 to a mere 2.9. It will not be possible to say that this time, as in fact they were in the legislative elections, the renewal faction members were the "executioners" of the socialists.

The centrist advantage over the social democrats was not to reach the 1,000-vote level. But in fact this sufficed to deprive them of the majority they had had for 3 years. (S.R.)

Viseu

Parishes Verified -- 33
Town Council - 1985

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	62,987
Votes Cast -	40,851 64.86
Blank Ballots -	674 1.65
Invalid Ballots -	825 2.02

Registered Voters -	58,895
Votes Cast -	40,553 68.86
Blank Ballots -	801 1.98
Invalid Ballots -	1,055 2.60

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
CDS	15,537	38.03	4	PSD	14,512 35.79
PSD	14,678	35.93	4	CDS	12,453 30.71
PS	6,103	14.94	1	PS	8,652 21.34
PRD	1,611	3.94		APU	1,518 3.74
APU	1,177	2.88		PPM	1,023 2.52
UDP	246	0.60		UDP	539 1.33

Comparison With Legislative Elections

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Dec 85 p 9

[Article by Jorge Gaspar, who occupies a professorial chair at the Geographic Studies Center: "Results for the Increasingly Self-Governing Bodies"]

[Text] The map showing the distribution of votes in the elections for self-governing bodies, and in particular the municipal elections, still remains rather close to that for the legislative elections. Three main factors contributed to this result: the requirement that only parties or party coalitions sponsor candidates in the municipal elections; the relative youth of the political party system, with a rather rigid pattern of electoral behavior since the first election; and, finally, the frequency with which legislative elections have been held, since with the aid of the major mass media, in particular television, they tend to have the effect of carrying local elections along with them. However, a comparative analysis of the election results for the self-governing bodies since 1976 shows that the differences from the legislative elections have been tending to increase.

For example, there is increasing autonomy on the local level, justified and strengthened by daily practice. Local forces and personalities are asserting themselves, in many cases against the current of the political party forces which are dominant in ideological terms. The proof of this is seen in the successive victorious candidacies of individuals who have changed party support. And there have now been changes in the widest variety of party affiliations, in both directions: APU-PS, PS-PSD, CDS-PSD, CDS-PPM, PPM-PSD, PS-PRD, and PSD-PRD.

Thus the results in the election for self-governing bodies have increasingly been losing overall political meaning, and therefore the framework for their analysis should be more limited and localized. Case by case, it is important to focus the analysis on real local situations, and very especially on an assessment of the "work" done, since unlike the background for the legislative elections, very often the desire for progress and identification with those who may achieve it are replaced by the fear of losing what has already been achieved locally ("in such a short time"), and the identification is with the city council, i.e., the president.

Electoral Map Stable

However, we must not lose sight of the most important characteristic of the electoral geography with regard to the self-governing bodies--the stability of the major outlines on the map which has been developing since 1976. The main variations are local and have more to do with the men who are the protagonists in politics "in the field" than with the changes, realized or desired, espoused by the party forces on the national level.

With advances and retreats, although it is not always possible to say which is dominant, the large areas remain, because, among other things, the country has not as yet changed too much, and the political forces themselves continue to adapt to the changes. Thus the more conservative and/or liberal parties dominate in the center and the north, with greater overall voting support in the interior, while Lisbon and a part of its Western periphery constitute an exception within the territory, to a certain extent, explained by the dominant social structure. The Communist Party, in coalition with the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement], continues to show strong influence in Alentejo and in the Lisbon metropolitan area. The Socialist Party dominates in the hinge areas between the north and the south, in the urban industrial areas along the central and northern coast and in the Algarve.

Winners and Losers, Where and Why

In the elections last 15 December, even more than in others, with one single exception, all of the party forces regarded themselves as victors. What seems generally to be difficult to accept does have an explanation: all of them scored important triumphs, and all of them had reasons to be satisfied. This was due to two main causes. First, the various temporary alliances, explicit or implicit, which have followed one upon the other in the various elections, make comparative analyses difficult, and second, the primary focus of comparisons was the election on 6 October last, and in that connection, what the PRD lost served to satisfy the other four party groups.

Obviously, although a comparison with the recent legislative elections is necessary, the only correct method within the context of local government is to limit the comparison to the local elections. Basically, what was at stake was an assessment of the self-governing bodies elected in 1982, and not the PS-PSD government in office between 1983 and 1985, nor the Cavalco Silva government which emerged from the 6 October elections.

Viewed thus, and taking the various coalitions mentioned into account, the only triumph (measured by the increase in percentage of votes) which is not subject to doubt is that which the complex of parties in the old AD can claim. But it is still difficult to analyze separately, for example, the portion of the victory which can be ascribed to the PSD (the party which clearly benefitted most from the policy of alliances, both with the right wing and the left). The situation in Lisbon is quite indicative. In that city alone, the PSD had the support of 10.8 percent of its total electorate for the city councils, with doubt remaining as to what portion fell to the CDS.

Therefore, we have analyzed the variation in the percentages of votes (percentage votes) between the elections for city councils in 1982 and 1985 on the basis of adjusted voting totals. Naturally, we examined the APU and also the PS, which did not participate in a coalition in 1982 (a single case with the UDES [Union of the Social Democratic Left] is not significant) separately.

The complex of parties in the AD which controlled a total of 42 percent of the votes in 1982 saw an increase by 1985 to 44.2 percent. The PS saw a drop from 31.1 to 27.4 percent, and the APU a decline from 20.5 to 19.4 percent. It should be noted that we are using provisional and still incomplete values, but the likely changes are in the range of one-tenth.

Thus the greatest difference in the results between the two municipal elections is seen in the PRD votes (4.7 percent). In other words, had that party not participated, which it did in slightly more than one-third of the municipalities, everything would nonetheless have remained about the same. The total for the AD parties would not have changed, the APU would not have seen the loss, or might even have seen a slight increase, and the PS would have suffered a smaller decline. Or, in other words, the APU and the PS would have retained a few more majorities and the PSD would have gained an additional one or more.

An analysis of the variations by district (Fig. 1) more clearly reveals the continuity in the voting, in which the only (limited) "disturbance" reflects the introduction of the PRD.

Thus the APU held steady in 10 districts and in the autonomous regions, gained in Lisbon and lost in the northeast, in Leiria, Santarem, Beja and Faro. The results of an analysis of the consequences of the polarization caused by the coalition (implicit or explicit) between the PS and the PSD (with or without the support of the CDS) are curious. Generally speaking, the advantage went to the APU, and so, among other conclusions, it can thus be viewed as the only force in local government capable of providing an alternative to the other more influential parties. Where there was polarization, a stronger APU vote was not more widespread (in Setubal, Ribatejo, Alentejo and the Algarve) due to the intervention of the PRD.

The PS gained only in Beja (benefitting somewhat from the coalition with the PSD), and it held steady in Setubal (for the same reason) and in Braganca, showing a decline in all the other districts and in the autonomous regions. Generally speaking, the PRD was the main beneficiary of this decline, although on the northern and central coasts, the PSD also won significant gains over the PS.

The parties in the former AD, among which the PSD still seems to dominate with the greatest strength, had the most significant gains in Viana do Castelo and Aveiro, thanks to the PS, and only lost strength in the districts of Setubal, Lisbon, Evora and Beja, in part due to votes which went to the PS, and in part due to the "resistance" of the APU.

If, finally, we study the variations in the votes of the capital PS-PSD-CDS-PPM as a whole, which to some extent were involved in (implicit or explicit, two-, three-, or four-way coalitions in 1982 or 1985), it becomes clear that there was only an increase in Vila Real (+1.3 percent) while the group maintained its position in Braga (+0.6 percent) and Beja (-0.8 percent) and showed a decline in the autonomous regions and the remaining districts, more severe in some of them--Setubal (-6.8 percent), Castelo Branco (-8.6 percent), and Santarem (-7.5 percent). In its main outlines, this map corresponds to that showing the relative influence of the PRD.

Influence of the 6 October Elections

As can be seen from what we have said, the parliamentary elections have not basically influenced the voting choices of the electorate in the local elections. Despite the lack of financial, technical and human resources, all of the self-governing bodies are doing tangible work, either mainly cosmetic, developmental or pertaining only to social security (aid). Therefore the leaders of the self-governing bodies tend to remain in office. In the parliament, however, the discontent of substantial sectors of the electorate, prepared to try some change, has always been present.

However, the proximity of legislative elections always influences others to some extent. Similarly, the resulting practice of the parties in the government or the Assembly of the Republic may also have electoral consequences, although in another sector.

Something of this sort, although with different characteristics, may have occurred with the PRD and the PSD. The electorate of the former, strongly characterized by anxiety and the hope for immediate action, in particular in the promised change in practice, which it did not see reflected in the local candidates the party proposed, may be disillusioned, leading it to increase the sector abstaining or to return to its origins. In the PSD, on the contrary, there is not only a dynamics of victory but also the hope that the promises will be kept alive, which favors the prospects for harmony between the local and central governments. Here again the PSD has once more won with its policy of alliances (implicit or explicit).

The Rural and Urban Votes

The fact that the officials of the self-governing bodies are reelected in successive elections, both in the rural and the urban town councils, serves to a certain extent to challenge some ideas about the difference between the two votes. Voting for personalities and the emergence of local bosses may not be limited to the rural sectors alone.

On the other hand, in order to understand the gradual standardization of the rural and urban votes, in the north as well as the center, south and autonomous regions, it is necessary to consider the changes which have occurred on the social and economic levels, and which have contributed to the elimination of the particular difference between the urban and rural sectors in terms of access to information and individual aspirations.

A further comment is merited on the voting in the two urban industrial areas, Lisbon and Oporto, which we might call the metropolitan vote. It is first of all a more politically aware vote, both in the sense that the relationship between ideological choices and social status can be more clearly seen, and in the sense that local issues lose relative importance in comparison to the problems of social and economic achievement. It remains interesting to note, however, that in the metropolitan areas as well, local issues are gradually becoming of greater concern to the people who, feeling incapable of intervening on the superstructural level, in an atmosphere of crisis, are seeking at least to protect (and improve) their living circumstances on the residential level. This is seen, for example, in the discussions which have developed in the rural sector about the specific problems in the two leading cities in the country, and in the great differences between the political vote and the self-governing body vote of the APU in the municipalities most affected by the negative external effects of the growth of the metropolitan phenomenon--Loures, Amadora, Vila Franca de Xira and the Southern Strip.

Rate of Abstention

For well-known reasons, important among them being the absence of the full force of the mass communications media, as well as the consensus reached by certain candidates, leading their political opponents to fail to take a stand (as electors) in the elections for self-governing bodies, these elections always have higher rates of abstention than the parliamentary elections. This is natural.


On the other hand, due to external reasons, which we have already analyzed, including for example the inadequate method used to update the electoral records, the abstention rate has always been an artificial component which tends to rise. But this alone does not explain the 36 percent last Sunday, which is very close to the 35.4 percent in 1976. Another explanatory factor, moreover, comes into this comparison: the proximity in time between elections tends to tire the voters. In 1976, we had three consecutive elections. We can see that with elections for the parliament and the self-governing bodies separated by 15 days in 1979, the abstention levels were 12.5 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively, a larger difference than that seen now between October and December--24.6 percent and 36 percent.

A rapid analysis of the percentage variation in the rates of abstention between the 1982 and 1985 municipal elections (Fig. 2) serves to reveal three additional aspects which it is important to remember. First, abstention tended to increase more in the districts where the level was lower. Second, it tended to remain high in the districts with less political polarization. And third, there were great increases in districts where, due to the polarization of the positions of some parties, a reduction in the usual voting


choices of the electorate occurred in a certain number of councils (clear cases in the districts of Setubal, Lisbon, Beja and Evora).

It is important then to remember that abstention, although it had reached the highest level (or highest levels?) since 1975, was not by any means a reflection of apathy or an antidemocratic attitude. As we have written earlier in more detailed analyses, abstention is also a political and democratic attitude. Unlike what is sometimes claimed, democracy cannot be limited to the choice of the lesser evil, nor can abstention mean one does not favor democracy.

Percentage (Point) Differences Between 1982 and 1985



Variation in Abstention Between 1982 and 1985



5157
CSO: 3542/55

POLITICAL

SPAIN

ORDONEZ CONFIDENT ON NATO REFERENDUM, SPEAKS ON OTHER ISSUES

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 18 Nov 85 pp 19-22

[Interview with Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez by Nativel Preciado; date, time and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Do you know that you arouse great passions?

[Answer] No, in fact I didn't know.

[Question] Either they hate you or they admire you; there is no middle ground.

[Answer] That puzzles me, because I consider myself very insignificant. The problem is, in Spain there is a type of celebrity that lives in what Azana called the temperate zone of the spirit. That was the case with him, and perhaps with me as well. We are people who cause irritation in certain sectors of the right by being reasonable.

[Question] They say terrible things about you.

[Answer] I have never been accused of anything specific, nor have I done anything to provoke hatred. I do not think I am capable of inspiring great passion in favor of me either, because we moderates by definition do not arouse passion.

[Question] They say you are intelligent and effective, but above all malleable, and that is a defect in politics.

[Answer] Malleable? I have always had a reputation as an "enfant terrible," a destructive person. . . These are contradictory criticisms. It's not that I have such a high opinion of myself; on the contrary, as the years go by one tends to judge oneself more harshly. But to say that I am malleable strikes me as a stupid and contradictory judgment, like so many others.

[Question] Do you think they are envious of you?

[Answer] I am not an enviable person, either. It is true that I have led a happy and tranquil private life. I have overcome the classic obstacles, I

have attained a respectable status as a professional . . . but I have always worked hard. Envy in Spain is an uncontrollable emotion.

[Question] A man who is so persuasive in his modesty does not seem real.

[Answer] If I am persuasive it is because I say what I think. I go by the "maybe," the "I think," the "it seems to me" . . . I always stay in the territory of what is reasonable, and in some cases that in itself ends up convincing people.

[Question] It is bad for a politician to be so doubtful.

[Answer] I know that here the politician is supposed to choose between black and white, true and false. The president of the government has been criticized a lot because he said he was not certain of the roads that lead to liberty and justice. That is very much in line with what Willy Brandt said. It has been said for a long time that doubt is a form of intelligence.

[Question] Do you feel you are the prototype of the useful politician?

[Answer] That is nasty question. You know I don't.

[Question] Are you proud to be indispensable?

[Answer] No, I consider myself absolutely dispensable.

[Question] How do you manage to prevent them from doing without you?

[Answer] I was out of politics for several years, and I led a tranquil and happy existence. I get the feeling that I am in politics, but that I am not a politician; the feeling of being someone who gets by. The fact is that I have been more at ease in politics since I made the final break with the Democratic Center Union (UCD), going on 5 years ago, rebuilt my old social democratic party, and finally joined up with the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE).

[Question] It is considered bad form here to belong to governments with diverse ideologies.

[Answer] A respected politician like Andreotti has participated in a wide variety of governments in his country, and has been president several times. . . I have not committed any ideological contradictions or betrayed myself. Going over what I have written, what I have said, and what I have done, I find a tremendous consistency. Looking back, I feel terribly monotonous. Ten years ago I was a social democrat as I am now; I had the same opinions about divorce, fiscal reform, NATO, . . . and even about what my future would be in a socialist party like this one.

[Question] What is your idea of political loyalty?

[Answer] Friendship has a hard time flowering in politics. There is a strong dose of ambition, vanity and envy, but there is also generosity and affection.

I have always tried to be understanding with my friends and not judge them. Friends don't judge each other.

[Question] And what about the other kind of loyalty? Your marriage is known to be indestructible.

[Answer] Yes, we are still very close, although I have not spent much time at home since I was named foreign minister.

[Question] Are you happy at 55 years of age?

[Answer] I always like to quote the saying that happiness is a stroke of luck that lasts. When one begins to look back, a little of the maturity has already gone by. I have become, as Maranon said, a packrat of time. In other words, someone who does not waste a single minute or let an instant go unused. When I discover that I have little free time when my mind is organized, I get anxious. I would like to write a great book on Spain. I have the material to do it; I lack only the time.

[Question] Would you like to go down in history?

[Answer] What I want to do is write about history, not go down in it. The cemeteries are full of people now forgotten who had the illusion of going down in history.

[Question] In Finance, fiscal reform; in Justice, divorce; what mark would you like to leave in the Foreign Ministry?

[Answer] My role in this ministry is nothing brilliant. In politics, as in bullfighting, you have to fight all kinds of bulls. I have to consolidate the EEC issue, resolve the matter of NATO, reduce the U.S. military presence in Spain, restore relations with Israel, adapt the Foreign Ministry to Spain's new situation . . . As you can see, the bull I have in front of me is enormous.

[Question] You could go down in history if you manage to get rid of the U.S. military.

[Answer] It is a question of reducing their presence, and I think we will accomplish that. Didn't you say I am very persuasive?

[Question] Spaniards would greet the news with tremendous enthusiasm, but it seems impossible that they will ever leave.

[Answer] Well, let's be serious. We are explaining to the Americans that their military presence has not been reviewed in 30 years, and that at this time it is probably excessive, given current needs.

[Question] Reagan and Shultz do not appear to be familiar with President Gonzalez' decalogue.

[Answer] It has been explained to them, by both the president and myself, and I am convinced that they are perfectly well informed.

[Question] They give the impression that they do not believe what they hear. The idea of cutting back on their troops strikes them as an audacious suggestion by Spain.

[Answer] Not at all. We have a right to bring up the issue, with all its ramifications. That is what Spain wants, and we have reason on our side. This will not diminish our contribution to collective security. The Americans know this, even those who at first may not have understood the problem. The cutback will take place, in spite of the incredulous ones.

[Question] They say Felipe Gonzalez named you because the Americans were comfortable with you.

[Answer] I would like you to ask them about that. The fact is, I must not be too easy for them to accept. When it comes time to defend Spain's interests, I am as tough as anyone. I know them very well and I have been talking with them for years; they also know me, because I have some great friends who are U.S. politicians. I do not have a complex. I was very happy during the years when I lived in the United States.

[Question] At any rate, if there is any success, President Gonzalez will take the credit, not you.

[Answer] Of course, and that is as it should be, although I don't perceive him as being so eager to take credit.

[Question] Don't you feel the need for more autonomy? You give the impression that you do not take a single step without consulting with Felipe Gonzalez.

[Answer] Any foreign minister would do the same with any president in any country in the world. The best parts, like the upcoming talks between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva, are reserved for the presidents. The important thing is for the president to communicate very well with his minister. And in this case, you needn't have the slightest doubt about it. Besides, I have as much autonomy as I need.

[Question] Who made the blunder of expelling the Polisario Front from Spain, the president or you?

[Answer] These things can result in a lot of demagoguery. It pains me to keep bringing up that unfortunate incident. It was the response the entire government took to the machine-gunning of our boats, in which two Spaniards lost their lives. That was an isolated incident, a specific response to a specific action.

[Question] A dramatic response.

[Answer] Not nearly as dramatic as the action. Anyway, the government wants to play down the affair with the Polisario Front. I can say that this regrettable incident will not change Spain's foreign policy with respect to North Africa.

[Question] We are very bad off in North Africa.

[Answer] What people in the EEC call the southern shore of the Mediterranean could be one of the most tense spots in the world. We may have even more elements of tension. The 800 boats that are fishing in nearby waters are a problem we must bear in mind. We have already resolved the dispute with Algeria, and in general our relations are calmer with all of North Africa. But the problems are inevitable, because neighbors always have problems in their relations.

[Question] The problem is that Spain will be a target for international terrorism if it establishes relations with Israel.

[Answer] I don't think so. We are holding talks with almost all the Arab foreign ministers, and they are aware that Spain will take that step on the basis of the principle of the universality of diplomatic relations. That will not change our policy in the Arab world.

[Question] Will we be in the EEC on 1 January?

[Answer] I am confident that we will be; that is my desire and my hope.

[Question] Is the government preparing any surprise for the foreign policy debate that will take place in December?

[Answer] There is no surprise left.

[Question] I am referring to the NATO referendum.

[Answer] I cannot and should not say anything new about that matter. The referendum will take place, and we will win it.

[Question] It is rumored again that the elections will be moved up to March, so goodbye referendum.

[Answer] Calling elections is not within the purview of my ministry. I have no reason to believe they will be moved up. In any case, we are working normally here, based on our assumption that the dates will remain the same and that the referendum will be held.

[Question] "White cat, black cat, what difference does it make if it catches mice?" is a saying tailor made for you.

[Answer] Like all sayings, it is meaningful in the proper context. When President Gonzalez quoted it, he was referring to Chinese communism; thus, it was taken out of context. It is a thought expressed by Deng Xiao Ping, quoted

in many books. I am surprised it drew so much attention; that means that some people are not very well read.

[Question] Anyway, you are an excellent mouser.

[Answer] In politics, the means are becoming increasingly important. Don't tell me about the ends you are pursuing, I care only about the means you use. Ideological content has been reduced all over the world. The important thing in any policy is how much does it cost and who will pay for it. And that lies at the heart of great debates: who catches the mice and who lets them get away.

8926
CSO: 3548/25

POLITICAL

SPAIN

NATO ATTITUDES SLOWLY CHANGING; PSOE, GONZALEZ STILL POPULAR

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 2 Dec 85 pp 22-28

[Text] The government's intention of garnering more social support for Spain's remaining in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has begun to find some backing: For the first time in the past year, ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA's "Barometer" has been able to detect a slight decline in the number of people favoring our departure from NATO, and a slight increase in those who defend membership or the maintenance of the status quo. The results of the referendum are still in the hands of Socialist voters.

The publication of the 24th opinion poll, which marks the end of the second year of ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA's exclusive "Barometer," coincides with the 7th anniversary of the referendum in which the Constitution was approved. After 7 years, it can be confirmed, as was noted after the poll conducted in September of this year, that the majority of Spaniards have a high opinion of both democracy as a political system and the Constitution that was drafted on the basis of a consensus among the majority parties.

Voting Plans: Still Pending

Democracy, as in the first poll of December 1983, is regarded as "good" by more than 3/4 of Spaniards, and the Constitution by more than 3/5.

It is appropriate to take another look at the oft-measured image of the Spanish Government and its president, Felipe Gonzalez. On this occasion, both have improved. The government garners 3.6 percent more "good" responses and 0.2 percent more "bad" responses, resulting in a neutral vote 3.4 points higher, though still negative.

President Felipe Gonzalez has a 2.1-percent higher "good" rating, and a 1.6-point drop in his "bad" rating, yielding a neutral vote 3.7 points higher.

The improved image of the government and the president holds true across the board among the different constituencies, coinciding with the stability of the Socialist vote. There is hardly any difference with respect to the previous poll, in which, it may be recalled, a simulated parliamentary election resulted in an absolute majority of deputies for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) with a slight margin.

Aside from the almost identical results among Socialist voters, people's plans to vote--both the direct responses and the projected plans of undecided voters--reflect a certain downward trend in the vote for the Popular Alliance (AP). The latter loses 2.1 points in this poll on the direct responses and 1.2 points on the projected undecided vote, compared with last month's survey.

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) declines slightly and the Democratic and Social Center (CDS) increases, which puts it in third place again, overtaking Gerardo Iglesias' party.

CiU, even with the loss of a tenth of a point, remains in good shape. In last month's simulated parliamentary election it tied with the Socialist Party of Catalonia in the number of deputies: 17 seats each.

The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Herri Batasuna (HB) and EE appear to be holding onto their respective constituencies, although their reduced influence among the national parties prevents them from exerting more pressure.

The PRD is losing ground from its already weak political position.

NATO Referendum: Date and Question

Given the apparently imminent referendum on NATO, we are obliged, as we have been since the first poll, to repeat the research on the kind of relationship Spain should have with the Atlantic Alliance. This question will have to be asked again in the next survey if, as expected, the government announces the specific wording of the question that will be put to the public in the referendum.

For the time being, a slight decline can be detected in those advocating our departure from NATO; 6 months ago they represented 45 percent of the respondents, and in the past 4 months they have dropped to about 41 percent. Nevertheless, those who want to pull out of NATO (41.3 percent) still outnumber those who want to stay (35.6 percent) in either of the possible forms, total membership or just membership in the political organization, not the military one.

In any case, as has been noted previously, it is the Socialist voters who will determine the outcome of the referendum, and at present 46.8 percent of them favor leaving NATO, compared to 30.5 percent advocating continued membership. If 6 percent of Socialist voters changed their vote from pulling out to staying in, or if 12 percent of Socialist voters favoring our departure decided to abstain, the results would change and the government's pro-NATO option would ultimately win.

Suarez Closer

Adolfo Suarez gains ground in the ranking of leaders according to popularity, with 2.4 points more than before. This is the highest rating he has obtained in the "Barometer," and the closest he has come to the perennial front-runner,

Felipe Gonzalez. In January Gonzalez had a 17.5-point lead, and now the gap between them has narrowed to just 6.2 points.

Alfonso Guerra is still on a downslide. Roca, with a 2.8-point increase, confirms the rising prestige of the leaders of the center. On this occasion, this trend has a certain impact on the leader of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the old left-wing standard-bearer in the pack, Oscar Alzaga.

The Communist leaders, with their ongoing internal disputes, continue to reach new lows.

Technical Data

Poll directed by: Tecnicas de Comunicacion, Consultores, S.A.

Poll conducted by: Sigma-Dos, S.A.

Population: People 18 years or older.

Location: Spain, except for the Canary Islands, using 11 autonomous regions as a sample.

Sample: 1,111 interviews, with a margin of error of 3 percent, for a confidence interval of 95.5 percent and $p/q = 50$, according to the Arkin and Colton tables.

Selection: Random, on the basis of the "Random Route" method, complemented with the system of correcting for sex, age and profession.

Interviews: conducted personally in the home.

Dates of field work: 4 to 8 November 1985.

NATO Gaining Ground

In your opinion, what kind of relationship should Spain maintain with NATO?

Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	13.7	15.2	11.8	13.6	13.0	12.8	13.1	14.8	14.9	15.7
Political membership										
only, not military	20.0	15.0	12.3	21.7	19.4	19.9	16.5	16.3	18.3	19.9
Total withdrawal	49.2	39.8	44.4	44.0	46.8	44.8	45.4	40.6	42.6	41.7
Don't know/no resp.	17.1	30.0	31.5	20.7	20.8	22.6	24.8	28.4	24.2	23.1

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	4.0	4.2	6.2	5.6	6.5	5.1	7.3	4.9	6.6	8.4
Political membership										
only, not military	16.1	17.3	12.4	22.9	23.7	20.6	18.3	22.7	21.9	22.1
Total withdrawal	63.0	48.6	53.6	53.5	48.7	55.4	50.4	48.4	44.8	46.8
Don't know/no resp.	16.9	29.9	27.8	18.0	21.0	19.0	24.0	24.1	26.6	22.7



Dec Jun Oct Nov Dec Jan Jun Sep Oct Nov

	83	84	84	84	84	85	85	85	85	85
Total membership	38.5	41.2	29.7	37.7	35.4	43.3	39.9	47.3	45.2	39.2
Political membership only, not military	23.1	15.3	14.4	26.3	23.0	18.2	16.5	14.2	17.7	20.3
Total withdrawal	24.8	12.2	15.7	16.7	15.5	16.3	21.8	10.2	11.8	19.8
Don't know/no resp.	1.6	31.3	40.2	19.3	26.1	22.2	21.8	28.3	25.3	20.7



Dec Jun Oct Nov Dec Jan Jun Sep Oct Nov

	83	84	84	84	84	85	85	85	85	86
Total membership	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	2.1	8.6
Political membership only, not military	12.5	8.3	5.8	4.4	1.3	1.8	1.8	0.0	4.3	8.6
Total withdrawal	81.3	86.1	85.5	93.7	98.5	92.9	94.7	90.7	91.5	81.1
Don't know/no resp.	4.1	5.6	8.7	2.2	0.0	5.4	1.8	9.3	2.1	1.7

The Good Constitution

What do you think of the Spanish Constitution?

Overall

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	61.1	61.1	66.3	59.9	67.0	66.9	61.0	61.9
OK	24.0	24.5	20.8	22.8	20.9	20.4	22.2	23.5
Bad	5.9	7.2	5.9	9.6	5.7	6.9	8.6	8.4

By Party



Dec Feb Apr Jun Aug May Sep Nov

	83	84	84	84	84	85	85	85
Good	73.6	71.5	79.2	74.0	77.5	79.7	75.0	74.2
OK	18.4	19.6	12.5	18.0	15.6	12.2	16.0	16.0
Bad	1.7	2.6	2.1	3.7	3.1	4.2	2.9	5.3



Dec Feb Apr Jun Aug May Sep Nov

	83	84	84	84	84	85	85	85
Good	52.9	56.7	50.8	53.8	67.7	60.4	61.0	54.1
OK	25.6	28.8	33.3	22.0	18.6	30.0	22.4	29.5
Bad	11.9	9.0	9.2	16.7	7.9	5.8	13.2	10.9

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	70.9	72.2	68.9	54.1	54.4	70.2	55.8	77.6
OK	25.0	24.5	25.0	27.0	21.2	17.9	34.9	19.0
Bad	2.1	5.6	4.2	8.1	12.1	11.9	4.7	3.5

Democracy Firmly Entrenched

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Overall

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	74.5	76.1	79.0	72.6	75.0	81.0	77.0	76.5
OK	16.4	14.3	11.9	13.9	14.3	11.6	11.4	14.5
Bad	5.7	6.6	5.5	10.1	7.8	5.5	7.4	6.6

By Party

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	81.7	86.1	89.1	84.9	85.9	89.6	85.2	85.9
OK	13.6	8.6	6.0	9.9	10.9	5.7	7.4	9.4
Bad	2.9	2.3	1.9	3.4	1.9	3.2	4.6	3.4

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	70.1	66.7	66.7	57.6	71.6	73.7	67.3	66.6
OK	16.2	20.7	20.8	15.2	14.7	18.8	16.1	17.6
Bad	11.1	9.9	10.0	21.9	11.8	6.8	15.1	12.8

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	81.2	80.5	85.4	70.3	66.7	79.1	81.4	81.0
OK	8.3	13.9	10.4	13.5	15.2	13.4	9.3	13.8
Bad	10.4	5.6	4.2	16.2	15.2	7.5	4.7	5.2

The President Is Moving Up

What is your opinion of the current president of the government, Felipe Gonzalez?

Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	54.1	42.3	39.8	36.8	34.8	35.5	36.5	38.6
OK	29.2	31.8	35.6	33.1	33.7	33.2	32.5	32.8
Bad	12.3	22.9	20.5	26.8	28.6	28.5	28.2	26.6
Neutral Vote	41.8	19.4	19.3	10.0	6.2	7.0	8.3	12.0

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	77.4	67.9	61.3	61.1	60.0	61.3	61.8	54.9
OK	17.9	26.3	27.9	28.0	29.6	29.6	29.0	25.7
Bad	3.2	4.4	9.9	9.3	9.6	7.6	8.1	9.3
Neutral Vote	74.2	73.5	51.4	51.8	50.4	53.7	53.7	55.6



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	38.5	25.5	15.7	11.9	3.7	5.2	12.4	14.0
OK	35.0	31.3	38.1	29.0	32.5	32.3	30.1	39.2
Bad	21.4	40.1	39.0	56.3	62.5	60.9	53.8	44.0
Neutral Vote	17.1	-14.6	-23.2	-44.4	-58.9	-55.7	-41.4	-31.0



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	50.0	30.2	14.8	27.4	21.1	30.0	17.0	20.7
OK	29.2	37.3	50.8	49.3	40.4	35.0	31.9	43.1
Bad	18.8	32.4	32.8	23.3	36.8	35.0	51.1	36.2
Neutral Vote	31.2	-2.2	-18.8	4.1	-15.7	-5.0	-34.1	-15.5

Government Improves Its Image

What is your opinion of the current government of the nation?

Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	39.4	30.7	27.8	27.8	26.9	26.9	24.5	28.1
OK	38.5	35.9	40.9	37.2	36.5	40.9	41.3	38.8
Bad	17.6	30.0	26.5	31.4	33.3	29.6	30.9	31.1
Neutral Vote	21.8	0.7	1.3	-3.6	-6.4	-2.7	-6.4	-3.0

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	65.5	56.5	45.6	52.7	52.7	50.6	47.0	50.6
OK	29.8	33.9	38.9	33.4	34.4	40.3	41.4	36.1
Bad	3.7	8.1	12.9	12.0	12.5	7.8	9.9	12.3
Neutral Vote	61.8	48.4	32.7	40.7	40.2	42.8	37.1	38.3



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	19.6	4.6	8.1	5.8	1.1	1.6	0.5	4.6
OK	40.2	37.9	35.4	27.6	21.3	33.9	37.1	41.0
Bad	35.1	53.8	49.3	64.1	76.1	64.6	57.5	53.2
Neutral Vote	-15.5	-49.2	-41.2	-58.3	-75.0	-63.0	-57.0	-48.6



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	35.4	21.6	13.1	20.5	10.5	22.5	17.0	19.0
OK	39.6	40.5	45.9	53.4	52.6	22.5	40.4	36.2
Bad	25.0	37.8	39.4	26.0	35.1	50.0	42.5	44.8
Neutral Vote	10.4	-16.2	-26.3	-5.5	-24.6	-27.5	-25.5	-25.8

Suarez Closes the Gap

Popularity Index

	Jan	Mar	May	Jul	Sep	Nov	Jan	Mar	May	Jul	Sep	Nov
	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	85	85	85	85	85
Felipe GONZALEZ	55.8	55.0	52.1	52.6	51.8	54.4	50.6	52.5	50.0	50.1	50.9	50.4
Adolfo SUAREZ	38.3	39.5	41.9	40.8	43.3	43.0	41.8	43.6	42.6	39.6	41.8	44.2
Alfonso GUERRA	44.1	44.8	41.7	41.0	41.0	43.5	41.1	42.8	40.9	41.0	39.8	39.5
Manuel FRAGA	39.3	35.9	38.0	39.5	36.2	38.3	35.3	34.8	34.2	36.4	35.6	36.3
Miguel ROCA	32.6	29.3	36.3	32.1	31.5	33.2	32.0	33.4	33.6	31.8	32.2	35.0
Antonio GARRIGUES	30.4	28.3	31.9	30.0	28.8	28.0	26.6	28.3	30.2	27.2	28.0	30.0
Jordi PUJOL	28.3	24.4	35.7	29.1	38.7	29.2	27.9	29.4	29.5	29.8	29.1	29.1
Santiago CARRILLO	27.7	28.0	30.3	27.9	31.2	31.9	30.2	32.3	29.0	29.7	27.0	27.2
Oscar ALZAGA	21.1	24.0	24.3	24.9	21.8	24.0	23.4	25.0	24.8	22.3	24.1	26.5
Gerardo IGLESIAS	29.9	29.2	30.4	29.3	31.3	32.3	27.7	30.6	29.2	28.7	27.1	26.1
José Antonio ARDANZA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	20.5	24.2

Vote by Vote

Voting Plans with Projection of Undecided Votes

	Voted	Dec	Dec	Dec	May	May	Jul	Jul	Oct	Oct	Nov	Nov
	82	83	84	84	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
PSOE	48.4	40.3	35.1	41.6	33.7	40.1	37.2	42.5	35.8	40.0	35.2	40.3
AP	26.1	24.2	24.7	26.5	25.9	28.5	26.2	27.4	24.9	26.5	22.8	25.3
PCE	4.1	4.7	4.9	5.8	6.1	7.0	5.6	6.8	4.7	6.4	4.5	5.9
CDS	2.9	2.4	3.8	5.4	5.1	6.1	4.2	5.3	5.3	5.9	5.3	6.2
CIU	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.3	2.9	3.4	2.9	3.5	3.0	3.7	3.1	3.6
PNV	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9
EE	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
HB	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.1
PRD	-	-	0.5	0.8	1.3	1.5	0.5	0.7	1.4	1.8	1.2	1.2
Others (+undecided)	12.4	22.1	24.3	12.8	21.6	9.9	19.9	10.3	21.4	12.2	24.4	14.0
Decided to abstain												
on census					14.0		9.3		8.5		10.2	
Unions in Dispute												11.3

Could you give me your opinion of the performance of the following unions?

UGT	Jan	Mar	May	Jul	Sep	Nov	Mar	Jul	Sep	Nov	Voted	Oct.	82	PCE
	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	85	85	85	PSOE	AP		
Good	21.3	16.5	18.7	18.4	19.6	17.0	20.4	18.5	21.2	25.3	40.4	10.6	24.1	
OK	25.5	29.6	26.6	28.6	28.9	29.2	26.8	27.9	25.1	26.3	27.1	24.0	37.9	
Bad	19.8	20.8	26.5	23.0	20.6	24.5	25.0	28.4	27.1	21.7	10.0	36.8	31.0	

CC. OO.

CC. OO.	Good	16.7	16.9	15.6	18.6	19.6	15.3	20.7	21.6	19.4	21.2	28.8	6.1	63.8
	OK	26.2	24.8	23.6	26.9	25.0	27.3	25.0	26.4	26.5	27.5	33.8	19.8	17.2
Bad	23.4	21.9	31.4	24.1	23.2	27.5	26.3	25.7	26.9	23.8	13.6	45.3	12.1	

8926
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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FIRMS OF THREE COUNTRIES IN JOINT SHELL PRODUCTION VENTURE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 27 Dec 85 - 2 Jan 86 pp 1, 10

[Article by Øjvind Kyrø: "'Ammunition Deal of the Century': Scandinavian Weapons Plants Begin Joint Shell Production"]

[Text] In spite of Danish industry's reluctance, a weapons industry consortium is about to take shape. Three Scandinavian firms have united for the mass production of heavy ammunition, and new shells are high on the Danish armed forces' wish list. At the Armed Forces Command the order is now to be submitted for the armed forces agreement's largest area: three billion kroner worth of ammunition. But Danish industry is being criticized both in the armed forces and at the Industry Ministry.

Three Scandinavian firms have united for the mass production of heavy ammunition, i.e., a new generation of 155-mm shells for heavy artillery. They are the Swedish Bofors concern, the Norwegian Raufoss plant and Jørgen Høyer Enterprise in Machining A/S [Inc.] in Denmark.

The three concerns will produce parts for the new advanced type of shell in accordance with a West German design. It will be at one of the two industry giants Rhein Metall in Düsseldorf or Diehl in Nürnberg that the parts will be assembled and installed. Production is beginning in 1986 and will go on for about 10 years.

The Scandinavian ammunition arsenals will buy about two billion kroner worth of new shells, and one fourth of the production will take place at the Danish partner's, Jørgen Høyer. The 120 employees at the plant at Måløv near Copenhagen will produce fuses for the new shell.

The reason that the sum will be so high is that, among other things, it has been decided that ammunition reserves in Denmark are to be doubled.

The reputation of the Danish manufacturer, Jørgen Høyer, is enormously commendatory in NATO and Danish armed forces circles; "He is strikingly good at manufacturing ammunition," one comment goes. Jørgen Høyer, who has a hard time killing a mouse who visits his residence, reports that, "Exports to other European NATO countries will most likely follow in the wake of production."

Wish List

It was decorated with a Christmas tree, hearts and spruce in the Danish Pentagon when the Danish armed forces presented their wish list to WEEKENDAVISEN the other day, and the new shells are high up on it. The secretaries in the concrete building made the desk-job generals comfortable and an Advent candle burned in Commander S. Torp Petersen's office, and a bowl with Christmas cookies lay within reach on the desk.

Torp Petersen is the chief of the materiel and logistics department, and his long wish list combined constitutes the largest single area within the armed forces agreement: new ammunition.

The issue is that over a number of years war reserves of ammunition have been eaten into because of what is characterized here as "too few and too small appropriations." But now it is hard to keep the pessimism intact, for in the latest armed forces agreement--what was previously called a /compromise/ [in italics]--the politicians realized that the reserves must be strengthened. "We got about 10 million kroner a year for this purpose, and although it is far from enough it is now going in the right direction," Commander Torp Petersen says.

Shell with Plastic Darts

The artillery is about to be modernized--or "beefed up," as the jargon goes--and therefore there is a need for the new type of shell, both for the self-propelled M-109 guns and for towed howitzers.

The new 155-mm shell is able to travel farther, because its ballistic properties have been improved. Technically it is called a "carrier," i.e., a "transport shell," because at the factory end it can be outfitted with various charges:

It can strew out a dozen little infantry mines which will put soldiers out of action on contact.

It can find its way to the areas on an enemy tank which are protected by the least armor, i.e., on top, underneath or in back, and burn itself through here and "neutralize" the enemy.

It can spit out thousands of small plastic darts which will render enemy soldiers harmless. Afterwards the plastic darts cannot be registered on x-ray apparatus. But the Danish armed forces will under no circumstances purchase this type.

A decision has still not been made regarding how many shells the armed forces will procure, and also not regarding which properties they will be furnished with.



Armed Forces' Representation of How the New Shell Works When It Is Charged with Infantry Mines

New Missiles for F-16

Another important item on the shopping list is new air defense facilities for the army. The so-called Redeye system--which roughly speaking consists of a tube with a rocket inside which can be fired by a soldier--is to be replaced by a modern system--either the RBS-70 from Bofors in Sweden, the Stinger from General Dynamics in the USA, the Javelin from Great Britain (the system was tested with success during the Falklands War) or the Mistral from France.

One billion three hundred million kroner have been applied for for this purchase, which is also expected to be made in 1986.

The air force is also counting on being able to supplement its missiles on F-16 combat planes and therefore the development of the AMRAAM, the long-range radar-guided air-to-air missile which will soon roll off the assembly lines at the American Hughes Aircraft Company, is being followed closely.

Finally, they are interested at the armed forces command in a new type of air-to-surface missile, titled the Maverick. It is a guided missile which itself finds its way to its target by means of optics or infrared sensors. Such an extremely harmful gadget costs about one million kroner, and Torp Petersen figures that "a few hundred" will be bought.

In sum total, within the next two years three billion kroner worth of ammunition will be procured.

Fear Unrest

But there is not much interest in Danish industry in taking part in weapons manufacturing. The three Scandinavian firms which are taking part in the new shell production are all old specialists in the field.

A couple of years ago the Armed Forces Research Service with the industry minister's blessing attempted to involve several hundred Danish firms in a military-industrial complex with large NATO projects, and both being privy to advanced technological secrets and nice profits were offered as enticements.

But it is still the same handful which dominate weapons manufacturing here at home today: Jørgen Høyer, Chr. Rovsing, A.P. Møller's DISA, Nea-Lindberg, Terma in Århus, Wejra near Aalborg, Per Udsen in Grenå and Kristian Kirk in Horsens.

"It is our feeling that industry wants to have only ready-made food; it must simply have orders served on a platter," Commander S. Torp Petersen says. "But we are still interested in weapons' being produced here at home, in part because it is easier to get weapons purchases approved when Danish industry takes part, and in part because it is important to have an industrial base in one's own back yard."

A highly placed official at the Industry Ministry, who wishes to remain anonymous, adds: "Some firms desist from weapons production because they do not want to risk unrest on the job, or because they do not like to be subjected to the security restrictions which come with this form of production. Some of the biggest in Danish industry say no because they do not believe in the promised technological lead and, besides, believe that they are doing fine as it is."

8831
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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GABON ORDERS ATR-42--The first military version of the French-Italian ATR-42 biturbo-propeller aircraft has been ordered by the Gabonese armed forces for use by paratroopers. This version, which can carry 40 fully equipped men, was developed largely by Aeritalia and features a reinforced floor, a sliding side door, and a rear loading ramp. Aeritalia also provides the final assembly of the aircraft at its Naples factory. Contacts are in progress with many other countries for the naval patrol version of the same aircraft, the ATM. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 5] /8309

AGUSTA CUSTOMERS ABROAD--Many foreign military and civil organizations became Agusta customers last November. The Finnish Border Guard [Rajavartiolaitos] has ordered three AB.412's for patrol and rescue missions in the North Sea equipped with the latest generation radar and radio navigation equipment as well as a high performance hydraulic winch which can lift loads of up to 300 kg. The first model has already been delivered. An A.109 MK-II has been delivered to the DMR Department which supervises road traffic in New South Wales, Australia. Destined for road patrols and fast transport, it proved successful in competition with various American, French, German, and Japanese helicopters. The A.109 MK-II performs this type of work in many other countries, including Italy, Yugoslavia, and Venezuela. Finally, two NH-300 helicopters made by Breda Nardi, one of the firms of the Agusta Helicopter Division, have been delivered to the Greek Military Air Force flight school. This is the first sale of Breda Nardi helicopters to a foreign customer. One of the few helicopters in the world that can be used efficiently in a flight school environment, the NH-300 can also be employed for various other tasks, including air patrol and control, executive transport, farm and forestry work, and photographic surveys. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 5] /8309

CSO: 3528/60-M

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

STEYR PRESENTS PROTOTYPE ARMORED VEHICLE

Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 9

[Text] The Steyr-Daimler-Puch trust recently presented the prototype of its new 6x6 armored vehicle, the PANDUR, to the Austrian Army. The vehicle currently is on operational trials with the Bundesheer units and may already go into mass production in 1986.

As is customary for this type of vehicle, the PANDUR is offered in a basic version [VTT] and in many specialized variations. Steyr offers a VCI with a turret-mounted 12.7 mm light machinegun, a reconnaissance vehicle with 20 mm automatic cannon, a self-propelled antiaircraft vehicle with 20 mm weapons, a support vehicle with 90 mm low pressure cannon, a mortar-piece carrier [81 mm weapon], an armored ambulance, and so on.

In the basic version [without turret] the PANDUR in combat order weighs 8.5 tons and can carry up to 12 men. The armor-plating meets the usual standards, insuring protection against 12.7 mm bullets in front and 7.62 mm armor-piercing bullets on the sides. The vehicle is powered by a Steyr WD612.5 six cylinder diesel with turbosupercharger and intercooler joined to a five-gear automatic transmission and can supply 155 kw [210 hp]. The Steyr firm refers to a "flat bottom," which suggests the existence of H-shaped propeller shafts.

The main characteristics of the basic PANDUR are as follows:

Weight empty [tons].....	8.5
Weight in combat order [tons].....	11.3
Length [mm].....	5,697
Width [mm].....	2,500
Hull height [mm].....	1,810
Ground guide [mm].....	420
Track [mm].....	2,134
Wheelbase [mm].....	1,530/1,530
Maximum road speed [km/h].....	105
Road range [km].....	650
Maximum superable slope [%].....	70
Vertical obstacle [m].....	0.50
Trench [m].....	1.20
Steering diameter [m].....	16

/8309

CSO: 3528/60-M

MILITARY

DENMARK

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND CHIEF ON MISSION, PROBLEMS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Everything Is Stocked Here--From Buttons to Cannons"]

[Text] The Army Materiel Command in Hjørring has 90,000 different groups of merchandise in its depots and has more than twice as much business as the Illum department store.

One of Denmark's biggest department stores is in the outskirts of Hjørring. It never advertises in the newspapers, but nevertheless has 1.2 billion kroner worth of business--more than twice as much as Illum. And it is in a position to deliver everything--from buttons, textiles, surgical instruments and canned goods, to cannons and tanks.

The operation is the Army Materiel Command, HMAK, whose chief, Major General T. Hjalf, has 1350 people directly under him, 1100 of whom are civilian engineers, office people and tradesmen, and who in addition manages 1600 military and civilian technicians around the country.

"We have three main duties," the major general relates in his office in the materiel command's modern facility on Arsenalvej [Arsenal Street] in the southern outskirts of Hjørring.

"We are to procure the army's materiel, we must keep it operating, and when it is worn out we must see to scrapping it. The materiel command has its headquarters in North Jutland but has command over materiel departments, depots and workshops over all of Denmark."

Sixty Thousand Regular Stock Items

"Keeping things operating is the duty which requires the greatest effort. We have 60,000 stock items which we deal in every single year, and in addition there are 30,000 more which are needed every other year. This concerns, for example, spare parts for materiel which is normally found at mobilization depots."

"The concept of 'procurement' encompasses the gigantic problem of procuring for the armed forces the best possible materiel for the limited funds we have available. This is becoming constantly more difficult, among other things, because we have difficulty in holding on to competent personnel. For example, at the moment we are short 5 civilian and 12 military engineers. And this is due not only to the State's salaries; it is also due to HMAK's location. There is very little industry in the area and it is hard to entice people so far north."

"The last of our duties is scrapping. Some of the worn-out materiel is sold at auctions. Weapons are destroyed, and the same holds true for ammunition. Some is blasted off, but normally the explosive is melted out of the cartridge cases, after which these are sold as scrap metal. Incidentally, it is surprisingly large sums the sale of these scrapped goods brings in," Major General Hjalf relates.


"The Army Materiel Command has command over a number of workshops around the country. One of these is a neighbor on Arsenaluej, the West Denmark Workshop, which in part builds prototypes of materiel which will later be manufactured by civilian firms, and in part modernizes and reconditions the armed forces' heavy materiel. In addition to the workshop in Hjørring there is the truck repair shop in Rørdal near Aalborg and the tank repair shop in Nyminddegab. They use almost exclusively civilian tradesmen and permanently have not quite 50 EFG [not further identified] students in training," Engineer T.W. Asmussen relates.

"The West Denmark Workshop receives in behalf of HMAK all newly purchased motor vehicles and tests them before they are accepted and paid for. At the moment the workshop is about to modernize the army's 155-mm howitzers, which will have new, longer barrels. This is taking place by means of American "do-it-yourself kits" and a good deal of Danish hardware; for example, gun clips and Danish fire extinguishers. This is the only place outside the USA this modernization is taking place, and it will bring the almost 20-year-old artillery completely in line with the artillery which the USA's armed forces, for example, command."

"A noteworthy feature of the modernization is that the Danish technicians have furnished each of the guns with a little Honda electrical generator so that they will be self-sufficient in terms of electric power while shooting, without its being necessary to run the big gluttonous main motor. This is a nicety which the Americans have shown great interest in."

"Comparable modernization is being done for the Centurion and M-41 tanks, and will be performed at the workshop in Nyminddegab according to a prototype developed in Hjørring," Graduate Engineer Asmussen relates.

In spite of its name, the Army Materiel Command also takes care of supplies of some common materiel for the other two services, as well as the Home Guard. This relates to, for example, the supplying of combat uniforms, while the navy and air force themselves take care of sailor suits and the blue-gray airmen's uniforms.



The Army Materiel Command's West Denmark Workshop is at the moment about to modernize the army's 155-mm howitzers, which will get new, longer barrels. Photo: Henning Bagger



New Mercedes jeeps ready for delivery to armed forces units. The Army Materiel Command buys and inspects all rolling stock for the armed forces.

Tests Durability

An important share of the testing of the armed forces' electronic equipment takes place here in Hjørring in HMAK's special quality control section, whose head is Chief Engineer Tony Hansen. The laboratory contains a series of machines which can test whether an item is sufficiently durable to be introduced in the armed forces, and the facilities are used to a great extent by civilian industry also, for the testing of new products, Research Chief, Engineer P. Mortensen relates.

"Here a 48-hour study can be made of whether a radio still functions after having rattled away in a vehicle for hundreds of kilometers in rough terrain. Here studies are made of whether an electronic measuring instrument can endure the effect of an F-16 plane traveling at supersonic speed while firing big machine guns, or whether an item can cope with the salt water during a winter voyage back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean," Engineer Mortensen says.

"The army has a strong need for replacements. We are doing what we can to keep the wheels running," Major General T. Hjalf concludes. "When weapons assistance was dropped in 1967, it was decided that the armed forces were to have 400 million kroner a year for new procurement. We have never seen this money, and it is only with extreme thrift and with summoning of all our ingenuity that it has been possible to keep the armed forces running."

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MILITARY

DENMARK

COUNTRY'S FIRMS WIN CONTRACTS FROM NATO JOINT FACILITIES FUND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Billion-Kroner Orders for Danish Firms"]

[Text] NATO's new joint-financed facilities program is providing over a half billion kroner worth of orders to Danish firms, but at the same time the Faeroes are tapping the Danish national treasury to the tune of 20 million kroner in customs duties for air raid warning equipment, the periodical STAMPERSOENEL [REGULAR PERSONNEL] writes.

Among the new purchases is a Lynx flight simulator which is being purchased in cooperation with Holland, Norway and West Germany. It will be used in connection with the training of pilots for the navy's Lynx helicopters. Denmark's share of the expenses is 6.8 million kroner.

Twenty million kroner will be used to construct squadron air raid shelters with accompanying road and parking facilities at the Vardel and Tirstrup air stations.

The NATO projects encompass primarily 260 million kroner for the construction of air shelters at a number of military air fields. The alliance's infrastructure program totaled 11.6 billion kroner in 1985. Denmark will get the 200 million kroner refunded, but in addition there are a number of national accompanying expenses. The 1986 program includes, as far as Denmark is concerned, facilities work and purchases to the tune of 270 million kroner. This concerns, among other things, a cost increase of 30 million in connection with the procurement of the new IHAWK air defense missiles, construction at six air stations, improvement of fuel installations, and also the expansion of Combaltap's war headquarters. This money, too, is expected to be refunded.

On the other hand, what we do not expect to get back is the 20 million kroner which the Faeroes have demanded in customs duties for the importation of air raid warning materiel to the tune of seven million kroner and equivalent materiel for a British radar station. In spite of the fact that the warning stations are a big advantage for air and shipping traffic around the islands, the Faeroese authorities plead that it is Denmark and not the Faeroes which is a member of NATO and that Denmark must therefore pay.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE MINISTER DENIES OPPOSITION TO WOMEN IN FORCES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 15

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Defense Minister: I Have Nothing Against Women in the Army"]

[Text] The defense minister denies that he is keeping secret the report on women in the navy because he is opposed to women soldiers.

"The chairman of the Equality Council, Helle Degn (Social Democratic Party), knows perfectly well what it is said in the secret report regarding women in the armed forces. The council has had an observer present during all the discussions of the steering committee which was established in connection with the experiment with women in the navy," Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) says in a conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The context is the criticism which Helle Degn raised in the periodical STAMPERSONEL [REGULAR PERSONNEL], which is a members' magazine for sergeants, enlisted privates and other permanent employees in the armed forces. In it she claims that the report on the experiment, which concluded a year ago, must now come out and maintains that the defense minister has classified it secret in order to check the debate regarding the place of women in the services.

"Helle Degn is very well acquainted with the report which she is putting out a bulletin for," Hans Engell says, and adds:

"At the moment the report has been sent out for comments by the military authorities, in part the Armed Forces Command and provincial commands, and in part the units in which women are doing service. I figure that we can hold the last meeting in January, after which I will receive the final recommendation."

"For this reason I think that it is strange that Helle Degn is coming out with this criticism, especially in light of the fact that the Equality Council has been represented during the discussions."

"There is nothing mysterious about the fact that the report has been classified as secret. It is a question of an internal white paper which contains

a number of pieces of information on military conditions," the defense minister continues. "I cannot judge to what extent it is a question of classified or non-classified information. According to the rules it is always the authority which prepares a report which decides the classification level. I am certain then that as soon as the work has been completed we will then be able to put it out for a general broad debate."

"Helle Degn has hinted that the secretiveness is due to the fact that I am against women in the armed forces. I want to emphasize strongly in this connection, then, that it definitely is not this which it is about," Hans Engell says.

"I myself have read the report very thoroughly and it can be said that the lessons learned have been varied. It is clear that one does not establish an entirely new system without its having a number of consequences, both positive and problematic. But to sum it up it is my impression that the experiences have been good."

"We expanded the experimental system to cover, in part, the army antitank infantry and, in part, the navy's motor torpedo boats," Hans Engell says, who is calling for a debate regarding the ethics of using women in the armed forces.

"The very question is whether it is even ethically right to use women in combat units. My own attitude is that I can well understand those people who are doubtful of the use of women in actual combat missions. On the other hand, it must be realized that the war picture has changed. One can no longer talk about a front line where the men fight while the women look after the home and children in safety behind the front. Today we talk of far greater integration of combat areas and civilian areas and with this the ethical dimensions in connection with the use of women as combat troops have also changed. A modern war will be so horrible and have such frightful consequences that there are many concepts which were totally unambiguous 30 years ago but which today have lost their real content."

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COLONEL CHARGES HOME GUARD HARMED BY BUREAUCRACY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by RB: "Colonel: Home Guard Plagued by Bureaucracy"]

[Text] "Bureaucracy is threatening the Home Guard's status as a popular movement," believes the commander of Home Guard Region III, Colonel J. Frederik Edeling of Haderslev.

"Today we must recognize that the Home Guard has gradually become strapped into a set of provisions and rules which, in pace with the bureaucratization of the other armed forces, have become constantly narrower and stricter. The Home Guard has to a very high degree 'bought' or had forced upon it the Armed Forces Command's stipulations, especially in the administrative area," J. Frederik Edeling says.

This has meant a growing drain on personnel resources. The latest shoot on the stem of new administrative stipulations is, according to the region commander, the drawing up of 1.5-kilogram-heavy accounting instructions. The observance of these involves, as far as Home Guard Region III alone is concerned, the need to employ three full-time salaried employees.

Region Commander Edeling foresees that the service which the regular system can offer volunteers in the Home Guard will thereby become steadily more limited.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

NAVY'S OPERATIONAL COMMAND CONCERNED OVER DEFENSE CREDIBILITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jan 86 p 6

[Text] "Today, the Danish defense is militarily credible. This fact has often been established by our NATO allies when our units participate in joint maneuvers. Such statements of confidence in the Danish military units are often followed by statements of surprise at our ability to maintain that level of military professionalism in view of the limited funds available to the military. We thus have military credibility. The question is whether we shall be able to maintain it."

The above statement was made by the chief of the Navy's Operational Command, Rear Admiral J. F. Bork in his speech last Sunday night on the occasion of the 107th anniversary of the Ex-Servicemen's League in Copenhagen.

Rear Admiral J.F. Bork pointed out that the defense of a country is based on two pillars of credibility--the military and the political.

After mentioning examples of outstanding performance on the part of Danish units participating in NATO maneuvers, Rear Admiral J. F. Bork added that he was somewhat concerned over Denmark's political credibility in the security policy area. Many of the other NATO countries do not always understand Denmark's actions in relation to the countries that are our allies and with which we cooperate. Most recently, many foreign friends of Denmark are now following in astonishment the commotion in this country in connection with the EC package.

Rear Admiral J. F. Bork concluded his speech with the following reflections on the future of the Danish defense:

"We shall have to make an effort to maintain the military credibility that Denmark today still enjoys--and, in this connection, the Defense people need the support of the civilian friends of the Defense, including the support of the many ex-servicemen around the country," the chief of the Navy's Operational Command stated.

Rear Admiral J.F. Bork pointed out three problems to which the Danish Defense will have to find solutions in the coming years, viz. its budget, the depletion of the reserves of materiel and the personnel problems resulting from the ability of the civilian sector to offer competent people better conditions than the Defense is able to.

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CSO: 3613/60

AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY, GUIDANCE SYSTEM INNOVATIONS REVIEWED

ROLAND Command Center Options

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 74-77

[Article by Wolfgang Flume]

[Text] For achieving coordinated, and therefore effective, operations of ROLAND, which is to protect Luftwaffe airfields, and other air defense weapons, such as the 20 mm Zwilling [twin] gun, radar-equipped command centers are to be procured simultaneously with the introduction of ROLAND. At present an evaluation is in progress of several proposals from industry which are mostly based on existing systems, partly on systems which would require modification. This article describes requirements for the ROLAND air defense command center and proposals from industry.

Between 1986 and 1990 the German Luftwaffe will receive 95 wheel-mounted ROLAND air defense systems for the protection of 12 TORNADO and F-4 air bases, as well as the three USAF bases at Frankfurt, Sembach and Wiesbaden. The ROLAND are organized in 15 batteries, divided among three battalions: the 41st Air Defense Missile Battalion in Wangerland near Bremen; the 42nd in Schoeneck near Frankfurt and the 43rd in Leipheim. The personnel will come from the present NIKE regiments, as it will for the six PATRIOT regiments. In addition, there will be 20 ROLAND to protect the naval aviation at bases located at Nordholz, Eggebeck and Jagel. Of the 95 Luftwaffe ROLANDs, the German-U.S. agreement on PATRIOT/ROLAND provides that 27 be deployed for the protection of the above named three U.S. air bases. This leaves 5 to 6 ROLANDS each, or one battery, for the German air bases--fewer than had been thought necessary years ago. Prior to the 1981 Defense Examination, which stopped the ROLAND program, the Luftwaffe had planned procurement of a total of 170 ROLAND, i.e., about eight ROLAND per facility to be protected.

Specifically because of the smaller number of ROLAND systems per base and the concomitant requirement for better coordination of their deployment, the ROLAND Air Defense Command Center (Flugabwehrgefechtsstand ROLAND or FGR), which is to be activated simultaneously with the ROLAND at the rate of one per battery has gained increased importance. This FGR is to exert centralized control at the air base over ROLAND and the other air defense weapons, such as the 20 mm Zwilling gun and possibly the AIM-9L ground-to-air launchers, so as to achieve an effective defense, particularly against saturation raids.

Requirements

The requirements for the FGR are still based on the old tactical requirements for a ROLAND combat control system, whose design was greatly influenced by the combat control system for the HAWK air defense missile system. The Defense Examination killed the entire Luftwaffe ROLAND project; but the German-U.S. agreement caused it to be resuscitated, which led to the integration of the FGR as a system and to the elaboration of outline specifications in 1984.

The mission of the ROLAND air defense command center can be described as follows:

- Analyze the air situation with a radar sensor possessing a range of about 40 to 60 km and an altitude covering range of up to about 5000 meters;
- description and display of the air situation on viewing screens in the command center;
- command and control in conjunction with the wing on the air base, i.e., determination of the defense situation, threat analysis and identification of aerial targets; target allocation to specific weapon systems and/or initiation of defensive measures, e.g., starting friendly aircraft (for defensive or protective operations) or moving aircraft into shelters when a raid is found to be impending;
- Attacking targets with weapon systems available at the facility.

To be able to accomplish this mission, the FGR must have certain capabilities. While it is to defend a stationary facility, it must be able to change location, for its own protection and to make enemy reconnaissance more difficult. This is true for the ROLAND as well as for the FGR, which must therefore be of mobile design, i.e., contained in a truck-transportable compartment. This means further that communications between the weapons and the FGR are by radio, with highly automated transmission of all data required by the weapon systems. For this purpose, ROLAND must be designed in such a way that automatic programming is possible. The less sophisticated systems, 20 mm Zwilling and AIM-9L are to have terminals whose displays have to be acted upon by the gun or launcher controller. Additionally, if the FGR and the weapons are emplaced in prepared positions, communications can be transmitted via interference-immune cables.

With the FGR it should become possible that only the FGR air surveillance radar be used for air situation analysis and target allocation, and not the ROLAND air surveillance radars, whose position thus remains concealed from enemy electronic reconnaissance. For attacking the target, the ROLAND crew then uses only the fire control radar or the optical aiming device. Target data thus must be extremely accurate for transmittal to ROLAND. To be able to allocate targets to the weapon systems, the FGR will have on its radar scopes adequate data on the status and position of friendly weapons and their ranges.

At the same time the FGR provides connection with the NATO integrated air defense, from which (from the CRCs) it receives early warnings. Maybe someday it will be possible to transmit information direct from the AWACS to the FGR. All this makes it clear that the function of the FGR depends significantly upon

the performance of the built-in computers and the software. In the functional chain between analysis of the air situation and attacking the targets the greatest possible number of steps must be automated--among them the description of the air situation, the threat analysis, recommendations for the type of defensive operation and target allocation. However, the command to fire will always remain a human decision.

For reasons of time, but primarily of cost, the Bundeswehr renounced a specific FGR development. A contributing factor was the fact that in past years German industry and that of allied nations had already developed combat command centers on their own initiative which could be usable at FGRs, though partly requiring modification.

Proposals From Industry

In August 1984 the Bundeswehr headquarters requested the firms AEG and Siemens to write product specifications for the FGR, using the greatest possible number of existing components or those already under development; sensors were specified. Later on a proposal was received from the Kongsberg firm, resulting initially in five approaches:

- AEG, with two proposals based on the GIRAFFE and TRML radars;
- Siemens, with the BCP and RCC;
- Kongsberg, with a proposal based on the LASR radar.

The GIRAFFE and BCP proposals can be considered simple solutions; the three others are more complex systems.

AEG-GIRAFFE

This FGR approach uses the Ericsson GIRAFFE C-band radar in its Mk IV version (still being developed), which has a range of 40-50 km. The antenna is attached to the control cabin and can be telescoped up to a height of 8-10 meters. The cabin contains the control center with two work positions and all accessory equipment such as radar, computer, etc. For the combat control portion AEG proposes two solutions: one is based on the components and software of the army defense reconnaissance and control system (still in the development phase), the other is a "free" approach, optimized for FGR application.

AEG-TRML

TRML (Telefunken Radar Mobil "Low") is a simplified 2D version of the 3D air surveillance radar developed for the army air defense reconnaissance and control system TRMS (military designation: airspace surveillance radar LUE), having a range of about 50 km (compared with 100 km for the TRMS). The radar works in the C-band. Here too the antenna is mounted telescoped on the cabin. AEG proposes the two approaches described above as the combat command component.

Siemens-BCP

The Siemens-developed BCP (Battery Coordination Post) also combines radar and combat control instrumentation into a single unit. Among others, BCP is

proposed for use as a combat command system for the Greek ARTEMIS 30 mm air defense system. It is capable of controlling up to 12 different weapons. Radar used is the Siemens X-Band DR 641 (formerly designated MPDR-30X), having a range of 30 km; the cabin has a two-man crew.

Siemens-RCC

The ROLAND Coordination Center (RCC), which was developed on its own initiative by Euromissile in cooperation with Thomson CSF and Siemens, has been configured specifically for the ROLAND weapon system. From the control cabin, with its two-man crew, fire from up to eight ROLAND and eight tube- or other weapons can be coordinated. Data received from up to three radar instruments can be processed. To date, interfaces have been developed to the Siemens DR-641 and Thomson-CSF TIGER: the Siemens proposal would use for the FGR the C-band radar TIGER G (TGRS 2105) by Thomson-CSF with a range of about 60 km, as specified by the Bundeswehr. In the RCC the radar remains separated from the control cabin on a trailer.

Kongsberg-ARCS

Kongsberg is offering a variation of the ARCS (Acquisition Radar and Control System) which it had developed together with Hughes for the Norwegian HAWK (where it is to be used jointly with the Bofors 40 mm L/70 gun in a multiple system, among other things for air base protection). The first ARCS is to be operational in January 1987. The proposal directed to the Luftwaffe combines ARCS, into a single unit; it is operated by two persons at two multiple-function Kongsberg consoles. The Hughes 3D LASR radar in the X-band as an air surveillance and target tracking radar is a refinement (preserving about 90 percent of the original components) of the AN/TPQ-36 FIREFINDER mortar radar, 160 of which have been delivered so far. It works in the X-band and has a range of about 60 km.

As to their complexity, the five proposals are not too different. Final selection of one proposal should take place toward the end of the year by decision of the Luftwaffe chief of staff, after a technical and budgetary evaluation by the Bundeswehr and tactical evaluation by Luftwaffe headquarters. It is obvious that apart from performance capability the cost is of paramount importance. The question remains open however whether the projected budget of about DM 200 million for the 18 systems for the Luftwaffe and three for the Navy will be sufficient for procuring more than a bare-bones system.

We do not wish to preempt the evaluation of the proposals in this article, but we should like to address a few points which may have a bearing on the final selection:

--For practical purposes, only two systems are in existence as prototype hardware: the Siemens BCP and the Euromissile RCC. The BCP's configuration is better suited for tube weapons and short-range missiles (infra-red anti-aircraft guided missiles); the software would therefore have to be modified for better integration of the ROLAND systems. The RCC, as stated above, is configured specifically for the ROLAND system, but can integrate other weapons also.

--The proposed radar instruments are more or less proven systems--some work remains to be done only on the TRML, which derives from the TRMS, which has been approved for operational use. The GIRAFFE Mk IV still requires some development work also, but is based on a system which has proven itself in operational use in several countries.

--From the standpoint of logistics, the TRML radar could provide certain advantages to the Bundeswehr: the TRML would have about 60 percent of the same components as the TRMS, which will be deployed in the army air defense reconnaissance and control system as an airspace surveillance radar and in the Navy as a coastal radar. Apart from logistic simplification, production of the TRMS would be less expensive also.

--Concerning performance capability, the LASR, being a 3D radar, provides altitude information also--this could be useful for better allocation of targets to the tube or missile weapons, because their use depends on the target altitude also. Later on, the TRML could be expanded into a 3D radar through combat effectiveness upgrading.


--The radar antenna, which telescopes in most cases, is attached to the control cabin in all except the RCC proposal. While this means that the FGR would require only one truck, the threat posed by anti-radiation missiles (ARM) would make separation of radar antenna and control center preferable (the latter could for instance be located in an aircraft shelter), even though this would require two motor vehicles. Only the RCC has this feature so far.

--Proposals made to date incorporate a prescribed combination of the combat control component and a specified type of radar. While the strengths of one component can compensate for weaknesses in the other, a more flexible combination would be preferable. Thus the RCC is not tied to a specific type of radar. This consideration has recently caused the Bundeswehr to issue another short-term request for proposals which would provide for other combination options.

It would be desirable that the Luftwaffe and the Navy receive an air defense control center for ROLAND whose components, especially radar and computer, are configured in such a way that later adaptation to a change in threat are possible through combat effectiveness maintenance or upgrading. Apart from changes in software, this could mean also integration of new hardware. Even today there are plans for a combat effectiveness upgrading of the ROLAND system, addressing, among other things, greater immunity to electronic countermeasures and an 8 km increase in the range of the missiles. In addition, a combination with the infrared guided STINGER fire-and-forget missiles on the same launcher is conceivable.

For the longer term, consideration can be given to enlarging the areas to be protected by facilities protection, to counter the introduction of enemy standoff weapons; in other words, a defense against standoff weapons should be provided. Thus the configuration of facilities protection and threat adaptation will remain an interesting subject in years to come.

Chart: Coordinated Functioning of the RCC Components



Key:

1. To the central surveillance radar
2. To the ROLAND weapon system
3. To the weapon terminals
4. Communications facilities
5. Radar interface
6. Radar operator console
7. Computer
8. Image display processor
9. Data synthesizing
10. Data synthesizing
11. Data synthesizing
12. Color TV monitor
13. Weapon console
14. Surveillance console
15. Alphanumeric keyboard
16. Operating controls
17. Commands
18. Ball tap

GEPARD Upgrading Planned

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 p 78

[Article by Juergen Mogilowski]

[Text] The GEPARD air defense armored vehicle has been in use by three European ground forces for almost 10 years. The project officer for the

GEPARD in the Bundeswehr Materiel Office, Engineer Juergen Mogilowski, describes the weapon system in this article and lists the aims of the planned combat effectiveness upgrading.

The essential tactical requirements for the GEPARD have been the following:

- great hit and destructive probability;
- effective range in the main battle area: up to 2,500 meters; maximum range 4,000 meters;
- autonomous operation, i.e., independent search, recognition, identification and attack by an air defense armored vehicle;
- reduced manpower requirement for operation and maintenance.

Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands agreed in 1973 on the joint introduction of the GEPARD air defense armored vehicle 35 mm weapon system. The version selected, developed by the Swiss firms Oerlikon and Contraves, were at that time the most advanced version of an autonomous air defense gun.

Germany procured 420, Belgium 55 and the Netherlands 95 armored vehicles between 1976 and 1980. These numbers permitted the FRG to activate one air defense regiment, with 36 air defense armored vehicles each, per division. In addition, a battalion was established in Schleswig-Holstein (LANDJUT). Each regiment consists of six batteries with six air defense armored vehicle. each.

Equipment

The monopulse-Doppler search radar with high ground clutter rejection and ECCM capability serves for the surveillance of the airspace and the acquisition of targets. Its range is about 16 km. The IFF is integrated into the surveillance radar.

The tracking radar as monopulse-Doppler radar tracks the target automatically after target allocation in the azimuth angle.

Use of the Neodym-YAG-Laser (as an EW protective measure), tracking radar or surveillance radar is optional for distance determination.

The crew's periscopes also serve for airspace surveillance and target tracking. The commander can use his periscope independent of the gunner and thus save time in defense against several targets (e.g., in attacking a two-aircraft formation).

The angles and distances measured by the sensors are converted by the fire control computer into lead angles, considering also the ballistics of the munition. The aiming mechanisms of the turret and the weapons are automatically controlled by the computer.

The fire control computer was developed in analog, since at the time the weapon system was introduced this method provided the best computing accuracy (data refinement) and reliability.

The two 35 mm weapons, which are mounted externally on the turret, are used to attack the target. 640 rounds of munition (HEI high-explosive incendiary and SAPHEI armored high-explosive incendiary) are stored in an annular magazine in the turret cupola in a space which has low vulnerability. For attacking ground targets, each weapon has 20 rounds of small caliber armor-piercing ammunition (APDS). For exact calculation of the lead angle the muzzle velocity of the munition is measured and corrected during the burst of fire.

Crew Training

Crew training occurs largely on simulators:

- Training system air defense armored vehicle, operating elements of the console;
- simulated combat work space (training of a 2-man crew);
- aerial target simulator (inside the vehicle; optics simulated by CGI);
- tactical fire evaluation facility for monitoring crews inside the vehicles during combat training.

Maintenance personnel are trained on training simulators dedicated to the specialties of fire control, weapon and power supply.

Combat Effectiveness Upgrading

A combat effectiveness upgrading of the weapon system must be used to adapt to the threat, especially from

- high-performance aircraft;
- combat helicopters;
- electronic warfare.

The following is proposed:

- Procurement of a higher-velocity munition (to shorten its travel time) and greater impact in the target, e.g., a small-caliber non-explosive round with fragmentation effect;
- Integration with a command and reconnaissance system with external sensors (army air defense reconnaissance and control system);
- passive optronic sensors with infrared imaging and tracker;
- digitalization of fire control and internal guidance and monitoring by a digital computer which also processes the information of the command system (enemy air situation).

These measures are intended to result in the following:

- increased hit and destruction probability;
- passive operation, i.e., little or no use of the actively radiating radars, to reduce enemy reconnaissance and to reduce the threat from anti-radiation-missiles (ARM);
- coordinated defense against enemy aircraft and combat helicopter formations approaching in large numbers (swarms).

German STINGER Modifications

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 78-82

[Article by Klaus-Juergen Glee]

[Text] Following a market survey of several portable antiaircraft missile systems, the Bundeswehr has decided on procuring the U.S.-developed General Dynamics STINGER. The weapon system is to be produced in Europe under license by the general contractors, Dornier and Diehl. Engineer Klaus-Juergen Glee, program engineer for the STINGER with Dornier GmbH, describes the system, called Fliegerfaust 2 in Germany, and mentions a few possibilities for upgrading it during the 1990s.

Lightweight, portable antiaircraft systems like the Fliegerfaust 2 (FLF2) are generally used under optical visual conditions for defense against low and very low flying aircraft for self-defense or facilities defense. Systems of this nature are generally known in NATO terminology as man-portable-air-defense systems (MANPADS). In the Bundeswehr they are known as "Fliegerfaust." The following are at present deployed worldwide:

--SA-7
--BLOWPIPE
--RBS-70
--REDEYE
--STINGER

The essential tasks for these systems are the following:

--all-around defense against approaching aircraft and helicopters at low and very low altitudes;
--target speeds of zero to Mach 1.4;
--target maneuvers of up to 8g;
--method of use: fire-and-forget, if possible;
--highest possible countermeasure invulnerability;
--availability 0.95;
--shelf life of more than 12 years.

Common MANPADS characteristics are light system weight, small missile diameter, small warhead weight and command guidance or IR homing.

Problem areas for portable missile systems are mainly in their portability, i.e., limitation in weight and dimensions concomitant with adequate performance and in detection capability, i.e., target acquisition, target identification and target tracking.

Portable guided missile systems are used under visibility conditions, in which the human eye serves as the sensor.

The U.S. portable STINGER air defense system was selected as Fliegerfaust 2. This system is to replace the portable air defense system Fliegerfaust 1

(REDEYE), a predecessor of the STINGER, which is currently in use by the Bundeswehr, in 1986.

The STINGER Basic missile has a passive IR search head. The search head of the upgraded STINGER POST works in the IR and UV sectors. The illustration shows the components of the weapon system and the training device. Additional system components are a field handling trainer, the gas pumping unit, argon gas supply, and the metal weapon round container and the wooden missile round container.

Among the main features of the weapon system are the following:

- rolling airframe (length: 1,074 mm);
- proportional navigation with target adaptive guidance (LEAD BIAS);
- great start and lateral acceleration capability;
- high supersonic speed (approximately Mach 2);
- great kinetic impact and penetration energy at the target;
- impact fuze with ignition delay, causing detonation of the warhead charge in the target.

The performance of such a portable air defense system is determined essentially by optical, visual target perception, reaction time and the fire and deployment areas. Minimum reaction time of the weapon, after target search and visual perception have taken place, takes several seconds.

Since the weight of the high explosive in the warhead is relatively small, the missile does not have to score a direct hit on its target in order to destroy it. Some systems, e.g., the STINGER, do not even have a proximity sensor. The goal is to have the warhead detonate inside the airframe, so as to obtain maximum effect. A sophisticated ignition system with appropriate ignition delay causes the warhead to explode inside the target.

The upgraded STINGER POST model has a two-color search head (IR and UV), which works with a rosette scan rather than with reticle modulation. In addition, a slightly conical external contour of the search head provides slightly improved aerodynamics. This improvement should provide the following advantages for the STINGER POST in comparison with the STINGER Basic:

- improved IR/CM capability;
- improved fire and hit capabilities, especially in head-on approach;
- improved separation of double targets;
- improved target acquisition (using the UV component for targets having suppressed IR radiation characteristics).

The lack of an automatic IFF instrument and the relatively late acquisition of approaching targets causes a trend in several countries to more fully exploit the capabilities of this missile by using it in other weapon systems having better sensors or their own fire control system. Basic research in this area is proceeding for Fliegerfaust 2 also.

The great expense of developing new ground-to-air guided missile systems would indicate a future requirement for a Fliegerfaust 3, which would meet the threat in the close and immediate vicinity in large numbers and in conjunction with tube weapons in a personnel and cost economic manner.

The following improvements are desirable for the 1990s:

- an adequate solution of automatic target identification;
- improved flight mechanics and guidance equipment;
- missile speed approaching Mach 3;
- greater lateral acceleration capability;
- better hit accuracy, so as to render unnecessary either a heavy warhead weight or the development of "aimed" warheads with very expensive fuze-warhead combinations;
- improvement in head-on capability with two-phase guidance, i.e., improved target search heads, especially for the final approach;
- improvements in the areas of all-weather capability, enlargement of the acquisition distance through the use of electro-optical instruments, automation of target identification, tracking and guidance of the missile inside the target, resulting in reducing reaction time;
- adaptability to a variety of carrier vehicles and suitability for integration with other weapon systems.

These desired improvements must however not cause the cost of the systems to preclude their procurement in large numbers.

Chart: Portable Air Defense Guided Missile Systems

		BLOWPIPE	RBS-70	SA-7	REDEYE	STINGER BASIC	POST
eingeführt in	1	GB, CAN	S (N)	W.-P	NATO; S	USA —	
Reichweite	2 m	~ 3 000	5 000	3 700	3 800	5 000	5 200
Flugzeit	3 s	14	16	6.5	~ 10		8.5
max. Einsatzhöhe	4 m	1 700	3 000	3 000	2 500		3 000
max. FK-Geschw.	5 Mach	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6		2.1
max. Zielgeschw.	6 Mach	0.9	~ 1	< 1	0.7		1.2
System-Gewicht	7 kg	20.7	82.5	~ 13.9	13.1		15.6
Länge ¹	8 mm	1 350	1 320	1 440	1 272		1 524
FK-Durchmesser	9 mm	77	106	72	70		70
FK-Gewicht	10 kg	14	15	9.2	8.3		9.4
Lenkung	11	16 Funk-Kdo 17 Zieldeckungs- verfahren	Laser- Beamrider	pass. IR- Homing	pass. IR- Homing	pass. IR-Homing + UV	
				Prop.-Nav.	Prop.-Nav.	Proportional-Nav	
Gefechtskopf	12	18 3 kg HE oder Hohlladung	1 kg HE St-Kugeln	19 1 kg HE	1 kg HE	1 kg HE	
Zunder	13	20 Aufschlag u. Annah.	21 Aufschlag u. Annäh. Laser	Aufschlag	22 Aufschlag	Aufschlag	

Störfestigkeit	14	ECM	23	»keine«	IRCM	IRCM	IRCM ger. IRCM
Besondere Merkmale	15	gegen anfl. Ziele	24	gegen anfl. Ziele	gegen abfl. Ziele	gegen abfl. Ziele	gegen an- und 26 abfl. Ziele

1) des Startrohres mit Abschlußdeckel

Key:

1. Used In:
2. Range (meters)
3. Flying time (seconds)
4. Altitude ceiling (meters)
5. Maximum speed (Mach)
6. Maximum target speed (Mach)
7. System weight (kg)
8. Length (of launch tube with cover) (mm)
9. Missile diameter (mm)
10. Missile weight (kg)
11. Guidance
12. Warhead
13. Fuze
14. Immunity to interference
15. Special characteristics
16. Radio command
17. Line-of-sight course method
18. 3 kg high explosive or shaped charge
19. 1 kg high explosive steel balls
20. Impact and proximity
21. Impact and proximity laser
22. Impact
23. "none"
24. Against approaching targets
25. Against departing targets
26. Against approaching and departing targets.

Transition to NADGE Successor

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 82-85

[Article by Werner Gerlitzki]

[Text] The NADGE NATO air defense system, designed in the 1960s, is to see a transition to a new ACCS system within about 15 years in 5-year increments. Engineer Werner Gerlitzki, head of the Ground Radar Systems Branch of the Position Finding Division of AEG, Ulm, describes in this article the current state of the art in information acquisition and processing in air defense and talks about future developments.

Three different levels can be defined in the command and deployment structure of air defense:

--command of subordinate units and deployment planning at the tactical air command level (ATAF); specific command facilities are provided by the two sector operations centers of an ATAF (SOC);

--execution of tactical tasks and deployment of weapon systems at the air defense command centers (CRC), several of which are subordinate to a SOC;

--actual engagement at weapon system level (antiaircraft missiles, fighter aircraft).

Taking a closer look at the second and third level, we find that the air defense components represented there depend for the accomplishment of their tasks to a large extent upon data provided by their sensors (almost exclusively radars). Sensors available today and in the foreseeable future are the following:

--for second-level systems: allocated air defense radars, other surveillance radars (e.g., ATC), surveillance radars in attached weapon systems; AWACS;

--for third-level systems located on the ground: surveillance and fire control radars of the air defense missile weapon systems; in the air, on-board radars and IR sensors of the flying systems.

Functions to be accomplished with the aid of sensor information include the following:

--at the second level: acquisition, identification and classification of aerial targets, air situation display, threat calculation, target allocation to the weapon systems, interceptor deployment, command of friendly flying units and groups;

--at the third level on the ground: determination of the air situation, threat calculation if necessary, target acquisition, target tracking, fire control; in the air, navigation, ground and aerial target acquisition, target tracking, fire control.

State of the Art and New Concepts

In the NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) system, designed for air defense in the 1960s, a CRC usually has a stationary, co-located long-range radar which provides the air situation as well as radar information for fighter command functions. The attached HAWK or NIKE air defense missile systems, which have their own radars at their level, receive target allocations from the CRC and return status reports to BOC and CRC. However, an information exchange on the air situation is possible only via the LINK-1 connection between the CRCs (Crosstell procedure). The vulnerability of this system in case of interference with or destruction of the CRC radar is obvious. It would require independent functioning of the air defense missile systems, which impairs weapon effectiveness.

To counter these weaknesses, the GEADGE (German Air Defense Ground Environment) program has been in operation since the early 1980s in the Southern Germany area, that of the 4 ATAF. This permits connection with supplemental

radars, connected with the CRC radar, which transmit their air situation data digitally; in addition, there is a procedure for receiving AWACS situation reports. Based on the incoming target data from the radars, the CRC computers are able to conduct multi-radar tracking. This results in better radar coverage of the CRC area and in diminished vulnerability.

At the same time, the introduction of new data transmission procedures in the HAWK system (ATDL) permits automatic transmission of status and air situation information to the TSQ-38 HAWK battalion command post and, in a further upgrading, from and to the CRC (via TADIL-B).

AEG currently has a contract for implementing the requisite modernization which will permit transmission and display of status and situation reports to the TSQ-38.

Beyond that, there have been since about 1980 NATO studies and plans for a revision of the air defense system, known as ACCS (Air Command and Control System). The following are the basic requirements and prerequisites for their fulfilment:

- Reduced vulnerability by data networking existing positions and sensors; connecting additional mobile radars with the CRC; introduction of passive sensors into the radar frequency bands; hardening of stationary facilities to the maximum extent possible;
- Increased immunity to ECM by interference-resistant modern radars; networking of radars in different frequency bands; use of passive sensors to locate jammers;
- Adaptation to the characteristics of next-generation targets through improved acquisition of small and low-flying targets; adaptation of the computer software to greater maneuverability of the targets; acceleration of the defense sequence through software support;
- Improvement of identification procedures by standardizing the IFF/SIF process in the NATO area; computer support in executing procedural identification sequences;
- closer coordination between offensive and defensive air war components (Joint Airspace Management) by improved data links and therefore a better exchange of information at the ATOC-SOC-CRC level (ideally: co-location of ATOC/SOC); new definitions of functional sequences and procedures; integration of new command systems (EIFEL, HEROS).

In addition, attention must be paid in the air defense structure of the future to the impacts deriving from the introduction of new weapon systems, e.g., PATRIOT. Also, detailed procedures must be worked out for coordination with the ground forces (air defense, army aviation).

Considering the special characteristics of the NATO Central Air Defense Region, the implementation of the outline structure for ACCS leads to the basic organization shown in Figure 1. In it, ATOC and SOC are closely linked by data networks; the CRCs have, instead of less firmly committed radars, a sensor net which in addition contains supplementary mobile active and passive sensors. The new tasks resulting therefrom for the network or

sensor management must be newly integrated with today's functional sequences. One essential task for the CRC is the determination of a validated air situation for its area (Recognized Air Picture, RAP) and its maintenance under enemy attack. It is available to the fighter command and for transmission to the attached air defense missile units. Note must be taken in the future also of the fact that in view of the planned HAWK/PATRIOT weapon mix air defense missile systems with differing deployment parameters and effective ranges will have to be controlled. The additional functions required for this will have to be performed by the mobile air defense missile control centers of the future.

What defense-oriented instrumentation is available, especially, from German industry, for implementing this system? In recent years the AEG-Telefunken 3D TRMS surveillance radar has been developed as a highly mobile 3D radar, all the way to field use readiness. In the passive sensor area, several firms and institutes are conducting research and development which should result in deployment during the 1990s. It will cover a wide operating spectrum, extending from the bistatic radar (SEL), to passive radars for detecting the position of radiation emitters in the frequency ranges of surveillance radars and AEG on-board radars, and to triangulation of jamming transmitters by the interference direction finder of ground radars made by Siemens.

Industry can also supply--contrary to the situation 20 years ago at the beginning of the NADGE program--fully developed display and indicator units, computers and basic software modules. However, in producing complex software for air defense purposes, special care must be taken, apart from the available experience of German firms and available software capabilities, to define, the required function in a programmable manner before starting out. This is a task beyond the capacity of industry alone; it can be accomplished only by joint efforts between user, procurement officials and industry.

Aspects of System Transition

NATO plans exist for transitioning the present air defense system into an ACCS condition within the next 15 years in five annual increments. This will require a series of time-phased implementation steps, since on the one hand a number of system components must be improved and maintained, while on the other hand new weapon systems will become operational relatively early within this period. Thus the modernization of the present inventory must proceed in parallel with the introduction of new subsystems and components.

The following would be a conceivable sequence of programs:


- better crosslinking of air defense operations centers and weapon systems by appropriate data transmission; introduction of multiradar tracking where it does not presently exist; integration of supplementary available sensors (ATC radars);
- introduction of a limited number of mobile sensors and operational control centers; linkup with the data flow in higher echelon command systems (EIFEL, HEROS);

--expansion and improvement of communications equipment and transmission channels; standardization of data formats.

In a further upgrading, about the middle of the 1990s, passive sensor networks could be integrated into the system.

Thus the users, procurement officials and industry are faced with a very ambitious program which would incorporate the areas of sensor technology, hard- and software of the control centers and new communications equipment and command and control centers and new communications equipment and command and control systems. Such a program can be brought to fruition only through the joint efforts of all concerned.

Figure 1: Basic Organization of ACCS (Central Region)



Key:

1. Sensor network, stationary radars, mobile radars, passive sensors, AWACS
2. Supplementary information (e.g., EIFEL network, Army Air Defense Reconnaissance and Command System)
3. Fighter aircraft
4. Air defense missile control centers
5. Command status
6. Air situation
7. Air defense missile units (HAWK, PATRIOT)

Air Defense Simulator Developments

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 87-88

[Article by Siegfried Schulz]

[Text] Addressing the requirements for training in the operation of air defense systems, Engineer Siegfried Schulz, of the Philips Systems and Special Technology Division in Bremen, describes presently available training systems and those of the future, emphasizing optical simulation of the environmental and target images as used in the GEPARD aerial target simulator.

Why Training Simulators?

The successes achieved by simulators in defense technology are closely linked with developments in the field of electronics and especially with digital data processing. Only by using these aids has it been possible to reproduce complex events and to process large quantities of data.

There are two reasons for using simulators in defense technology:

--simulation is in many cases the only means of attaining the desired training goal;
--usually, a great deal of money can be saved: after just a few years (1 to 3) there is usually proof of the economy of using simulators, despite the relatively high procurement cost. Such proof is valid if only about 10 percent of the operating hours and munition of the actual weapon system are saved.

Points of Emphasis in Training

Apart from operational training, the main requirement is for tactical combat training and the weapons disposition, in conjunction with the following sensors:

--periscope
--radar and IFF
--navigation instruments
--laser rangefinder; all this in:
--different scenarios
--realistic flight patterns
--under increasingly difficult conditions
--with multiple targets and alternate targets
--while encountering ECM
--in all operating sequences
--with intentional operational malfunctions
--under reproducible conditions
--under conditions subject to analysis and control
--independent of weather conditions
--environmentally harmless
--time and cost effective.

Due to the importance which will be gained in the future by passive sensors (IR, Peri), training in the use of these sensors will have to be emphasized even more, thus increasing the share of the optical component within the overall system. At present, the share of optics in combat situations mounts to about 30 percent; in the future it will come closer to 50 percent.

Simulators for Air Defense Systems

For the GEPARD and ROLAND air defense systems the following major training facilities are available:

ROLAND:

--simulator crew compartment

--aerial target simulator

GEPARD:

--training facility

--simulator crew compartment

--aerial target simulator.

Let us discuss the aerial target simulator for the GEPARD in greater detail.

Periscope Simulation in the GEPARD Aerial Target Simulator

The optical component in the GEPARD consists of the periscopes for the commander and the gunner.

For simulation with the aerial target simulator the original periscopes are replaced with training periscopes. The training periscopes contain, apart from the steering mechanism and the optics, one black and white monitor each. The monitors display a portion of the landscape or the targets which corresponds with the visual angle of the periscope at that moment.

The simulated picture in the aerial target simulator is generated in three steps:

--generation of the landscape image

--generation of the target image (max. three simultaneous)

--superimposition of landscape and targets.

The image to be displayed is chosen either manually with the joysticks or automatically (e.g., in a radar chase).

Generation of the Landscape Image

Three different methods are used for displaying the landscape:

--use of a 360° panoramic photograph and scanning of the photograph by a TV camera (in the GEPARD aerial target simulator five different panoramas can be selected per program);

--use of a digitalized panorama image. Every point of the image is stored on a magnetic disc. This is used in the ROLAND simulator crew compartment;

--use of a 2-D landscape model with distance information.

The model is stored on magnetic disc. Choice of five panoramic images per program in the GEPARD aerial target simulator.

A panoramic photograph is the starting point in the GEPARD simulator for generating a 360° landscape image.

The relevant parts of this photograph are digitalized by sections. For this purpose horizon lines, shapes of houses, trees, etc. are scanned manually and the data stored.

Finally, distances and textures are allocated to individual objects.

To intensify the depth effect in the simulated landscape image, the texture for each surface can be supplemented with shades of grey in 64 intensities out of a total of 256 available ones.

Textures for Landscape Image Displays

To generate a realistic image, the various surfaces of a landscape model can be covered with so-called textures. A total of eight different textures are available, e.g., for leaves, grass, masonry. In addition there is a perforated texture, which serves to generate such partially transparent images as treetops in conjunction with the "leaf" texture.

Principle of Target Display

In addition to generating the landscape display, the images of a maximum of three target silhouettes are generated in the GEPARD aerial target simulator. These targets may be either ground or aerial vehicles. They are displayed in the shape of triangular or rectangular models.

Model Generation

The targets are stored in a computer memory as mathematical models. Each model consists of two parts:

--it contains for each surface corner point the x, y, and z coordinates in a three-dimensional Cartesian space;
--an instruction indicates which of the corners are to be connected so as to generate triangles or rectangles.

Target Projection

For proper display of targets according to their aspect angle at any particular moment the models are turned mathematically in the three-dimensional space. This takes into account such maneuvers as rolls, turns and pitch, as well as distance from target, to generate a display of appropriate size. Transformation occurs every 40 milliseconds in accordance with the TV raster.

Inasmuch as the 13 targets of the GEPARD simulator are stored in the computer memory as mathematical models, aspect angle transformations can be made for

parts of these models also. These so-called "pre-transformations" (execution prior to the aspect transformation) permit such displays as changing the wing angles of a swing-wing aircraft, or the rotation of a helicopter rotor.

Training Systems of the Future

In view of future requirements by the users, development is proceeding on further improvements of optical simulation:

--Multiple Unit Training: For future joint simulation training of a six-GEPARD battery, different types of positions within the training area are important for the optical component of the simulators. These positions, as well as targets to be jointly attacked by several weapon systems, must be linked to each other by several simulators. This would mean for instance that a target hit by one weapon system would have to be shown as having been hit by all other systems participating in the simulation.

Another item of progress concerns free mobility in the training area. It permits training of tactical variants, e.g., the selection of a position for the air defense armored vehicle by the commander.

Technically, mobility permits the use of so-called computer generated (synthesized) images (CGI or CGSI).

--Improvements in the Optical Image: The display of optical simulators, i.e., their realism, can be improved in a number of ways:

--target imaging with shades of gray (already in use in the ROLAND simulated crew compartment);
--use of color for the landscape as well as the targets;
--higher image resolution (e.g., 1280x1024 dots) as well as more rapid image turnover (50 Hz without intercalated scanning);
--replacement of projection display by a spatial target display.

These measures would also make the simulator suitable for target identification training.

--Consideration of Additional Sensors: apart from the "periscope" optical sensor, infrared sensors will in the future be integrated into the weapon systems also. The display of infrared images will therefore be a new task for optical simulation.

Targets in Color

All target models are composed of flat polygons (triangles and rectangles). This gives an "edged" impression to all models in normal monitor display. However, special shading methods can impart an impression of curved surfaces to images which were "edged" originally (the so-called "Gouraud Shading").

Fire Control Data System

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 88-91

[Article by Ralf Liebers]

[Text] Luftwaffe facilities protection is currently provided by the 20-mm Zwilling [twin] antiaircraft guns. To be able to practice with these weapons and to train gun commanders and gunners, the antiaircraft gun training unit (AAF) was developed; it has been used by troops in the field since 1982. Captain Engineer Ralf Liebers, from the Office of the Commanding General, Luftwaffe Materiel, of the Department of the Luftwaffe, Koeln-Wahn, here gives a description of this unit.

Luftwaffe facilities protection is generally provided by the ROLAND Rad weapon system, 20 mm Zwilling antiaircraft guns and twin-mounted machineguns as active protection. Passive protective measures are added to supplement them: camouflage and deception (which are expected to become more important in the future than they have been to date) and hardening of various facility components.

In this setup, the MK-20 mm Zwilling is charged with attacking aerial targets flying at low and very low altitudes. These extend, by definition, from 0 to 150 meters (very low) up to a maximum of 600 meters. The guns are emplaced in a ring, about 1000 meters in front of the facility, thus providing an engagement range of up to 2000 meters away from the facility. Since the guns do not have radar support, airspace observers (Luftraum-beobachter, LRB) are positioned at 4 to 5 km distances in a circle around the facility. They report the number, direction and speed ranges of the approaching aerial targets within seconds to the antiaircraft gun crews. Apart from its antiaircraft mission, the MK-20 mm Zwilling can also be used against ground targets in case a higher priority intervenes.

Development History of the AAF

Upon approval of the tactical requirement for a antiaircraft gun training unit (AAF), the request for such a unit was formally made and justified on 16 March 1977. The unit was to have the following capabilities:

- simultaneous operation of several guns;
- training opportunities with or without ammunition;
- firing practice at aerial targets including estimation of target speed and the so-called minimum slant range with separate evaluation;
- determination, recording and evaluation of all aiming failures as well as their image display and representation options for purposes of documentation;
- separation of performance results for gun commander and gunner;
- determination and recording of various times, distances and weapon data during the engagement operation.

In addition, the unit should be easily transportable.

The unit was designed by Dornier and Rheinmetall and, after construction was authorized, built mainly by Dornier. The AAF was issued to the field on 4 May 1982 and has been in use since that date.

Function and Operational Use of the AAF

Optional Uses and Deployment Parameters

The AAF is suitable for use with manually operated antiaircraft guns with optical aiming instruments. It provides actual, but primarily simulated, engagement of a real aerial target. Its transportability enables the AAF to be used at the actual position of the guns. This has not only the advantage of permitting the incorporation of all object-specific conditions into the training; it also provides the opportunity of flying all conceivable wartime attack profiles with the aerial target and to practice dealing with their specific problem areas. Up to 20 guns can be used simultaneously.

Functional Principle

The flight course and speed of a target acquired by a radar is compared with the theoretical flight course of the simulated munition, which had been computed based on the barrel angle at the moment of fire. This calculation of the theoretical munition flight course includes ballistic data for the gun and the munition as well as the previously estimated wind velocity and direction. The result is available immediately upon completion of any engagement at the gun data terminal, which is attached to every gun. The type of error is shown immediately, identified as to the individual who made it, i.e., the gun commander or the gunner.

Main Components of the Unit

An attached, dedicated tracking radar furnishes the AAF control center with the measured position and speed of the aerial target.

The control center is contained in a standardized II Fm A communications cabin and has an instructor console which can tune into and monitor the activity at every single gun or the actual target position. Also, this is the place from which the telemetered target position data are transmitted to the individual gun data terminals, where they are fed into the computer. In addition, the control center is capable of recording and evaluating all relevant exercise data.

Every gun has its own gun data terminal, which receives, via an adapter, the gun-specific data as well as the power supply. The terminal provides the calculation of the theoretical munition flight paths as well as a comparison with the actual target position, an immediate evaluation and display.

Up to 22 items are displayed, among them
--minimum slant range, measured and estimated;
--target speed, measured and estimated;
--target distance at target acquisition, start and end of fire sequence;
--number of rounds per burst of fire;
--duration of burst of fire;
--number of hits per burst of fire;
--target acquisition time;
--aiming accuracy;
--crew reaction time.

The weak point of the entire unit is at present the obsolescent SUPERFLEDER-MAUS type radar. The high failure rate of this instrument causes unsatisfactory use frequency rates for the AAF.

Fire Sequence of a MK-20 mm Zwilling Without AAF

The engagement sequence breaks down into three phases:

--in the first phase the approaching aerial target is acquired by the airspace observation squad (LRB squad), identified and reported within seconds;
--in the second phase the gun crew is alerted and gun commander and gunner observe the airspace in the direction indicated. Upon target allocation by the gun commander the gunner acquires it with the auxiliary gunsight and subsequently transmits it into the optics of the gun. The gun commander now estimates the speed and minimum slant range of the target and enters these data into the lead angle computer of the gun;
--in the third phase, fire is opened and the target is attacked until shot down or until the minimum slant range is reached.

Critical Points

Depending upon flying speed, the gun commander has 10 to 15 seconds to estimate speed and slant range, from which however 5 seconds must be deducted for entering the data into the gun. The remaining time of 5 to 10 seconds is short, but adequate.

However, the critical point is not the time factor, but human inability to estimate distances or speeds in a halfway accurate manner.

Operation of the AAF

First, a gun data terminal (GDT) is connected to each gun via an adapter and the exact position of the gun with relation to the radar is determined. This measurement must be highly accurate, with an error tolerance of 0.5 meters maximum if adequate hit accuracy is to be achieved. The measured data are automatically entered into the GDT computer and stored.

During the engagement sequence the gun commander must enter the estimated minimum slant range and target speed data into the gun as well as the GDT. The barrel positions are scanned through the adapter and continuously

transmitted to the computer. When the fire command is given, the theoretical point of intersection or the miss distance, as the case may be, is calculated and subsequently displayed.

Impact on Firing Performance

Data available since the introduction of the AAF in 1982 indicate unequivocally that there has been a steady decrease in the number of rounds per hit, and a percentile increase in the number of gunners demonstrating minimum proficiency in their first firing at actual targets.

Final Evaluation of the Unit

In the AAF the Luftwaffe has a training aid which provides optimum training with or without ammunition, and in which performance can be objectively evaluated. It is optimal not because of that capability of objective evaluation, but because of its ability to point out each operator-caused error according to its cause. The unit does not require modification of the weapon feasible. Simultaneous functioning of several gun crews and practice at the location of the facility to be protected makes it possible to practice especially the time-wasting estimating of minimum slant ranges and speed at small expense and using actual targets. The present weakness, the obsolescent radar, will have to be replaced by a reliable instrument within the foreseeable future.

To increase the engagement range of the MK-20 mm Zwilling up to the self-destruct limit of the munition of about 2000 meters, accurate aiming is required. However, this could be achieved only if present-day estimates of minimum slant range and target speed could be replaced by exact measurements.

Increased computer capacity of the AAF component control center and GDT would permit use and onward transmission of flight data determined by the radar to the gun commanders. The gun commander would then only have to read these data on the GDT scope and to enter them into the gun or to make the necessary correction in case the aerial target changes its direction and speed. It is conceivable also that under certain circumstances the gun commander and the GDT could be bypassed and that the data could be radioed from the control center direct to the gunner, who would then have to enter these data himself.

9273/9435
CSO: 3620/177

MILITARY

GREECE

DETAILS ON ARMED FORCES EQUIPMENT 'OPERATION RENEWAL'

Athens TO VIMA in Greek Dec 85 p 12

[Text] The new program of equipping the Armed Forces, the first phase of which has already begun being implemented, places greater emphasis on defense of the country, on the revitalization of domestic industry and cottage industry and ensuring the highest possible offset benefits for any purchase whatsoever.

"Operation Renewal" of the weapons systems began quietly a few months ago, based on the 5-year economic plan, activating, at the same time, hundreds of Greek industries that, perhaps, may this year have equal participation in defense arming of the country. With the participation of these industries there will be the benefit of several billion drachmai in foreign exchange, in addition to the revitalization of domestic production and a reduction in dependence on foreign countries.

While the first phase of the armaments program has already begun, new proposals for the modernization of the Armed Forces are about to be submitted--as confirmed by a military source--to KYSEA, aiming not only at the balance of forces in the Aegean, but at meeting the needs of all three services, up to the year 2000.

In implementing the decisions of KYSEA, the Ministry of National Defense established these armament programs, one for each branch of the Armed Forces. To wit:

Navy

The building of four ultramodern frigates. The selection of the platform for the design of the vessels by Greeks has already been made and we are now in the final phase, the selection of bids for their construction. Bids have been submitted by many countries, but only three have been chosen: West Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The Netherlands, which built the two frigates, "Elli" and "Limnos," has also submitted bids, but these were not considered satisfactory for the needs of the Armed Forces.

Prior to the completion of the selective process, of course, the Navy is awaiting the American and NATO approval of the selection of the proper type, a fact, however, that is not binding for Greece. The frigates will be built abroad with Greek cooperation in their construction and, according to projections, their delivery to the Navy is expected to take place by 1992. The new frigates will be smaller than the ones presently in service, with a more modern weapons system and be more maneuverable for their patrols in the Aegean.

By the middle of May the modernization of the destroyers "Apostolis" and "Kriezis" is expected to begin at the Skaramanga shipyards; their weapons systems will be replaced and they will be modified in order to carry "Sea Sparrow" missiles and the Italian gun of the OTO Melara type with its ultramodern firing system.

At the Elefsina shipyards the destroyers "Miaoulis" and "Themistoklis" will follow in being modernized and for general repairs and, in the first quarter of 1987, the destroyer "Aigaion," which the Navy acquired with German aid, is to undergo modernization (it will also carry missiles).

Within days the "secret," as the "Kanaris" fire guidance system is classified, is going to be delivered to the Navy. This ultramodern system of locating and destroying underwater targets has been designed exclusively by Greek specialists and is considered to be one of the most advanced of its kind. It was built in the United States under the supervision of Greek officers. All submarines of the fleet are going to be equipped with this system as well as many other vessels such as missile-carrying PT boats, destroyers, etc.

Emphasis should be placed on the procurement, in stages, of the "Harpoon" and "Sea Sparrow" surface-to-surface missiles as well as of the extremely expensive "Exocet" missile, which a few weeks ago the Navy impressively demonstrated.

However, over and above all of this, the staff officers of the Navy have prepared new proposals (they call them "projections") that they are going to submit to KYSEA.

These proposals are made, as explained in the introductory report, with the idea of strengthening domestic industry and meeting the needs up to the year 2000. In essence, they project:

The building of a floating drydock;

The construction of two tankers and a fleet oiler;

The construction of three towed barges and an additional two ocean-going ones;

The construction of two patrol vessels of the "Ambekin" type.

The plan also provides, but not with immediate priority, for the construction of four self-propelled barges and two more towed ones as well as the construction of two missile-carrying PT boats and an additional two patrol vessels.

Army

In addition to the mass production of the "Artemis" anti-aircraft system and the "6-3" rifle, not only for the needs of the Armed Forces, but also for export purposes mainly, the production of the first military jeep (a 1/4-ton vehicle) has begun. It is a perfect vehicle, built by the "Mercedes" and "Stayer-Hellas" company, and for which Greece secured 80 percent of its purchase price in offset benefits.

It is significant to note that in this case, the Greek industries had built the engine of the jeep, which is the same as that of the "Mercedes" 240 diesel

engine. The manufacturing companies have begun delivering the first of the ten thousand jeeps ordered by the Armed Forces. However, the companies can sell these jeeps to private individuals.

Building of artillery fire-control systems by EAV with a budget of 1 billion drachmai.

Building of auxiliary vehicles for the Armed Forces (tankers, fire trucks, etc.) by domestic manufacturing firms.

Production of various types of ammunition by PYRKAL that are also exported to third countries.

Manufacture of Greek mortars, mines and 155 and 105 mm. artillery shells.

Building of a Greek tank, the first to be built in Greece. The Ministry of National Defense has already sought bids to choose the type of tank to be built in Greece (under the joint production system) together with the manufacturing countries. At the same time, directives were issued for the building of another Greek armored personnel carrier of the "Leonidas" type. The new tank will be named "Leonidas II" and is considered to be one of the most modern of its kind.

The first anti-tank missile of the "Aris" type is being developed and expected to be delivered to the Armed Forces in full operational readiness within the next 3 years.

The projections of the Army also include:

The purchase of 10 "Chinook" personnel transport helicopters;

The manufacture (under the joint production system), with the Italian "Agusta-Bell," of a combat helicopter of the "A-109" type. EAV has already signed the relative agreement;

The purchase of assault helicopters, mainly anti-tank. Bids were sought for the purchase of six helicopters of the "Apache" type (extremely expensive, but ultramodern, with tremendous fire-power) of American manufacture, each costing 14 million dollars. Bids were also sought for helicopters of the "Cobra" type costing 8 million dollars, and for the Agusta "A-29" type.

Air Force

The Air Force program is known to all of us with the "purchase of the century." However, although a contract for the purchase of 40 "Mirage-2000" (which are already being built in Bordeaux) has been signed with the French "Dassault" firm, nothing has happened yet with regard to the American "General Dynamics" firm for the purchase of the 40 "F-16's."

Up until the time of the writing of this article, the American government--despite the signing of the "G-SOMIA" agreement (which privately guarantees it)--has not

granted the export permit so that the final contract can be signed. Air Force officers figure that the export permit must be granted before the end of the year (the manufacturing company is pressing for this) in order for the contract to be signed in January or early February. With the signing of the contract the Americans will receive 20 million dollars as a down-payment!

However, in addition to the fighter aircraft, the Air Force will modernize itself by commissioning EAV to construct an advanced technology system for the self-protection of aircraft. It is a complex system that allows the aircraft to attack without being hit by hostile projectiles. In essence, this system consists of flares (that attract enemy missiles) and aluminum foil [chaff] (as countermeasures for magnetic missiles) that are launched by the aircraft a few minutes prior to the attack. The entire self-protection system is estimated to cost 2 billion drachmai.

9731
CSO: 3521/76

MILITARY

ITALY

OFFICERS PROTEST NEW RULES ON PROMOTIONS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Leonardo Coen]

[Text] Aspiring Lt Cols outraged at sudden cutbacks in promotions. Defense Commission bombarded with angry telegrams. Waiting for promotions are 814 officers who have completed advanced courses at Modena Academy now discover that only 101 of them will get the expected rank. Protest greets Angelini's bill: "We are the backbone of the Armed Forces."

Milan -- The men on the standard promotions list are no longer prepared to live by the long-standing motto: "Make it a habit to obey in silence and to die in silence." Early this month they sent personal telegrams to every member of the Defense Commission, conveying their protest in no uncertain terms, more or less along these lines:

"The newly introduced Angelini Bill runs counter to our interests as a category." Then they started inundating the news media with letters crammed with bitter recriminations but, alas! accompanied by over-specific missives from attorneys, and all too heavily slanted in favor of their particular sector. Today they are readying to move onto the battlefield, and there are grounds for believing that they mean what they say, given the fact that the aggrieved parties are 814 lieutenant-colonels, graduates of the Modena Academy, all expecting promotions. That promotion, owing to legislation enacted and repealed or amended (since 1959, there have been more than 100 such bills enacted) will go to only 101 of them. What about the rest? They need only wait for next year's lists of "available assignments"... and so it comes to pass that there are lieutenant colonels who have been wearing the same uniform for 12 to 15 years, but will be taking it off for good on the day they reach retirement.

"Just take a close look at this bill, which is now practically assured of passage: you will find that special privileges are written into it for colleagues in the other two arms of the military." Lt Col Angelo Coviello, class of 1933, an architect who has served as a military engineer in the Northwest Regional Military Command in Turin -- that special single command that is made up of unassigned officers, the so-called "retained" officers who have achieved permanent active-duty status by scoring high in a competitive examination, and another group, of those who are "finishing out" their careers, meaning that they have been promoted without competition." What is the real basis for this disparity?

Let's take it, as the saying goes, one step at a time. The Standard Single List (RNU) is made up of officers from the Academy who have survived the stiff courses at Modena, and some of whom have also even attended the War School, and who, in the course of command assignments as lieutenant colonels have undergone frequent transfers and their concomitant upheavals. The Single Special Rolls (RSU), however, are crowded with command officers transferred at their simple request to permanent active-duty status: once they have accumulated sufficient seniority -- at least 10 years -- do their jobs as a rule in only one post, without command responsibilities. The terminal roll, however, receives no further input of active-duty personnel, but even so, it does take positions away from the other two arms, particularly the first. In practical terms, a lieutenant colonel makes a net salary of 1,600 million lire per month. A full colonel is paid 2 million. The standard career brings the trigger-point in after 6, or, at most, 10 years of service -- including command of a battalion. However, several factors have redimensioned the "transitions," forcing commands to make sometimes debatable cuts.

"It is true that Italy has too many colonels, especially in the Army. It is not our fault, though: the General Staff had planned for a very different level of strength when our country joined the European Defense Community, which De Gaulle torpedoed in 1958; the restructuring of the Army, begun in 1975, which in fact meant a one-third cut in divisions and agencies, not to mention the "Lynch-Law" (PL 804, passed on 10 November 1979, that called for a cap on the colonel list at 1,379. As of now, there are 2,658 lieutenant colonels and colonels on permanent active-duty status available on the RNU. It will be 1991 before we get thin the ranks down to normal." Result: officers on the RSU and terminal rolls have been granted adequate career advantages (including economic advantages), "but, all of a sudden, those coming out of the Academy are penalized." In short, Covielli is complaining on behalf of all his colleagues, "we who are the backbone of the armed forces are told to bug off, while those who do not come in by the front door get precedence over us..."

The gripe-file is fraught with anger at idiotic regulations: you rise in rank if you happened to be born in a particular year. "The good years are those from 1920 to 1930; any year later than that means that promotion is going to be a random occurrence."

Absurdity and paradoxes: for any promotion, a man has to attend up-dating or training courses at the university level. This is designed to upgrade your fitness report. No way! In the same classification on the standard list, people have moved within a few years of graduation to 100 percent on their third evaluation, to 40 percent 3 years prior to being hit by the age-limit, which for Army officers is fairly low at 56 years of age. Instead of planning one's own career around one's professional abilities, we see our professional military leaders waxing so wroth as to scorn appointments as colonel and pensions at the brigadier-general level. War? Oh yes: that's something you fight with officially stamped government stationery missiles....

6182

CSO: 3523/34

MILITARY

SPAIN

ARTILLERY REEQUIPMENT PROGRAM DETAILED

Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 10

[Text] E.N. Santa Barbara of Spain has released the first detailed information about its new 155/39 mm howitzer/cannon which is intended for the reequipment program of the division and brigade-level artillery units of the Spanish Army [where it will replace the existing "mix" of the American 155/23 mm M-114 and the Spanish 105/26 mm R-58 and 122/46 mm R-390 weapons].

The oscillating mass which is the base of the new howitzer/cannon uses a mono-bloc barrel with double span muzzle brake and semi-automatic vertical wedge breech. The new howitzer/cannon is designed to perform like other modern NATO materiel such as the FH-70, the 155TR, and the M-198. The scoring of the 155/39 is of 48 righthand turns with a pitch of 20 bores; the recoil system is oil-pneumatic with hydraulic braking.

The piece is designed to fire all types of 155 mm munitions standardized by NATO: The standard HE projectile weighing 43.5 kg can be fired a distance of 24 km with an 8 charge while the RAP [rocket additional propulsion] projectile can reach 30 km.

The maximum rate of fire is six shots per minute while the continuous rate is 2 shots per minute. The traverse arc in elevation ranges from -3 degrees to +70 degrees while the training arc is 30 degrees on each side. Loading is assisted by a semi-automatic system similar in concept to the one used on the FH-70, with a device automatically placing the projectile in front of the cartridge chamber.

The piece is being developed in three different versions:

--SB 155/39 mm REMO [Remolcado], the basic version with mechanical haulage, weight 9 tons;

--the SB 155/39 mm REMA [Remolcado with auxiliary motor], similar to the basic version but with a 70 hp diesel engine that, in addition to making battering easier, allows small autonomous shiftings;

--the self-propelled SB 155/39 mm ATP cannon [Autopropulsado].

This version has a tracked chassis which Santa Barbara is basing on an original design stemming from its experiences with the licensed production of the AMX-30 tank. The new self-propelled gun with turret-mounted armament for complete training will have a fighting order weight of 38 tons and will be powered by a General Motors 12V71QTA diesel engine supplying 912 hp at 2400 rpm and joined to an Allison CD-850-68 automatic transmission.

The choice of an unusually powerful engine for this type of vehicle, together with its moderate weight, give the new Spanish self-propelled gun a power/weight ratio that is unique for a self-propelled artillery gun [24 hp/t]. Therefore, this piece has correspondingly high mobility qualities: maximum road speed, 70 km/h; maximum slope, 60 percent, vertical obstacle 90 cm, trench 2.8 m. The 1,300 liter fuel reserve allows an operating range of 550 km. The hull and turret are welded steel and can resist 20 mm armor-piercing bullets. The ballistic performance of this version is exactly the same as that of the mechanical haulage model but the recoil system has been modified to hold the recoil stroke within 900 mm rather than 1,400 mm. The projectile and propelling charge reserve totals 28 shots. The rolling train type Vickers has six double wheels and five track-bearing rollers on each side. The suspension is torsion bar type, with hydraulic shock absorbers on four wheels on each side. The specific pressure on the ground is 0.75 kg per sq.cm.

In addition to the application of this piece to the field artillery reequipment program, the Spanish Army is studying the feasibility of using the oscillating mass in the modernization of its coastal defense weapons sites, which at present use old 152/50 mm Vickers pieces. The expected conversion, which would make use of carriages, cradles, and recovery gears from the old guns, is first of all seen as a logistical advantage resulting from the standardization of 150 mm munitions.

/8309
CSO: 3528/61-M

MILITARY

SPAIN

BRIEFS

CONTRACT SIGNED WITH ITALY--Following the Spanish Government announcement concerning the adoption of the SKYGUARD/ASPIDE antiaircraft missile system-- produced by Contraves Italiana and Selenia--a contract was signed last 19 November in Madrid. The total value of the contract, which foresees the integration of the ASPIDE missile into the SKYGUARD system, is about \$150 million. The SKYGUARD system has been in service in the Spanish Army but has been limited to the conventional configuration which employs 35/90 mm paired systems. The Spanish will have a role in coproduction of the system, which is designed for the defense of fixed and mobile ground facilities against low-altitude and very-low-altitude aircraft attacks. Through the integration of 35 mm components in ASPIDE missiles, a very large coverage range is obtained. Moreover, the system, equipped with many target sights, can effectively confront multiple attacks and, at the same time, engage more targets. ASPIDE not only represents one of the best defensive mobile antiaircraft systems in its class, but also offers considerable economic and operational advantages because it can be used for naval point defense as well as ground and air-to-air defense. Moreover, it can be adopted by more than one armed forces branch of a given country thereby guaranteeing the possibility of integrating different logistical channels. Spain, which had adopted ASPIDE solely for naval point defense as did 13 other countries, will now be the second one after Italy to also use it for ground point defense. Italian armed forces will also use ASPIDE in the air-to-air role. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 12] /8309

CSO: 3528/61-M

MILITARY

SWEDEN

NAVY TO RECEIVE FOUR TYPE 90 COASTAL CORVETTES BY 1990

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Dec 85 pp 16, 19

[Article by Lt Commander Johan Forslund: "Coastal Corvette 90: a Versatile Type of Ship"]

[Text] On 31 October the government decided to give the Defense Materiel Administration permission to order four type 90 coastal corvettes from the Karlskrona Shipyard. That marked the end of several years of study, planning, and design work. The vessels will be ordered from the Karlskrona Shipyard in the fall of 1985 and are to be delivered to the Navy at the end of the 1980's.

Coastal corvette 90 is a modification and further development of the recently delivered coastal corvettes of the Stockholm class. The changes consist mainly of improved antiaircraft capability, increased command and control capacity with great potential for development, and better protection from mines thanks to new propulsion machinery and a shallower draft. Coastal corvette 90 is also the first navy vessel since the 1950's to be designed from the start for antisubmarine operations, among its other missions.

The ship is constructed on an all-welded longitudinally framed displacement hull of steel with an aluminum superstructure. The hull is divided in the traditional way into watertight compartments and has a double bottom.

The coastal corvette is 57 meters long and 8 meters wide. It has a shallow draft and displaces about 370 tons.

Located under the main deck in the forward half of the ship are the berthing compartment and messdeck for the 36-man crew. Immediately aft are the combat information center, the radio room, and instrument spaces. Combat by the ship and the group is conducted from the combat information center. The after third of the ship contains the engines. The propulsion machinery and electric plant, which are located in two engine rooms, are supervised from the engine control room. The steering gear and certain storage spaces are located farthest astern.

The propulsion machinery consists of three diesel engines, each connected to its own water jet drive unit. So the coastal corvette has no propellers or

rudders! This type of propulsion machinery involves a new approach whose big advantages are quieter operation and a shallower draft, resulting in less danger from mines and reduced interference with its own hydrophones. In addition, maintenance is simplified and maneuverability is improved in comparison with conventional propulsion systems.

Most of the weapons are in the main deck. This includes the main armament: antiship missiles and torpedoes, antiaircraft guns, and antisubmarine weapons.

The superstructure houses officers' quarters and storerooms as well as the conning bridge. The conning bridge is designed in accordance with the latest findings to provide the greatest possible safety in maneuvering and navigating the ship.

The coastal corvette is fully equipped to handle a large number of tasks in every phase ranging from peace, crises, incidents, and neutrality to war.

The chief weapon for operations against naval targets during attack is the antiship missile: the Swedish-made RBS-15. The RBS-15 is a heavy antiship missile with advanced homing and a long range. The ship's command and control system makes it possible to place missiles at a great distance with no need for the ship to use its own sensors. As a complement or alternative to the RBS-15 missile, the ship can carry heavy torpedoes designed for operations against surface ships. The Swedish Navy has a long-standing tradition in torpedo weaponry, of course, and Swedish torpedoes do very well in international competition.

Ensuring a warship's safety and thereby providing it with great freedom of action in use means that it must be equipped with good antiaircraft defenses. Coastal corvette 90 is equipped with two complete ordnance systems whose chief purpose is to operate against air targets in cooperation with the electronic warfare system. The pieces in the ordnance systems consist of two light all-purpose guns that can also be used against naval targets when the tactical situation calls for it.

The design of the ship's command and control system reflects a new generation of technology. It is built around three general operator stations and database distributed information, thus providing great flexibility in use and good redundancy. The commander can therefore assign priority to various functions if operator stations are lost. The control function is built around both internal and external passive and active sensors. Information picked up by the sensors is received in the ship's combat information center, where it is processed and displayed. The system's capacity allows it to be used to control not only the ship's own operations but also those of additional units as well as antisubmarine and escort operations.

The arrival of these coastal corvettes will mean a valuable improvement in the Navy's antisubmarine capability. The ship is equipped with active towed sonar (VDS) for seeking out and locating submarines. In the antisubmarine fire control system, sonar information is evaluated to form the basis for attack. The weapons used in antisubmarine warfare are antisubmarine mortars, depth

charges, and antisubmarine torpedoes, making possible a graduated response at both short and long range. During antisubmarine operations, the ship will function both as a hunter unit in the antisubmarine force and as a command ship.

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, the ship can carry out minelaying operations, which will be an important task for the Navy in the event of war.

The coastal corvette is a very versatile ship that can participate in most types of naval warfare operations. Its long-range missiles, combined with its advanced antiaircraft defenses and its command and control system, signify a high degree of freedom of action for the coastal corvette group. The group commander can choose to fight out on the open sea or close to the coast.

The starting position for an attack can be frontal or from the flank at will, and it can be anywhere in a very large area. The new-generation weapon system means that we are the ones who can choose the time and place for combat to a greater extent than before. When the coastal corvettes are delivered at the end of the 1980's, they will form a necessary and important part of the total invasion defense and also play an essential role in our antisubmarine forces.

11798
CSO: 3650/112

MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEFENSE INSTITUTE PLANS NEW RESEARCH ON SUBMARINE INCURSIONS

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Dec 85 p 23

[Article: "Breadth and Depth in FOA's Research Into Antisubmarine Defense"]

[Text] The Defense Research Institute [FOA] recently published its public annual report.

We take the liberty of reproducing the portion dealing with the institute's research efforts in the area of defense against submarines.

Research concerning defense against activity by foreign submarines has had a very high priority within the FOA in recent years. To some extent, completely new technology and new technical system solutions are required in order to detect, locate, identify, and combat small targets in shallow water.

Research in hydroacoustics, for example, has been directed particularly toward matters of antisubmarine defense. Other research groups, which ordinarily have not concerned themselves at all with "submarine questions," have become involved to a greater extent.

In the area of hydroacoustics, great efforts have been made in connection with the propagation of underwater sound waves. Submarine relief, sediment layers, and their characteristics have been charted in several geographical areas. Measurements of sound propagation have been taken, and they will be compared with the results from new mathematical sound propagation models.

Numerical methods concerned with wave propagation and especially adapted for processing in supercomputers are being developed. Active high-resolution sonar has been used to study echo structures from submarines and the bottom of the sea.

Theoretical studies have also been made of the possibilities for active, low-frequency hydroacoustic reconnaissance. Among other things, those studies have included computer simulations that are to be verified and field tests for which preparations are now being made.

Mathematical methods of signal processing for use with high-resolution hydroacoustic reconnaissance systems were developed earlier, and their performance has been investigated by mathematical simulations in computers. Preparations have also been made to test such systems in practice.

Hydroacoustic countermeasures of various kinds were demonstrated during the year under review.

In the field of magnetics, analysis methods and alarm criteria for the Navy's magnetic coils were investigated. This has reference to background interference and the "signatures" of various objects. An effort was also made through research to elucidate the possibilities and limitations of extremely hypersensitive magnetometers.

Another method of reconnaissance and surveillance studied at the FOA involves airborne laser radar. This is especially useful for rapid surface reconnaissance.

Special attention was paid to problems related to the detection and identification of small objects on the surface of the water--submarine periscopes, for example--and extensive measurement programs were carried out. Various techniques were used--everything from "ordinary" radar wavelengths to optical wavelengths.

Multisensor systems--with a higher probability of detecting a target and less risk of false alarms than today's systems--must be used to an increasing extent to compile information from measurements in which different kinds of measurement techniques are used. Also needed is a large sample card showing how various objects are interpreted by the combined system--that is, a kind of reference library--and at the same time, we must gain a good understanding of the usual interference environment.

An important tool in that work will be the permanent passive multisensor station that the FOA has set up out in the archipelago. From the various kinds of sensors to be studied, signals can be transmitted around the clock in digital and encrypted form to one of the FOA's computers. The signals are stored and analyzed with a view to producing advanced detection classification and location methods and programs. For this purpose, use can be made of experience at the FOA's seismic station in Hagfors and elsewhere as well as the classification work and criteria used in negotiations concerning test bans in the area of nuclear weapons.

As far as research into launching, propulsion, and warhead technology is concerned, some of the matters dealt with were the problems related to input and counteraction.

Matters related to energy supplies that are of interest in the context of antisubmarine defense were investigated and studied experimentally.

11798
CSO: 3650/112

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

DEBATE OVER POSSIBLE INTERVENTION AS TRADE DEFICIT WORSENS

Exports Again Drop

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 Sect III p 2

[Article by Erik Bendt Rasmussen]

[Text] The trade figures for December were disappointing, showing a deficit of 2.9 billion kroner. The Federation of Danish Industries predicts that business is on its way to increasing the market shares of our exports after the strike of last spring.

The trade figures for December show that it is still business that accounts for the large import of raw materials and machinery for production.

The trade deficit amounted in December to 2.9 billion kroner. That is a large trade gap compared to December of 1984, when the figure was 953 million kroner. For the whole year, it is a question of a trade gap of 12 billion kroner, which is twice as much as for 1984.

The import amounted in December to 16.94 billion kroner as against 14.86 billion kroner in December of the previous year, while the export amounted to 13.96 billion kroner as against 13.91 billion kroner in December of 1984.

Verner Puggaard, head of department, of the Federation of Danish Industries points out that the trade figures are preliminary, and that it will only be possible to draw more exact conclusions from the final figures which will appear next week.

"It will be interesting to find out what the reason may be for the increase in imports. For it is not inconceivable that the figure may be affected by the speeding up of purchases of goods in the municipalities in anticipation of the cuts in block grants in 1986," Verner Puggaard states.

The Federation of Danish Industries, incidentally, points out that, following the labor dispute in the spring, industrial exports have largely reverted to the growth rates recorded in 1983 and 1984. It is expected that the market

shares lost in 1985 as a result of the labor conflict will be regained, and that there will, furthermore, be an additional increase this year in the foreign market shares of Danish industry.

Per Bendix, chief economist, of the Commercial Bank, stresses the necessity of increasing exports:

"The situation is very serious in view of these negative figures. Industrial exports are 1 billion kroner below the estimated figure. We are now compelled to improve our competitiveness. We are forced to damp the domestic demand and increase investments. If we fail to do so, we shall not be able to adhere to our krone rate of exchange policy."


On the basis of the preliminary trade figures, Erik Hoffmeyer, Governor of the National Bank, yesterday told RITZAUS BUREAU that the balance of payments deficit for 1985 probably will exceed 25 billion kroner and that the balance of payments deficit for this year will become larger than the hitherto estimated 16-17 billion kroner. It will more likely amount to 19-20 billion kroner.

Exports increased in 1985, viz. from 165 billion kroner in 1984 to 1979 billion kroner. Erik Hoffmeyer finds this quite good, adding, however, that he is concerned over the sharp increase in imports.

"Private consumption shows a broadly increasing trend, which must primarily be attributed to the fact that more people have become employed. There is no doubt that the increasing trend will continue into 1986. For that reason, it will be necessary to restrain consumption, but that is, of course, nothing new," Governor of the National Bank Erik Hoffmeyer says.

The Department of Statistics divides the export trade into three main groups, and the total export figures of 1985 and last year are given in billions of kroner with the figures for 1984 in parenthesis: agriculture 37.440 (35.575), industry 115.100 (106.818). fuels 9.360 (8.297).

The import trade is divided into the following main groups: goods for industry 109.360 (99.915), fuels 32.110 (30.386), goods for consumption and passenger automobiles 41.570 (36.328).



Trade balance developments during the past year. Figures for December 1985 are preliminary.

Minister Rejects Intervention

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 Sect III p 2

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen]

[Text] "There is no reason to conceal the fact that the trade figure for December is unsatisfactory. It, furthermore, underlines the necessity of the measures of intervention which were adopted by the government and the Folketing prior to the Christmas holidays. The balance of payments deficit will now amount to 25-26 billion kroner. It will be absolutely necessary to curb the costs of the public sector."

These are the comments by Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen (Liberal Party) on the most recent trade figures. Contrary to Arne Bjerregaard, finance policy spokesman of the Christian People's Party, who finds the trade deficit very alarming, he does not, however, mention the possibility of any further economic intervention.

"It clearly shows what I said at the most recent intervention that new measures to curb private consumption may become necessary in the near future to prevent too drastic measures of intervention at a later date which will restrain the economic activity," Arne Bjerregaard says.

Mogens Camre (Social Democratic Party) finds the deficit of 2.9 billion kroner worse than expected.

"It ought to give all of us cause for deep concern. The government cannot deny that the sad result is in glaring contrast to the plans and predictions of the government. The figure is solely the result of the government's unsuccessful policy in 1984-85," Mogens Camre says.

The minister of economic affairs establishes that the rate of consumption is still too high.

"It underlines the need for us to improve our competitiveness abroad through a very moderate rate of increase in wage and price levels," says Anders Andersen, who wants to ascertain whether the measures of the Christmas package, combined with the lower dollar rate and the lower oil prices, will suffice to correct the situation.

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CSO: 3613/60

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ARBED SAARSTAHL PLANS TO END SUBSIDIES BY 1987

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20-21 Dec 85 p 19

[Interview with Kurt Kuehn, chief executive of Arbed Saarstahl GmbH, by Rolf H. Fricke: "We Want to No Longer Be a Subsidy Recipient as Soon as Possible"; Voelkingen an der Saar, date not given]

[Text] Voelkingen an der Saar, 19 Dec, HANDELSBLATT--"We want to no longer be a subsidy recipient as soon as possible. And this situation is conceivable for 1987." With these words, Kurt Kuehn, chief executive of Arbed Saarstahl, described the hope of the largest metalworks on the Saar, which has been kept afloat over the last 5 years by public resources amounting to more than DM 3 billion, and his hopes for the company in a HANDELSBLATT interview in Voelkingen an der Saar.

The basic condition for the fulfillment of this prognosis mentioned by Kuehn are the continuation of a relatively low rate for the dollar (because of price relief on the part of raw materials) and a continuation of the acceptable state of the market for long products, in which Saarstahl is active. In the 1985 business year that is now coming to an end, the company has clearly progressed part of the way on the road to recovery. Thus, projecting for the entire year, raw steel production rose approximately 10 percent compared to last year, up to 2.7 million tons. Rolled steel production was raised by 11 percent to 2.4 million tons, and sales, at DM 2.6 billion, will be about 17 percent higher than in the previous year. Over the course of the year, the workforce was brought back by seven percent, up to 13,400. Kuehn gave a figure of 1,300 to 1,400 employees for the current necessary reduction in personnel.

The plan for 1985 included a subsidy requirement of DM 202 million, plus a sum of DM 70 million for "risks." Use was made of DM 155 million during the year under review, whereby beginning in July no public funds were used for 4 months, and only in December (because of end-of-year payments) was DM 40 million needed. "As things look now, we need at worst DM 200 million in 1986, while at best we would be almost at zero, it depends on the dollar and on market conditions," Kuehn said.

The director of Saarstahl formulated a very ambitious goal: "We want to become the supplier with the lowest prices in the German steel industry for

all products." For some products this is already the case, he said. Kuehn, who sees benefits and synergistic effects from possible cooperation between Saarstahl and the Dillinger metalworks (Saarstahl produces only long products, Dillinger only flat products), has the following attitude towards the entry by steel concerns from the Ruhr into Saarstahl which is currently under discussion: "I neither have objections, nor am I particularly an advocate of a step such as this. Everyone who wants to help the company is welcome. In previous times we hardly got any response from the Ruhr to our efforts, and now things are somewhat different."

Participation by Ruhr concerns in Saarstahl would in Kuehn's opinion "at any rate lead to better organization of the steel market." Recent attempts by German steel manufacturers to arrive at an agreement on "market conformity" (meaning disciplined pricing and product resolution) were not successful. "Not everyone is going along. Everyone would like to expand his share of the market," Kuehn said. As a concrete example, talks "about one product" concerning a sales system based on the rolled steel model fell through. Since concordant conduct on the too heterogenous level of European steel cannot be restored, participation by Ruhr concerns in Saarstahl would "help in terms of market strategy."

Every conceivable solution for Saarstahl has its advantages and disadvantages, he said. Thus, Kuehn pointed out that the Dillinger metalworks, which is striving for not only the business purchase agreement for Saarstahl that has already been arranged, but also for a majority of capital in the largest Saar works, is in the end dependent on Sacilor, the French state-owned steel producer. If Saarstahl is controlled by German companies, then there will supposedly be the danger of market regulation "by force." In the coming year, Kuehn wants to "maintain price discipline." He suggested that criticism in this realm has not always been unwarranted. However, this is also true for other areas, he said.

In contrast at least to the public statements by Saarland Minister President Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), Kuehn is not of the opinion that the debt-clearing fees from the Land, the federal government, banks and IG Metall for Saarstahl can be cut back before the end of this year. He hopes for binding decisions in the course of January, in which a round-table discussion between all interested parties is planned. Should even one of the participants not "go along," Kuehn still sees "a clear risk of bankruptcy." The director of Saarstahl made it quite clear that the company expects more from Bonn than the sacrifice of surety amounting to DM 760 million, which has already been decided upon. However, the federal government has thus far firmly rejected the desire by Saarland that it also assume the approximately DM 500 million in Land surety. In this context, Kuehn would like to see emphasis put on the words "thus far."

Kuehn is convinced that after the option held by the federal and Land governments on 76 percent of the Saarstahl company stock shares was "parked" in the Saarland-controlled SIKB bank, the Luxembourg Arbed steel concern is ready to hold onto the remaining 24 percent share (at one time 100 percent) in the metalworks. Arbed is possibly even prepared to strive for a higher share than it has at present, in the course of the restructuring of the terms of

ownership at Saarstahl. Kuehn explained that "in order to make Saarstahl into an attractive bride," it is necessary that the federal and Land governments relinquish the long-term improvement bonds maintained for the surety.

The sales system between Arbed-Luxembourg and Saarstahl was recently restructured. While domestic and foreign sales of bulk steel have up to now been handled to an overwhelming extent by the Luxembourg Trade-Arbed companies, Saarstahl is now carrying out approximately 80 percent of domestic sales in bulk steel. Only bar steel and structural steel are still sold by Arbed. The export business remains in Luxembourg.

Kuehn considers the partial liberalization of the EEC steel market on 1 January 1986 "premature." It will have a detrimental effect on the market, he said, because the already tangible drop in proceeds for liberalized products could radiate out to other products. "This will result in additional risks for earnings," he said.

In Kuehn's opinion, Dillingen's business purchase agreement for Saarstahl will not interfere with the ability of Saarstahl management to function. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that several seats in this new arrangement will be filled in a personal union. By his own admission, Kuehn is looking forward to this cooperation. "That would be fun."

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

FINNISH-POLISH TRADE MORE FLEXIBLE--(FNB)--Next year, according to an announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it will be possible to make payments in connection with trade between Poland and Finland either in freely convertible Finnish markkas or U.S. dollars. The arrangement applies only to 1986. The new feature of the agreement is that besides the dollar, the markka can also be accepted now as the invoicing currency. Previously, the markka could indeed be used in submitting a quotation, but not as the invoicing currency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects the change to make the flow of trade more flexible and reduce the firms' risks in connection with foreign exchange rates. There were urgings from the Polish side to make the currency basis permanent, but Finland declined to go along with such an arrangement, since Finland shows a substantial deficit in its trade with Poland. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 85 p 7] 11798

CSO: 3650/105

ECONOMIC

GREECE

EXPORTS TO USSR PURSUED

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 Jan 86 p 9

Text A broad conference with representatives of the export sector took place yesterday at the Ministry of Commerce. The participants were briefed by officials on the results achieved in Moscow by the ministry's delegation. More specifically, the exporters were told about possibilities for expanding Greek exports to the Soviet Union, following the agreements reached last month in Moscow.

However, the exporters were warned that they must make the effort to improve competitiveness of the Greek products, while Deputy Minister of Commerce G. Katsifaras assured them that, in their effort to enter the Soviet market, they will have the full cooperation of the government. Katsifaras further stated that the ministry, in the framework of the Export Council which will convene in January, will deal favorably with the matters raised by the exporters (insurance, financing, etc.)

The meetings put special emphasis on the effort Greek exporters must make in promoting new products in the Soviet market. It should be recalled that, on the basis of the recent agreements, a new serious rise in our exports is expected in 1986, especially in the sector of light industry products.

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ECONOMIC

GREECE

EEC REGIONAL FUND TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Jan 86 p 7

/Text/ Greece will receive 25.2 billion drachmas for infrastructure projects from the EEC Regional Fund.

This represents the fifth and sixth portion which will finance the National Power Corporation projects in Ptolemais and Amyndaion, modernization of the railway line between Oinoi and Larisa, projects of social infrastructure such as the hospitals of Amfisa and Kefalonia, and projects scheduled by the Public Investment Program. Deputy Minister of National Economy P. Roumeliotis said that with the above sum the total payment from the Regional Fund to Greece in 1986 will exceed 53.5 billion drachmas. Roumeliotis added:

--The second Greek Mediterranean Comprehensive Program /MOP/ dealing with information will be submitted soon.

--The MOP-Crete will be approved by the end of April and its financing will begin in early May.

Roumeliotis underlined that certain EEC member-states expressed some objections on certain investment projects included in the MOP-Crete (expansion of the irrigation network for citrus groves) and added that "we will fight for our national positions and interests in order to implement our development targets." He also said that our country has an obligation to submit all its MOPs by the end of 1986. The total financing for the Greek MOPs will reach 268 billion drachmas.

In summing up, the deputy minister underlined that the Greek MOPs will apply to all geographic areas in the country.

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ECONOMIC

GREECE

SLIGHT DROP IN FARM INCOME REGISTERED IN 1985

Athens: I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Jan 86 p 7

(Text) The 1985 farm income in Greece and specifically the income of farmers and their families, dropped by 0.8 percent according to the EEC Statistical Service which claims that the EEC income, after marking a rise in 1984, declined again, due mainly to inclement weather conditions.

On the other hand, appropriate Greek authorities say that the income of our farmers will be affected negatively this year because of the low prices of products and price increases in production cost factors as a result of the drachma devaluation.

According to a telegram to the Athens News Agency from Brussels, the EEC Statistical Service announced that: In 1985 the income index for all persons occupied with farming within EEC marked a drop of about 8 percent compared to 1984. In 1984 this index had increased by 3 percent compared to 1983 when it declined by 6 percent compared to 1982.

In 1985, the income index dropped by 12 percent compared to 1984 when it increased 5 percent compared to 1983. In 1983, the index declined almost 10 percent compared to 1982.

An analysis by country-member of the development of the real added true value to production costs per unit of personal work) between 1985 and 1984 shows that in 1985 the drop in farm income affected all country-members except Italy (+ 3.2 percent) and Denmark (+ 1.5 percent). The decline was particularly serious in Great Britain (- 17 percent); Federated Germany (- 15 percent); Ireland (- 12.2 percent) and France (- 9 percent). This decline is below the average Community figure in Holland (- 4.4 percent) and Luxembourg (- 2.9 percent). The decline is minimal in Belgium (- 0.6 percent) and Greece (- 0.8 percent).

In most cases, the almost general decline of farm income in 1985 is a continuation of the 1984 particularly significant increases, especially in Federated Germany (+ 18.5 percent); Ireland (+ 13.6 percent); and Great Britain (+ 10 percent).

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3521/78

ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SCANDINAVIAN GAS COOPERATION SEEN NEAR REALIZATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 86 Sect III p 18

[Article by Henrik Damm]

[Text] Following the report last Friday and the purchases of stocks by Statoil and Shell in the state-owned Swedish Swedegas as well as Minister of Energy Knud Enggaard's "very understanding" attitude toward the desires on the part of DONG chairman Holger Lavesen, a gigantic, Scandinavian natural gas cooperation is on its way.

Three days before Christmas Eve in 1985, Holger Lavesen, chairman of the board of DONG, expressed the following desire in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE: "A closer Nordic cooperation within the natural gas sector." Friday afternoon it looked as if Holger Lavesen will get a delayed "Christmas package."


Minister of Energy Knud Enggaard stresses his positive attitude toward the offer on the part of the Swedish Swedegas company, and DONG is expected to be able to purchase 10 percent of the stock of the state-owned company.

Earlier in the day on Friday, Swedegas reported from Stockholm that the Norwegian Statoil and the Dutch Shell company will each acquire a stock holding equivalent to 40 percent of the now expanded capital stock. If Knud Enggaard gets the necessary, but expected, political support, the two companies will have to surrender 5 percent each, as a result of which the holding ratio will be as follows: 60 percent for Swedegas, 30 percent for Statoil and Shell International as well as 10 percent for DONG.

Already in December, Holger Lavesen told BERLINGSKE:

"We have been in contact with Statoil for the past year. A contact which remains open. In order to secure the necessary supplies and to obtain the best possible business terms, it is necessary to study all possibilities, but DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] (which includes both Shell and A.P. Møller, editor) is our most natural cooperation partner. It is only natural that the supplies for an expanded Danish and Swedish market should primarily be taken from the Danish section of the North Sea."

The Minister of Energy will now negotiate the final details of a Danish participation in Swedegas.



The graph shows the possible model for a close Scandinavian gas cooperation. The fully drawn line is the gas network now established, while the broken line shows the further expansion of the gas network in Sweden and Norway.

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CSO: 3613/60

ENERGY

DENMARK

ELECTRIC POWER IMPORTS DROP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by RB]

[Text] Electric power imports, especially from Norway, dropped to such an extent in 1985 that electric power consumers in Jutland and Funen only saved 100 million kroner in fuel costs.

Eight percent of the electric power consumption was covered by way of imports from Norway, Sweden and West Germany, as against nearly 30 percent in the years from 1981 to 1984. During the first 3 years, the savings amounted to approximately 250 billion kroner annually, in 1984, however, only to 175 billion kroner.

The sharp decline in imports last year was, to a large extent, due to weather conditions. Especially Norway sends low-cost energy to Denmark on account of years with large volumes of precipitation and a corresponding surplus production by hydroelectric power stations.

In 1985, however, the reserves were fairly low, at the same time as the demand in the Norwegian domestic market increased as a result of better business conditions, says Arne Ring Nielsen, chief of ELSAM, the Organization for Coordination of Electric Power in Jutland and Funen.

When imports of low-cost electric power from Norway were at their highest level, a few of the power stations were able to stop their entire production. Elsam, however, cautioned the power stations against basing their expansion programs on a continued favorable electric power exchange.

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CSO: 3613/60

ENERGY

GREECE

INCREASED ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION LIMITS IMPORTS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Jan 86 p 7

/Text/ Industry and Energy Minister A. Veryvakis announced yesterday that the country's 1985 energy production increased by 11.6 percent compared to 1984, while energy imports during the same period decreased by 70.9 percent. He added that the total load of the country's energy producing system increased by 2.8 percent and reached 24,669 million kilowatt hours.

Veryvakis pointed out that this favorable development in production of electrical energy is due exclusively to the large production--by 17.6 percent --of the stations using lignite as fuel following connection of the two large lignite-using units to the central system and after the Agios Dimitrios unit in Kozani started operations in the middle of 1985.

In all, seven new units were added to the central system, including the Asomaton hydroelectric unit and two units of the Sfikia hydroelectric station. Capacity of the seven units is 1,228 mw and the total capacity of all installed units is 22 percent.

The minister also said that by early 1987 the Agios Dimitrios 4th unit (using lignite and having a capacity of 310 mw), the two units of the Amyndaios lignite station (total capacity: 600 mw), and the 3rd unit of the Sfikia hydroelectric station will be connected to the central system.

Participation of the Public Power Corporation's lignite-using units represent 66 percent of the total load (compared to 57.7 percent in 1984, while that of oil-using stations marked a decline and represents 19.7 percent of the total.

The energy production of the hydroelectric stations also showed a slight decline--it reached 11.3 percent of the total. The 1985 imports of electric energy represent 3 percent of the total load compared to 10.6 percent in 1984.

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